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Abstract
“To organize the sovereign people”: Political Mobilization in Pennsylvania, 1783-1808
By
David W. Houpt
Adviser: Andrew W. Robertson
Political mobilization is the connective tissue between the people and their government. Whether
through petitions, voting, parades or even riots, it is the tool political actors use to engage in the
deliberative process. Scholars have explored a variety of facets of the political culture of the early
American republic and have noted the importance of certain forms of political mobilization such as
parades and fêtes. These studies have not, however, fully explained how elections emerged as the
primary means for citizens to express their will and the boundaries of political expression changed
accordingly. This dissertation explains the evolution of Americans’ engagement with their government
by charting the trajectory of different forms of political mobilization in early national Pennsylvania. By
focusing on the ways in which Americans organized and participated in the political process, this project
presents a new way of thinking about democracy in the early republic and shows that, while citizens lost
the ability to engage directly in the deliberative process, the rise of political parties and their emphasis
on elections offered the public an effective means of securing change.
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Introduction
In the decades following the adoption of the Declaration of Independence, Americans
struggled to define the meaning of the Revolution and to balance establishing a new nation with
a desire to remain faithful to the ideals of liberty and equality that had inspired their rebellion.
Historians have analyzed different facets of this battle over the extent and legacy of the
Revolution and have provided important insights into how Americans reached a Revolutionary
settlement. The existing scholarship has not, however, sufficiently explained how elections
emerged as the primary means for citizens to express their will and how the boundaries of
political expression changed accordingly. This presents a new way of understanding the
evolution of Americans’ engagement with their government in the early republic through
analysis of different forms of political mobilization in early national Pennsylvania.
Political mobilization is the connective tissue between the people and their government.
Whether in the form of a vote, a petition, a rally, or even a riot, it is the tool actors use to engage
in the deliberative process.1 By focusing on the ways in which Americans organized and
participated in the political process in first twenty-five years following the end of the
Revolutionary War, this analysis presents a new way of thinking about democracy in the early
republic and shows that the early republic is not a simple story of declension. While citizens in
the decades following the Revolution did, indeed, lose the ability to engage directly in the
deliberative process, the rise of political parties and their emphasis on elections offered the
1

I define the deliberative process as the back-and-forth process of creating and implementing laws and policy that
occurs between citizens and/or members of the government. For a good overview of the literature on the deliberative
process, see chapter 1 of Sandra M. Gustafson, Imagining Deliberative Democracy in the Early American Republic
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). See, also, James Bohman and William Rehg, eds. Deliberative
Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).
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public an effective means of securing change when other approaches failed. Thus, it
demonstrates that the emergence of parties did translate into the “rise of American democracy,”
albeit a different kind of democracy than had flourished in the 1770s and 1780s.
At its core, the American Revolution was a movement to provide people with a greater
voice in their government. Frustrated by the lack of representation in Parliament and upset with
increases in taxation, American colonists rebelled against the British monarchy and established a
new government based on the principles of liberty and equality. Initially, Americans were flush
with idealism and harbored a lingering fear of centralized power, a combination that led them to
embrace a democratic form of government that empowered citizens to engage directly in the
deliberative process through town meetings, instructions to representatives, and frequent
elections. But within a matter of years, some Americans, particularly the wealthy, concluded that
the Revolution had gravitated too far toward democracy, and these individuals pushed for
reforms that would strengthen the national government and insulate it from the whims of public
opinion. Nationalists and supporters of the new central government, who called themselves
Federalists, concluded that the people held too much power. The nation, they believed, needed a
select group of wealthy and educated men at the helm. While Federalists did not endorse a return
to a monarchy or an aristocracy, they did seek to limit the participation of average citizens in the
deliberative process and favored a deferential culture. These same men, however, understood the
importance of public opinion and utilized different forms of popular politics to build support for
their cause. Their effort eventually led to the adoption of a new federal constitution in 1788 and a
state constitution in 1790 that placed new boundaries on the deliberative process.
In the first few years following the ratification of the Constitution, Federalists succeeded
in winning the support of most voters and controlled all three branches of government, but
2

controversial policies such as Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton’s Fiscal Plan and
the establishment of a “Republican Court” helped foster a growing opposition movement. By the
mid-1790s, an opposition party, the Republicans, started to coalesce. Members of this fledgling
party supported an active citizenry and argued that the people must remain involved in the
deliberative process to prevent corruption. Republicans focused initially on politics out of doors
and relied on symbolism from the French and American Revolutions to demonstrate popular
support and rally supporters. Additionally, they used town meetings to engage citizens in the
deliberative process. A series of popular uprisings that culminated in the Whiskey Rebellion in
1794, along with the lack of influence over important policy decisions, however, forced
Republicans to recognize that Federalists had succeeded in building a government insulated from
these forms of political mobilization. In order to remain relative, they needed to reconsider their
strategy.
Following the ratification of the Jay Treaty in 1796, which they had done everything in
their power to prevent, Republicans began to alter their approach toward political mobilization
and to focus more on elections and building a statewide network of committees that could
oversee and coordinate party activities. Federalists, meanwhile, seized on the threat of war with
France to discredit their political rivals. They passed a series of controversial laws that
empowered the president to deport any immigrant deemed a threat, criminalized criticism of the
federal government, and dramatically increased the nation’s armed forces. Republicans viewed
these laws as unconstitutional and, in addition to their electioneering efforts, experimented with
the concept of popular nullification. The outbreak of Fries’s Rebellion in 1798 and 1799 and fear
of being tarred with fomenting a rebellion, however, forced Republicans to commit to working
through the constitutional system to secure change. The new strategy reflected a retreat from
3

Republicans’ earlier commitment to engaging the public in the deliberative process, but the
electoral victories of Thomas McKean in 1799 and Thomas Jefferson 1800 appeared to justify
the concessions.
Republicans’ success at the polls, however, exposed underlying disagreements that had
been masked behind a shared opposition to the Federalists. Pennsylvania Republicans had agreed
on the best forms of political mobilization to challenge the Federalists and induce change, but
once in power, members of the party disagreed over what reforms to pursue. Moderates claimed
that the election of new men had been the party’s main goal and that the public could relax and
defer to their elected officials now that Republicans were in office. With the threat of monarchy
and aristocracy vanquished, these men believed, the time had come to move beyond the bitter
partisanship of the 1790s. In contrast to this position, other members of the original Republican
coalition argued that the elections had only been one step toward the goal of creating a more
democratic society. They called for significant reforms that would make the government more
responsible to the will of the people and sought a greater voice in the deliberative process for the
public. By 1803 the groups split into warring factions. Those who believed the ingredients
necessary for a healthy and successful republic were in place became known as Quids, while
those who pushed for further reforms adopted the name Democrats. Between 1803 and 1808, the
two sides battled for control and legitimacy, but ultimately neither side could claim victory, and
they reconciled in 1808. The reunification established that political parties would serve as an
intermediary body between the public and their government and that elections would serve as the
primary vehicle for the expression of the public will.

4

As Douglas Bradburn has shown, states established the definition and boundaries of
citizenship in the early republic.2 To understand the evolution of political mobilization and the
relationship between the public and the deliberative process it is necessary to begin at the state
level. Pennsylvania was at the forefront of early national political culture, and changes in how
citizens of the Keystone State approached political mobilization foreshadowed developments in
other parts of the nation. Historians have described the state in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries as an economic and social microcosm of the infant United States.3 In that
period, Pennsylvania had developed rural and urban regions and was home to diverse ethnic
groups and religious sects. Additionally, Philadelphia served as the seat of the federal
government between 1790 and 1800, and local and national politics were deeply intertwined. In
conjunction with the state’s unique history of partisanship, the presence of the federal
government in Pennsylvania contributed to the development of robust political parties earlier
than in other parts of the nation. Finally, the state witnessed two major rural uprisings during the
1790s that forced Pennsylvanians to define the limits of acceptable political action and to clearly
articulate the differences between legitimate popular politics and illegitimate popular violence.
Scholars who have explored the political debates during this time period tend to reach
one of two conclusions: either that the defeat of the Federalists and rise of Jefferson signified a
triumph of democracy over the forces of monarchy and aristocracy or that the federal
Constitution and emergence of political parties was a retreat from a genuinely democratic

2

Douglass Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution: Politics and the Creation of the American Union, 1774-1804
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009).
3
See, for example, Harry M. Tinkcom, The Republicans and Federalists of Pennsylvania, 1790-1801: A Study in
National Stimulus and Local Response (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1950).
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moment. A comparison between how historians Sean Wilentz and Seth Cotlar approach the story
of democracy in the early republic illustrates this divide.
In The Rise of American Democracy, Wilentz portrays the early republic as a slow, but
linear, march towards greater democracy and freedom. He contends that the Democratic Party
(his term for those who opposed the Federalists), along with farmers and urban workers, paved
the way for the spread of democracy in America. Despite the public’s deeply engrained
monarchical and hierarchical tendencies, the Democrats used grassroots organization and
advancements in electioneering to establish “the political equality of the mass of American
citizens” and dislodge the Federalists from power.4 Overall, Wilentz sees the rise of political
parties as a positive development that helped engage more Americans in the political process.
By contrast, in Tom Paine’s America Cotlar portrays the emergence of the Jeffersonian
coalition as a clear defeat for the forces of democracy. Cotlar’s study focuses on the dynamic
between Jeffersonian democrats and a network of radical democrats who were part of a
transatlantic network of activists who fought for greater equality. These democrats wanted to
make government more accountable to the people; they styled themselves citizens of the world
and sought to eliminate national borders. They called for an end to slavery and a more equal
distribution of wealth. According to Cotlar, the Jeffersonian Republicans defined themselves as
much through their rejection of these democrats as they did through their repudiation of the
Federalists. By dismissing the radical democrats as too extreme, the Republicans managed to
appear more moderate. They compromised on issues including anti-slavery and economic
inequality in order to build a broader coalition. These moves, Cotlar argues, facilitated the

4

Sean Wilentz, The Rise in American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), 138.
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emergence of the Republican Party and destroyed the opportunity to create a truly democratic
society.5 Thus while Wilentz sees the early republic as a story of democratization, Cotlar sees it
as an era marked by declension.
Both the democratization and the declension models contain important insight into the
nature of politics in the early republic. Using political mobilization as an analytical framework,
however, provides a way to move beyond this dichotomy and achieve a more nuanced
understanding of this era. This dissertation demonstrates that both of the earlier models are, in
some ways, correct. It agrees with historians, including Barbara Clark Smith who contend that
the opportunities for ordinary Americans to engage directly in the deliberative process
diminished following the end of the Revolutionary War.6 Contrary to Cotlar’s conclusions,
however, this analysis shows that political parties enabled citizens to effect change where other
methods had failed and gave them the opportunity to exercise greater control over the
deliberative process.
Scholars have explored different forms of political mobilization, but have tended to focus
on only one method. As a result, they have missed important connections and broader
developments. David Waldstreicher and Simon Newman for example, have explored celebratory
politics. In his book In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes, Waldstreicher analyzes the relationship
between rituals of celebration and an emerging sense of nationalism in the early republic. He
argues that parades, festivals, and speeches, along with the printed accounts of these events,
“made it possible for large numbers of people—men and women—to practice nationalism and

Seth Cotlar, Tom Paine’s America: The Rise and Fall of Transatlantic Radicalism (Charlottesville: University of
Virginia Press, 2011).
6
Barbara Clark Smith, The Freedoms We Lost: Consent and Resistance in Revolutionary America (New York: New
Press, 2010).
5
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local politics simultaneously.” Waldstreicher also demonstrates that Federalists and Republicans
adopted dueling styles of celebrations. In what Waldstreicher describes as “antiparty
partisanship” both sides claimed to speak for the nation and rejected their opponents as
illegitimate. Notably he finds that following the election of 1800, “Republicans pioneered
election-oriented festivals that helped legitimate key innovations in local political organizing.”
This process helped Republicans win elections but came at the expense of “narrowing the
political.”7
Simon Newman’s Parades and the Politics of the Street similarly focuses on politics out
of doors and argues that festivals, parades, and celebrations “constituted a vital part of the
political lives of ordinary Americans in the era of the first political party system.” These
activities provided ordinary Americans with the opportunity to engage in the political process.
Newman, like Waldstreicher, emphasizes that culture and print culture “went hand-in-hand” and
that printed accounts of these gatherings dramatically enlarged their audiences. More so than
Waldstreicher, however, Newman emphasizes that the first political parties and celebratory
politics were intertwined. While the Democratic-Republicans proved more comfortable with
popular politics, he finds, “they were constantly seeking to limit or prohibit the participation . . .
of women and Black Americans.” Celebratory politics became at once inclusive and
exclusionary. By appropriating the radical symbolism and rhetoric of the Revolution,
Democratic-Republicans managed to legitimize this process and ultimately seize control of the
public sphere.8

7

David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1800 (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 13
8
Simon P. Newman, Parades and Politics of the Street: Festive Culture in the Early American Republic
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), 4, 3, 190.
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These works have uncovered a rich part of the political culture of the early republic. By
factoring the study of celebratory politics into the study of the rise of democracy in this country,
Newman and Waldstreicher have enhanced our understanding of the first political parties and
opened the door to study of other styles of political mobilization. As a result of their work, it is
now possible to expand the focus to include larger developments and relationships between
different forms of mobilization beyond parades, songs and festivals. Analysis of the full fabric of
political mobilization in the early republic shows that, while the rise of the Republican Party
coincided with a shrinking role in the deliberative process, partisan organization offered a
significant gain.
Other historians have contributed to the understanding of political mobilization in this
time period but, again, their studies focus on specific forms of mobilization rather than on the
interplay between differing approaches. In Taming Democracy Terry Bouton looks at the various
forms of popular uprisings and crowd action Pennsylvanians used in the decades following the
American Revolution. More so than either Waldstreicher or Newman, Bouton finds that “most
ordinary white men were disappointed by the version of democracy that emerged from the
Revolution.” Bouton claims that the Revolution “expanded the definition of democracy” and
empowered ordinary Americans to take part in the deliberative process. Pennsylvanians became
convinced that for the republic to survive, a greater distribution of wealth was needed. During
the 1780s and 1790s, however, the elites in Pennsylvania waged a “counterrevolution.” Common
Pennsylvanians fought back. When formal political channels failed, these men turned to “civil
disobedience, extralegal protest, and ultimately collective violence.” The gentry eventually
crushed the opposition and instituted a new version of democracy that ignored glaring
inequalities of wealth and power. Bouton’s analysis elucidates the tactics and strategies ordinary
9

Pennsylvanians used to protect their vision of democracy. He demonstrates that, in the years
immediately following the Declaration of Independence, many Pennsylvanians favored an
expansive version of democracy that was not realized. There is no doubt that the Revolution did
not go as far as some men had hoped, but political parties enabled small farmers and rural
residents to effect change where popular uprisings had failed.9
Todd Estes’s The Jay Treaty Debate, Public Opinion, and the Evolution of Early
American Political Culture explores the different ways Federalists and Republicans mobilized
their supporters during the battle over the Jay Treaty. Estes shows that “while Federalists were
often ideologically elitist, they were also operationally democratic.” In fact, Estes finds that
Federalists were skilled at using town meetings and petitions as a way to influence public
opinion. Like other scholars of the political culture of the early republic, Estes identifies the Jay
Treaty debates as a key turning point the nation’s political culture. Both Republicans and
Federalists claimed to have public opinion on their side and engaged in different forms of
popular politics including town meetings, print propaganda, and petitioning to rally support and
demonstrate that they spoke for the majority. Estes concludes that while the Federalists won the
battle, the Jay Treaty debates helped undermine the hierarchical and deferential society
Federalists favored and, therefore, eventually contributed to their demise. This dissertation
agrees with many of Estes’s findings, particularly that the Federalists were skilled political
organizers who engaged in popular politics despite their elitist outlook. Estes, however, argues
that political parties formed from the top-down, and he does not take into account the existence
of state parties that formed at the same time as the national organizations. Additionally, while

Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: “The People,” the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American
Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 4, 6.
9
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Estes notes that the debates surrounding the Jay Treaty contributed to the democratization of the
nation’s politics, the most immediate consequence of the debates is that Republicans began to
focus more on elections and party-building. Their inability to stop ratification clearly
demonstrated that, in order to exert influence over the government, Republicans would need to
start winning elections.10
In “Let a Common Interest Bind us Together”: Associations, Partisanship, and Culture
in Philadelphia, 1775-1840 Albrecht Koschnik investigates the role of voluntary societies in
early national Philadelphia. During the 1770s and 1780s, most voluntary societies strove to
remain apolitical and remain above any particular political disputes. The Democratic and
Republican Societies broke this model and engaged directly in political debates. Moreover,
unlike previous organizations, the Democratic and Republican Societies claimed to speak for the
people writ large, and not just their members. Federalists viewed the societies as a threat and
tarred them as “self-created” and subversive. Following the decline of the Democratic Societies,
Republicans turned to older forms of association that made no attempt to speak for the people
writ large. Federalists, meanwhile, relied on the volunteer militia. Republicans initially rejected
the partisan militia as dangerous but eventually organized their own companies. In the final
chapters of his book, Koschnik looks at Federalists’ retreat into civic and cultural organizations
following their defeats at the polls. “To organize the sovereign people” builds on Koschnik’s
findings and places the shifting views and uses of associations within the broader context of
evolving forms of political mobilization and changing attitudes toward the role of citizens in the
deliberative process. Republicans’ decision to organize a volunteer militia was, for example, part

10

Todd Estes, The Jay Treaty Debate, Public Opinion and the Evolution of Early American Political Culture
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2008), 9.
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of their shift toward party-building and electioneering. It also helped them reaffirm their
patriotism and legitimize their oppositional politics in general.11
Print culture played an important part in the shifting styles of political mobilization in the
early republic and is important to understanding how the public engaged in the deliberative
process. In “The Tyranny of Printers” historian Jeffrey Pasley demonstrates that newspapers and
newspaper editors played a critical role in the formation of parties. “[T]he newspaper press,” he
argues, “was the political system’s central institution, not simply a forum or atmosphere in which
politics took place. Instead, newspapers and their editors were purposeful actors in the political
process, linking parties, voters and the government together, and pursuing specific political
goals.” Newspaper editors often doubled as political organizers and used their papers to rally
support and establish networks of like-minded men. Pasley contends that partisan editors became
the nation’s first group of professional politicians. According to Pasley, Pennsylvania stood at
the forefront of the partisan print network. The Philadelphia editors John Fenno, Benjamin
Franklin Bache, William Duane and William Cobbett wielded enormous influence. Indeed, fear
of the power of the Republican press led Federalists to adopt the Sedition Act in an attempt to
stifle the chorus of criticism. As Pasley shows, however, the Sedition Act backfired and led to a
dramatic increase in the number of Republican newspapers nationwide. This dissertation agrees
with Pasley’s findings and provides further detail on the role of partisan editors and on the
relationship between political mobilization and print culture.12

Albrecht Koschnik, “Let a Common Interest Bind Us Together”: Association in Philadelphia, 1775-1840
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007)
12
Jeff Pasley, “The Tyranny of Printers: Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic” (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2001), 3.
11
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The rhetoric politicians and journalists use is a form of political mobilization itself. As
Andrew Robertson argues in The Language of Democracy, “Rhetoric, acting as a mobilizing
instrument, played an indispensable role in the development of participatory political culture.”
Robertson finds that political rhetoric changed dramatically in the 1790s. With the electorate
growing and changing, political journalists and politicians needed to reach and influence a wider
audience. In the last decades of the eighteenth century, rhetorical styles shifted from a traditional
style that relied on reason and logic to a more emotional form of rhetoric. Robertson
characterizes the classic style as “demonstrative” or “laudatory” and the new style as “hortatory.”
Hortatory rhetoric was more accessible to the public, and Robertson argues that it helped pave
the way to further democratization of politics.13
In Scandal and Civility, Marcus Daniel reaches similar conclusions. Daniel argues that
the editors of the 1790s “broke sharply with the ideals of republican print culture” that called for
editors to keep their personality and personal beliefs out of the papers. Traditional republican
wisdom held that “editors were to be neither heard nor seen” and that their papers should be
impartial vehicles for information. The Revolution challenged and weakened this ideal, but the
idea of unbiased editor did not fully collapse until the 1790s. Daniel places Philadelphia editors
at the center of this transition. For example, editor William Cobbett, the acerbic English émigré
and rabid Federalist, disregarded the theory of impartiality and filled his pages with his own
views. As part of the breakdown of the republican ideal, the boundaries between private and
public blurred and Cobbett, like most of his Republican counterparts, reveled in character
assassination. The political debates between Federalists and Republicans, however, cannot be

13

Andrew W. Robertson, The Language of Democracy: Political Rhetoric in the United States and Great Britain,
1790-1900 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995), 7.
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reduced to personal rivalries or issues of character alone, and Daniel argues that real policy
differences lay at the heart of the partisanship.14
This dissertation develops the findings of Robertson and Daniel and shows how the
transition to a new style of rhetoric occurred at the same time that partisans shifted away from
attempts to engage the public directly in the deliberative process. The goal of hortatory rhetoric
and personal attacks is not to inform the reader of facts and enable him to reach their own
conclusions; it is to convince the reader of a position and inspire him to support party activities.
Pennsylvania Federalists, who believed the public’s engagement with the deliberative process
should be limited to election day, adopted hortatory rhetoric first, and Republicans only followed
after their decision to focus more on elections and electioneering.
Although it does not explicitly cover political mobilization, Andrew Shankman’s
Crucible of American Democracy is a valuable study of the debates over the meaning of
democracy in early national Pennsylvania and has informed this dissertation. Shankman argues
that in Pennsylvania, Jeffersonian Republicans agreed “that the state and the nation both needed
to be democracies.” Members of the coalition disagreed, however, “about how it was best
structured, what it was supposed to do, and in which ways the fundamental principles of a
democratic people intersected with the daily fluctuating needs and desires of temporary
majorities of that people.” Following Jefferson’s victory, these disagreements over the scope and
meaning of democracy fractured the Republican coalition. According to Shankman, the “crucible
of conflict” between Quids, who believed the ingredients for a healthy democracy existed, and
Democrats who, favored reforms to create a more equal society, forced the two sides to better

14

Marcus Daniel, Scandal & Civility: Journalism and the Birth of American Democracy (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2009).

14

articulate and defend their versions of democracy. These debates eventually forged a new
concept of democracy that was compatible with capitalism. “To organize the sovereign people”
complements Shankman’s findings and shows how the clashing theories of democracy led Quids
and Democrats to adopt different styles and methods of political mobilization. This dissertation
also shows that, in addition to creating a new version of democracy, the battles between Quids
and Democrats and subsequent reunification in 1808 with the election of Simon Snyder as
governor sealed the existence of political parties as an intermediary between the public and the
deliberative process.15
Recent scholarship on the early American republic has expanded in scope and considers
how global currents shaped the young nation. Two important themes emerge in these studies: the
effect of the French Revolution and the role of immigrants. Historians have long recognized the
importance of the French Revolution in America. Political historians writing during the 1960s
and 1970s emphasized the disputes over policies including Washington’s Neutrality
Proclamation and the Jay Treaty to demonstrate that the French Revolution drove political
debates in America. More recent studies have explored how the French Revolution influenced
political culture in America.16 Newman and Waldstreicher, for instance, both show that the
Republican coalition drew on symbolism and rhetoric from Revolutionary France. In The Reign
of Terror in America, Rachel Hope Cleves demonstrates the potency of anti-Jacobinism during
the early republic and argues that the violence of the French Revolution infused American

15

Andrew Shankman, Crucible of American Democracy: The Struggle to Fuse Egalitarianism and Capitalism in
Jeffersonian Pennsylvania (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2004), 2.
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The classic study of policy is Jerald A. Combs, The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers,
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970). For the cultural perspective see, for example, Susan Branson These
Fiery Frenchified Dames: Women and Political Culture in Early National Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2001) and Matthew Rainbow Hale, The French Revolution and the Forging of American
Democracy (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, forthcoming).
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rhetoric of the time.17 While these are important findings in and of themselves, the focus on
political mobilization provides another perspective on the effects of the French Revolution in
America. For example, this dissertation finds that while Waldstreicher and Newman are correct
that Republicans initially linked themselves with the French Revolution, attitudes changed as
Republicans shifted their attention to party building and elections. The carnage of the French
Revolution served as a powerful reminder for Republicans of the dangers of mobs and
unchecked democracy and contributed to the move away from certain forms of popular politics.
This shift is reflected in Republican symbolism as well as slogans including “principles not men”
faded and party leaders urged their followers to stop donning the tri-colored cockade.
In addition to the French Revolution, the massive influx of immigrants following the end
of the Revolutionary War had a profound effect on America. As Michael Durey shows in
Transatlantic Radicals, the American Revolution led to a “radical diaspora” where hundreds of
democrats flooded into America in search of greater liberty. The reality of immigrant life in
America, however, rarely lived up to expectations. Many new arrivals felt they needed to fight
for their dreams and leaped into the seething caldron of American politics. A large number of
these immigrants arrived in Philadelphia and, while some drifted to other parts of the country,
many chose to remain in Pennsylvania. A high proportion of them were Irishmen seeking refuge
following a failed uprising. Maurice Bric’s Ireland, Philadelphia, and the Re-Invention of
America, 1760-1800 and David Wilson’s United Irishmen, United States show that these Irish
immigrants wielded enormous political power and influence in the early republic. These works
are, however, primarily focused on how immigrants shaped political thought in America and not
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on strategies of political mobilization. Immigrants including Joseph Priestley, Mathew Carey,
and James Thomas Callender were veteran political organizers by the time they arrived in
America. They had experience mobilizing crowds and crafting propaganda and they applied this
knowledge in their new home. Factoring the activities of these immigrants into the context of
larger trends in political mobilization provides a new perspective on how immigrants shaped
early national political culture.18
Identification of the Federalists and Republicans as political parties is not intended to
indicate a belief that formalized parties existed in the 1790s, and this dissertation makes no
attempt to prove or disprove the existence of a “first party system.” Instead, “To organize the
sovereign people” demonstrates how elections emerged as the primary vehicle for the expression
of the public will. My treatment of political parties draws on Jeffrey Pasley’s recent work The
First Presidential Contest. Like Pasley, I find that “’Federalist’ and ‘Republican’ were deeply
meaningful and highly coherent categories for the politicians and citizens of the 1790s.” These
terms, however, did not refer to formalized institutional organizations. Parties in the early
republic were, as Pasley writes, “intense communities of political ideology, emotion, and action
that took form among politicians, political writers, and their audiences.” These communities
formed from the top-down, bottom-up and middle-out, and focusing on political mobilization
enables this dissertation to consider both national leaders and grassroots activists as well as to
explore the dynamic between the two. It also helps shed light on the activities of the mid-level
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organizers who served as the connection between leaders in Philadelphia and citizens across the
state.19
In approaching political parties in the early republic, this study bridges the gap between
the “new political historians” and the “new new political historians.” The “new political
historians,” who emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as a reaction to traditional political history
approaches that focused on elites, relied heavily on quantitative data and focused on political
parties and voting. New political historians who studied Pennsylvania include Ronald Baumann,
Richard Miller, and Harry Tinkcom.20 These scholars have provided a comprehensive overview
of the socioeconomic conditions that led to the growth of parties and used election returns to map
general information about voting patterns. The “new new political historians,” who gained
prominence during the 1990s and 2000s, concentrated on culture and drew from anthropology.
Many of the historians who have studied forms of political mobilization including Waldstreicher,
Newman, and Koschnik fall into this category.21 The “new new political historians” have
expanded our knowledge of the early republic and provided insight into the era’s political
culture. Little hybridization, however, between the methodologies of the new political historians
and the new new political historians has occurred. By considering both the cultural and the
institutional perspectives and by relying on qualitative and quantitative evidence, this study
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connects politics indoors with politics out-of-doors and provides a methodological foundation for
future studies of the early republic.
Chapters one through four of this dissertation explore specific forms of political
mobilization between 1783 and 1800; the final chapter looks at political mobilization more
generally from 1801 to 1808 during the schism in the Republican Party. The first chapter
examines town meetings and petitioning. During the Revolution and early 1780s, town meetings
in Pennsylvania functioned as quasi-legal bodies that dealt with issues including price control
and what to do with Loyalists. These gatherings, which also issued instructions to elected
officials, gave the general public the opportunity to engage directly in the deliberative process.
The adoption of the Federal Constitution marked a shift away from this style of town meetings as
Federalists sought to place new boundaries on the deliberative process. In place of the
deliberative meetings, Federalists began staging public meetings as way for citizens to offer their
support for the new federal government. The emerging Republican opposition, however,
continued to try to use meetings as a way to engage the citizenry. The culmination of these
Republican efforts came during the Jay Treaty debates when these men organized a massive
town meeting in an effort to convince Washington to reject the terms of the proposed treaty.
Their efforts failed, and Washington signed the treaty. When Republicans tried to stop the treaty
in the House of Representatives, Federalists organized a wide-scale petition drive that forced
even some leading Republicans to relinquish their efforts. Following these political setbacks,
Republicans abandoned public meetings as a forum for engaging the public in the deliberative
process and adopted the more deferential petition as the preferred instrument. The shift in
strategy became clear during the opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts, when Republicans
avoided large public meetings and focused their energy on signature collections.
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Chapter two focuses on celebratory politics and voluntary societies. In the years
immediately following the end of the Revolutionary War, Pennsylvanians lacked a coherent or
uniform approach to celebrating holidays. Residents made a few lackluster attempts to honor
events including the formal end of the war with Great Britain and the Fourth of July, but by the
mid-1780s even these efforts started to fade. Federalists and supporters of the new Federal
Constitution were the first group to seize on the power of ritual and symbolism. Federalists, often
operating through the Society of the Cincinnati and voluntary militia companies, utilized public
celebrations as a way for citizens to symbolically consent to the new government. The adoption
of monarchical customs and establishment of a Republican Court helped reinforce Federalists’
concept of a hierarchical/deferential culture. The Republican opposition viewed these
developments as a dangerous step toward aristocracy and began creating their own countercelebratory politics. Instead of honoring the nation and the Constitution, Republicans embraced
symbolism from the French and American Revolutions. With the help of newly organized
voluntary societies including the Democratic and Republican Societies, the Federalists’
opponents staged competing holiday celebrations. Both sides claimed to the true heirs to the
Revolution and denounced their adversaries as traitors and a threat to the republic.
Approaches to celebratory politics did not remain static. Republicans, in particular, began
changing their strategy in the latter part of the 1790s. Among other factors, the Whiskey
Rebellion, decline of the Democratic and Republican Societies, and declining relationship with
France led Republicans to adopt different styles of celebration and new symbolism. They
abandoned symbolism associated with Revolutionary France and toasted party leaders Jefferson
and Thomas McKean instead of the abstract principles of liberty and equality. Additionally, as
part of an effort to prove their commitment to law and order, Republicans organized voluntary
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militia units, which Federalists had been using as a form of political mobilization for years. By
the end of the decade, Republicans had established a new form of celebratory politics that
emphasized participation in the party and elections as the primary vehicle for change
Chapter three covers popular uprisings, riots and rebellions. Colonial Pennsylvanians had
accepted small-scale riots as a part of life. Communities accepted the right to use violence, often
ritualized, as a way to police the boundaries of acceptable behavior. The bloodshed of the
Revolution further solidified this right in the minds of some individuals. As part of their
commitment to engaging directly in the deliberative process, Pennsylvanians in the early 1780s
shut down court houses and harassed tax and debt collectors on a regular basis. These protesters
saw the taxes as unjust, and after failing to secure redress from the legislature, they believed it
was well within their rights to enforce the will of the community. In the mid-1780s, supporters of
the Constitution identified the inability to collect tax revenue as a significant problem and as
evidence that the country and state needed stronger governments. The adoption of new
Constitutions did not, however, immediately lead to a decline in popular violence. Western
Pennsylvanian communities in particular continued to use ritualized violence and threats to
impede tax collection and to punish those who transgressed community norms. Federalists
denounced these acts of violence and urged the federal government to respond. Republicans,
meanwhile, walked a fine-line between expressing sympathy for the westerners’ grievances and
not openly condoning the extra-legal actions.
The outbreak of the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794, however, forced Republicans to take a
firm stance on popular uprisings and violence as a form of political mobilization. Federalists
seized on the violence as proof that their political adversaries posed a threat to the republic and
argued that Republican criticism of the government had inspired the westerners to take up arms.
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In response, Republicans denounced the violence in the west and affirmed their allegiance to
seeking change through the constitutional system. Many Republicans even joined the army that
marched west to suppress the uprising. In short, the Whiskey Rebellion provided Republicans
with an opportunity to draw a clear distinction between their legitimate opposition to the
Federalists and the rebels’ treasonous attacks on the entire federal government.
Political violence of a different sort raged in the latter half of the 1790s. Young
Federalists often attacked their Republican opponents in an effort to punish and silence
Republican criticism. The aggressors justified the violence by claiming that Republicans were
enemies of the country and outside the body politic. Republicans, meanwhile, had not entirely
embraced the Federalist theory that citizens could only exercise their sovereignty at the ballot
box. Thus, when Federalists gained majorities in the House and Senate and passed legislation
calling for the creation of an army funded by new taxes as well as the adoption of the Alien and
Sedition Acts, Republicans turned to the concept of popular nullification, the idea that citizens
could declare a law unconstitutional. Fries’ Rebellion, however, forced Republicans to retreat
from this strategy. Now committed to working through elections, Republicans focused on
creating a party structure that could harness and channel the popular outrage with the Federalists
into constructive action.
Chapter four covers elections and electioneering. Despite the fact that most
Pennsylvanians agreed with republican theorists that political parties posed a threat to a republic,
party competition raged throughout the early republic. Following the Revolution, the state
divided into two loosely organized factions. Constitutionalists supported the state’s 1776
constitution, a radical government that gave the public significant power over the deliberative
process. Republicans opposed the constitution. Both groups engaged in some electioneering, but
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neither group built any effective organization or attempted to coordinate efforts with other parts
of the state in any meaningful fashion. Supporters of the Federal Constitution demonstrated the
potential power of a structured and disciplined campaign. By manipulating the election laws,
flooding the state with propaganda, and identifying and targeting key religious groups,
Federalists managed to overwhelm the state’s Antifederalists and secure a quick ratification.
Then they dominated the first elections. Although supporters of a strong national government
managed to maintain majorities in the state legislature and the congressional delegation
throughout the early 1790s, the defeat of their gubernatorial candidate in 1790 signaled that their
control could not be taken for granted. Initial efforts to establish an organized opposition party,
however, proved only marginally successful. Republicans did not begin to organize in earnest
until after the ratification of the Jay Treaty. The failure of town meetings and public rallies to
sway elected officials underscored the need to challenge Federalists at the polls and not just in
the streets.
Republicans entered the election of 1796 enthusiastic and committed to establishing a
foothold at both the state and national levels. The first contested presidential election, this event
gave Republicans and Federalists throughout Pennsylvania a cause to rally around. Although
some men, particularly the wealthy and elite, remained uncomfortable with the establishment of
a political party and few would openly call themselves a party, Republicans began constructing a
multi-level party organization designed to identify and mobilize potential voters. The party grew
from both the top-down and bottom-up, with leaders in Philadelphia directing lieutenants in other
parts of the state and grassroots activists taking the initiative to establish party committees.
Participation in the party structure gave citizens an opportunity to voice their opinion and work
to effect change in a non-threatening and non-violent way. Pennsylvania Federalists were slow to
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respond to the new Republican organization, and when they did focus on party building, they did
so in a top-down manner with a Federalist in Philadelphia appointing local delegates. The full
impact of the Republican organization became apparent during the election of 1799 as
Pennsylvanians turned out in record numbers to vote for Thomas McKean as governor. The new
strategy, it appeared, had succeeded in toppling the Federalists.
The debates over the role of citizens and legitimate forms of political mobilization did
not, however, end with Republicans’ electoral victories, and chapter five explores the schism in
the Pennsylvania Republican Party following the elections of Jefferson and Thomas McKean.
Shortly after Jefferson took office, the Party split into two factions. Quids, hoped to move past
partisanship and accepted that citizens could only participate in the deliberative process through
voting, and agreed that individuals should defer to their election officials. Democrats saw
Federalists as enemies and wanted to increase the public’s influence over the deliberative
process. These contrasting visions for the future led Quids and Democrats to adopt different
strategies of political mobilization, and the two sides fought for control of the state. Both sides
suffered during these clashes. Quids lost legitimacy when they publically aligned with
Federalists, and Democrats suffered from internal divisions. In the end, neither side could claim
victory and the factions reunited to elect Simon Snyder as governor.
The reunification of the Republican Party did not signify an end to all political
differences among party members. It did, however, mark the end of the debate over the role of
citizens in the deliberative process. Quids accepted political parties as a necessary, if not always
positive, part of American political culture and Democrats retreated from their campaign to make
government more responsive to the will of the people. In Pennsylvania, democracy would be
defined as participation in a political party and the casting of a ballot.
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And now the town was summon’d greeting,
To grand parading of town-meeting;
A show, that strangers might appall.
As Rome’s grave senate did the Gaul. P. 7
John Trumbull-- “McFingal: A Modern Epic Poem or, The Town-Meeting”
(Philadelphia, 1776)

Chapter 1: Petitions and Town Meetings

Public meetings are one of the most basic forms of political mobilization. A staple of
colonial and early national political culture, Pennsylvanians organized town meetings for a
variety of purposes including appointing a committee, dealing with unemployment, and
instructing representatives how to vote. Meetings often culminated with the adoption of a
petition which could then be distributed to allow people who were physically unable to attend the
event to express their support. Any citizen, including men and women of any race or age, could
attend a town meeting or sign a petition. Thus Pennsylvanians who would normally have no say
in public policy had an opportunity to be heard. During and immediately following the
Revolution, the town meeting was one of the more democratic forms of political mobilization.
The role of the town meeting would, however, change dramatically in the decades following the
end of the Revolution.
Unlike their counterparts in New England, town meetings in Pennsylvania were not legal
entities or a part of the state government. Town assemblies occurred irregularly, and any citizen
could call a meeting. This lack of constitutional backing, however, did not mean public
assemblies lacked power. In some instances, town meetings in Pennsylvania exerted more direct
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influence over residents than the actual government. Whereas town meetings in Massachusetts
derived authority from the constitution, similar gatherings in Pennsylvania derived it directly
from the people. The ability of a town meeting to effect change hinged on the number of people
who participated and whether the public viewed individuals in attendance representative of the
town as a whole. It also depended on whether residents viewed the meeting as a legitimate
method of gauging the general will.22
The role town meetings played in Pennsylvania evolved in the decades following the
American Revolution. An analysis of these changes helps illuminate the ways in which the
adoption of the Federal Constitution and the development of political parties changed the
relationship between people and their government. In the 1780s, Pennsylvania remained flush
with democratic ideals. Ultimate sovereignty, residents believed, rested with the people, and
elected officials were no more than vessels of the public will. During this time period, town
meetings served as a quasi-legal body with the ability to set—and in some instances
implement— policy. Meetings also generated instructions dictating how representatives should
vote and what laws should be proposed. Other than complaints from a few lone critics, the
authority of town meetings went unchallenged.23
The ratification of the Federal Constitution in 1787 and adoption of a new state
constitution in 1790 signaled a retreat from the democratic ideals of the 1780s. The Bill of Rights
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protected the right to free speech and to peacefully assemble, but the role of town meetings
remained uncertain. Members of the emerging Federalist Party began to assert that, under the
Constitution, the people’s ability to impact policy was limited to voting. But this assertion did
not mean that they opposed town meeting altogether or that they ignored public opinion.
Federalist leaders were sensitive to the importance of public opinion and used town meetings and
petition drives to rally the people behind their government. Rather than being an opportunity for
the people to assert their sovereignty, these gatherings were a chance for the public to express
their support for the government.
Members of the nascent Republican Party in Pennsylvania maintained a different
understanding of the role of citizens. They believed that the people had a right and a
responsibility to take an active role in public affairs, and that they needed to be constantly on
guard against corruption. What this vigilance meant in practice, however, remained unclear.
Initially, Republicans considered general meetings an important opportunity for the people to
engage in the deliberative process. Their inability to influence policy, however, led Republicans
to reconsider their views on the role of public assemblies. The Jay Treaty debates marked a
turning point in how Republicans approached town meetings. Members of the young party
organized massive meetings throughout the state in an attempt to demonstrate that the populace
disapproved of the treaty. Federalists condemned the gatherings and denied that they represented
the will of the people. Despite the public outcry, George Washington decided to sign the treaty.
Frustrated, but committed to their cause, Republicans switched their attention to the House of
Representatives, where Republicans held a majority and could potentially stop the
implementation of the treaty by refusing to appropriate the necessary funds. Federalists
responded by orchestrating a massive petition drive as a way to rally public opinion and pressure
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representatives to vote to fund the treaty. Republicans answered with their own petitions but
Federalists, who had more experience with petitioning, collected more than twice the number of
signatures. Even some of the Republican representatives who had been vocal opponents of the
Jay Treaty were forced to bow to this public pressure and voted to fund the treaty.
The Jay Treaty debates provided Republicans with two valuable lessons on political
mobilization. First, it clearly demonstrated the importance of winning elections. Public meetings
alone could not change policy. Second, the experience highlighted the value of petitions as a way
to mobilize and engage supporters. Republicans took these lessons to heart and, in conjunction
with other changes in the political climate, abandoned town meeting as a way for the people to
express their will and committed to challenging the Federalists through ballot box. The extent of
this change became clear during the Adams administration. In the wake of the XYZ Affair in
1798, Federalists organized a series of meetings designed to rally the public behind John Adams.
Ironically, Republicans—the former champions of town meetings—used some of the same
arguments Federalists had used in 1795 to try to discredit the pro-Adams assemblies.
Republicans also built on Federalists’ success with petitions by using petition drives as a way to
rally supporters peacefully in opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts. By 1800 partisan rallies
had effectively replaced the town meeting. What used to be a venue for the democratic
expression of the people’s will had now become a partisan tool for mobilizing supporters and
influencing public opinion.
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Format of Town Meetings
The majority of town meetings between 1783 and 1800 followed a similar pattern.24
Typically a notice appeared in the paper a day or two prior to the scheduled meeting informing
residents of the time and place. Larger gatherings tended to convene in a central location, such as
the State House Yard in Philadelphia. Taverns, hotels, and private homes often hosted smaller
assemblies. For larger meetings a temporary stage and podium might be installed but most
meetings made due with a few chairs and a desk. Although there is little evidence about who
actually called the meetings, the men elected to serve as president and secretary, along with those
appointed to various committees, tended to be prominent local leaders. The timing of the meeting
varied depending on the anticipated audience. If the organizers hoped to attract mechanics and
laborers, the meeting could not convene until the evening, when most workers would be
available. Conversely, merchants and gentlemen had much more flexible schedules and could
attend gatherings in the morning. Meetings typically opened with the election of a president and
a secretary; the president controlled the agenda and, if necessary, counted votes while the
secretary kept detailed notes of the proceedings for publication in a local newspaper. Meetings
usually concluded with the adoption of a series of resolutions, a set of instructions for
representatives, and/or a petition. In some cases a committee appointed by the meeting would try
to gather more signatures for a petition.
Published descriptions of the meetings helped to amplify the importance of public
meetings. The number of newspapers printed in Pennsylvania grew steadily following the
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Revolution. Newspapers in the early republic were a critical resource in the spread of
information. As one correspondent argued, a newspaper “tells us facts at the minute we are
curious to know them—it tells us also the opinion of the world upon them.” This outlet also
allows readers to “be made acquainted with strangers” and to develop “sympathy with mankind”
without leaving the house.25 The bonds these newspapers established helped knit the country
together and create what scholars have called “imagined communities.”26 As historian Jeffrey
Pasley has shown, newspapers made the first political parties possible by linking likeminded
individuals across the state and nation. A rural Pennsylvanian, for example, could read an
account of a town meeting in Philadelphia and feel part of a larger movement. Published
descriptions of the proceedings thus became almost as important, if not more so, than the actual
meeting and adopted resolves or instructions were often designed to influence the general public
in addition to specific government officials.27

Disloyalty, Debt, and Duty: Town Meetings in the Age of Democracy
Historians have identified Pennsylvania’s Constitution of 1776 as the most democratic of
the new state governments. Written by a coalition of revolutionaries, the constitution made clear
that all power derived from the people and that state officials were servants to the electorate. The
document created a plural executive, established a unicameral legislature and opened the
franchise to all tax-paying white men at least 21 years old. It also included a provision that
required an election to occur between the proposal of a bill and the final vote on its adoption as a
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law. In reference to town meetings, the constitution explicitly protected the “right to assemble
together, to consult for their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to apply to the
legislature for redress of grievances, by address, petition, or remonstrance.”28
The constitution also contained some undemocratic elements. One of the most
controversial provisions was a requirement that all citizens swear an oath to the state
government. Officers of the government were additionally required to swear that they believed in
a single God and that the Scriptures were divinely inspired. Those citizens who refused were
barred from voting or holding public office and were taxed at a higher rate. These oaths were
originally justified as necessary to prevent Loyalists from undermining the new government.
While they did prevent Loyalists from participating in government, the oaths also effectively
barred members of certain religious groups, including the Quakers, from voting or holding office
because their religion forbade them to take oaths. Additionally, opponents of the Constitution of
1776 were limited to proposing small changes. The Test Laws were controversial from the onset
and Republicans, as opponents of the Constitution of 1776 were called, made numerous attempts
to have them overturned. By 1779, the Test Laws eliminated nearly one-half of the inhabitants of
Philadelphia.29 Constitutionalists, or supporters of the Constitution, had managed to block
Republican efforts during the war, but opponents gained momentum with the adoption of the
peace treaty.30
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Questions of citizenship were not the only problems Loyalists raised. During the war the
Pennsylvania government had seized a significant amount of land belonging to Loyalists who
had fled. The Penn family, in particular, owned huge amounts of land throughout the state.
Constitutionalists had long feared that Republicans wanted to restore proprietary land to the Penn
family and return confiscated estates to Loyalists. Although Republicans denied accusations that
they wanted to see the restoration of the Penn family, their intentions with relation to confiscated
land remained less clear. With the end of the war, a number of Loyalists were likely posed to
return and try and make claims on their confiscated property.31 The matter came to a head in
1783 when Pennsylvanians bypassed the Assembly and took matters into their own hands.
In May of 1783, the officers of the militia of the city and liberties of Philadelphia met at
the State House to consider what to do about the return of Loyalists.32 After some discussion,
the meeting attendees unanimously agreed that “such persons as have joined the enemy, or have
been expelled [from] this or any other of the United States, ought not to be suffered to return or
remain amongst us” and that anyone who was caught “harboring or entertaining” such
individuals “ought to feel the highest displeasure of the citizens” of Philadelphia. In addition to
promising to use everything in their power to enforce these resolutions, the officers believed it
necessary to call a town meeting “to take into consideration the mode of instructing our
representatives.”33 The meeting was set for 3:00 pm on Saturday, June 14, and a notice appeared
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in the papers requesting that all freemen assemble to consider instructions to their representatives
“and other important matters of general concern to the community.”34
Two days before the scheduled town meeting in Philadelphia, residents of Newtown, in
the County of Bucks, convened at the local Court House in a separate meeting. The group
resolved that “a repeal of the test laws . . . is utterly incompatible with the peace, liberty, and
happiness of the good citizens of this commonwealth” and called on all Pennsylvanians to
instruct their representatives to defend the Test Laws and prevent the return of Loyalists. Even
though the laws disenfranchised approximately two-fifths of Bucks voters, many believed it
necessary measure.35 The meeting attendees adopted a circular letter to be distributed throughout
the county requesting that each township elect one or more representatives to attend a meeting on
July 29 to prepare instructions to their representatives and take any other steps deemed
necessary.36
Back in Philadelphia, the town meeting convened at the State House on June 14. Colonel
Samuel Miles, a well-known veteran of the Revolutionary War who served as quartermaster for
the State of Pennsylvania, served as president of the gathering. Attendees then proceeded to
adopt a series of resolutions that stated it was “inconsistent with the interest and dignity of the
good people of this state” to allow Loyalists to return and that the restoration of the property was
“incompatible with the peace, the safety and the dignity.” After noting the “unquestionable right”
of citizens “to instruct their representatives” they told their representatives to do everything in
their power at the next session of the assembly to pass laws to ensure that “no person who has
voluntarily withdrawn himself from the United States since the 19th of April 1775” be permitted
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to reside in Pennsylvania “or enjoy the rights of a citizen of this commonwealth.” Any sign of
mercy shown to Loyalists, even to those who may be connected through “friendship, blood, or
alliance…will be reprobated with a hearty indignation.” The instructions ended with a suggestion
that the representatives take steps towards protecting the nation’s credit. Before adjourning, the
meeting attendees appointed a committee comprising the field officers and captains of the militia
and representatives of each ward to “carry these resolves into execution.”37 A similar meeting
occurred in Germantown a few days later, followed later by ones in Chester and Cumberland
counties.38
Various citizen committees had been an integral part of the Revolution in Pennsylvania.
According to historian Richard Ryerson, it was “through the committee movement [that] the
Revolution had at last triumphed in Pennsylvania.” Private citizens, usually elected at a general
meeting, came together to form committees to regulate prices and guard against inflation and
monitor suspected Loyalists. In addition to making decisions and setting policy, these
committees, with the support of the militia, dispensed with justice. Citizens caught neglecting
price regulations or suspected of aiding the British would be hauled in front of the committee and
faced potential banishment. These committees held no legal authority, but derived their power
from the people. Though controversial, the committees were accepted by many as a necessary
measure to maintain peace and order during the war. In 1783, with a peace agreement signed, the
same justification did not exist.39
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Justified or not, the committee appointed at the State House on June 14 wasted little time
taking action. They met on the 30th and gave notice that all Loyalists had ten days to leave the
state. Anyone caught remaining after the allotted period “will be dealt with in a proper manner.”
They promised to “use all the means in our power” to execute the decision of the town meeting.40
Over the next month, the committee met regularly and heard evidence against suspected
Loyalists. At least eight men were denounced by the committee and warned to leave town.41
Committees in other parts of the state followed suit.42
The committee appointed at the State House did not receive universal approval. “A
Private in the Militia of Philadelphia” penned a sarcastic letter that appeared in the Freeman’s
Journal that pointed out that if the resolves of a town meeting could be considered binding, then
there was no need to worry about electing representatives to the Assembly. According to the
argument, if important questions such as what to do with Loyalists “are so easily discussed and
carried into immediate execution at a town meeting” then the “legislature is an unnecessary
expense to the public.” Moreover, as the resolves of the town meeting and subsequent actions by
the committee dealt with some of the same matters that American diplomats such as Benjamin
Franklin, John Adams, and John Jay were discussing in Paris, the town meeting might as well
decide the terms of the peace treaty.43
A response from “A Private in the Militia of Philadelphia” appeared a few days later,
asserting that the committee “exercised no power, but that which they are invested by the
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people.” “The people” the correspondent argued, “have an undoubted right not to suffer
traitors…to reside amongst them” and they have every right to appoint citizens to ensure this is
the case. The implication is that simply because the people have elected representatives does not
deprive them of their sovereignty or of their right to appoint other bodies to carry out their will.44
This debate over the power of the town meeting and committee served as the backdrop to
the scheduled meeting of delegates from various townships called by the Newton town meeting
to discuss the Test Laws. Thirty-six delegates from twenty-four townships assembled on July 29.
After reading and approving the original circular letter, the delegates resolved “that it is the
unquestionable right” and “indispensable [sp] duty” for freemen to instruct their representatives.
The meeting members then appointed a committee to draw up a list of instructions. These
resolves once again reflect the belief that elected officials are simply agents of the people’s will
and that the people retain sovereignty.45
The final instructions, addressed to the five members representing Bucks in the
Pennsylvania Assembly, covered much more than just the Test Laws. In addition to charging the
representatives “to oppose with your strongest efforts any attempt (should such be made) to
repeal the test laws,” the meeting called them “to promote a Convention of the States to take into
consideration the present defects of the federal government,” take measures to promote public
credit, and ensure a payment of the national debt. Lastly, the gathering “most solemnly
command[ed]” their representatives to prevent any alteration to the state Constitution. The
meeting also noted that it was “highly destructive of that confidence and harmony which must
constitute the basis of public happiness, for one county to interfere in the local polity and
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interests of another.”46 Government should be primarily a local affair, thereby ensuring that the
people’s will is carried out.
With the public’s support, the defenders of the Test Laws managed to fight back attempts
to repeal them until 1786 when critics passed legislation that rendered them effectively impotent.
The Assembly repealed the laws entirely in 1787, the same year that representatives from the
states gathered in Philadelphia to draft a new form of government.47 Taken together, the
Philadelphia town meeting and committee, along with the instructions adopted by Bucks County,
reflect the central role of public assemblies in Pennsylvania’s political culture during the 1780s.
Because the people as a whole—not their government—were sovereign, town meetings had the
power express and exercise the public will. Elected officials were considered spokesmen for the
people and therefore bound to carry out their will. As a participant at another town meeting held
in Bucks County in 1784 put it, “the spirit of 1776 has not lost all its influence among the
yeomanry of this state.”48

The Burden of Debt: Town Meetings and the Economy
In the years following the end of the war with Great Britain, Pennsylvanians, like many
other Americans, were deeply concerned about the state of the economy. Both the states and the
federal government went into significant debt to help finance the war. With the economy
sluggish, many citizens could not afford to pay even the most minimal taxes. As a result, many
states struggled to pay off their debt or to give money to the confederal government. The
impotent national government was left helpless as soldiers went unpaid and the nation’s credit
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abroad shriveled. To make matters worse, at the end of the war British merchants flooded
American markets, driving prices down. At the same time, Britain prohibited American ships
from trading in the West Indies and other British colonies, depriving American merchants of a
key source of income.49
The issue reached a boiling point in 1785. “The suplneness of Congress with respect to
trade and manufactures,” fumed one correspondent, “had rendered public meeting absolutely
necessary and indispensable; and the people find themselves obliged to form and strike out
modes for that redress which long since ought to have engrossed the sole attention of that
honorable body.”50 As had happened in 1783 with the Loyalists, Pennsylvanians had become
frustrated with governmental inaction and took matters into their own hands.
On June 2, 1785, a “large number of respectable citizens” gathered at the University of
the State of Pennsylvania to consider the “declining state” of the economy. The assembled group
agreed that measures should be taken immediately to provide relief for the suffering and
appointed a committee of thirteen men “vested with the authority to call a town meeting” as soon
as possible.51 The committee selected Monday, June 20th, at 9:00 am for the general meeting.
Citizens were notified through the local newspapers that the meeting would discuss “Business of
such general Importance to the Trade and Manufacturers of this Country.”52
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The meeting opened with a speech by Jared Ingersoll, a Philadelphia attorney and firm
patriot. Addressing the crowd from a temporary stage, Ingersoll spoke in “a most animated and
argumentative” manner. He called on citizens to remember the “tumult and horror” of the war
and the great expectations they had for the county with the arrival of peace. Becoming more
impassioned as he spoke, Ingersoll described in detail the suffering caused by the national
government’s inability to regulate trade and levy duties. “The consequences of this loose
system,” he cried, “have been felt in a greater of lesser degree by all ranks of people:--The
farmer, in despair, is obliged to abandon his plough—the merchant cannot freight his vessels—
the manufacturer is undersold—and the artists and mechanics are but partially, if at all
employed.” Because the national government lacked the power to retaliate, he claimed, states
were left to fend for themselves. Action at the state level, however, created a new set of
problems. If one state tried to retaliate and impose a duty on British goods, merchants would
simply trade with another state. The only remedy, Ingersoll thundered, was to invest Congress
with the powers to regulate trade. Those who feared that this approach invested the central
government with too much power needed only to remember that Congress was merely a servant
to the states and that representatives “serve for a limited time, after which . . . they must return
and mix with the mass of the people.” It was, therefore, unlikely that members of the government
would take unpopular or harmful measures because they would not only have to face the people
but would suffer themselves.53
At the conclusion of his speech, Ingersoll read a report drafted by the committee of
thirteen. The report opened with a declaration that the “present is a suitable occasion . . . for the
people to exercise collectively that privilege of offering their sentiments and advice to their
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representatives.” It went on to state “that nothing but a full power in Congress, over the
commerce of the United States, can relieve it from its present oppressions.” The meeting then
reviewed the report by paragraph and voted to approve it in full, and the committee was tasked
with drafting a petition to the Assembly. Before closing, the meeting added seven mechanics,
along with Ingersoll, to the committee to ensure that the committee adequately represented the
meeting. 54
The town meeting resolves and subsequent petition and memorial to the legislature reflect
Pennsylvanians’ firm commitment to popular sovereignty and the belief that the people had a
right to influence the deliberative process directly, even as they called for a stronger central
government. As one commentator stated, “It is the very nature of representation, that the
represented should instruct the representor [sp].”55 Even on such weighty topics such as
citizenship or the economy, citizens felt it their right, and duty, to express their opinions. Town
meetings provided one of the best forums for learning the public will.
The push for a stronger central government that could regulate the economy, however,
forced Pennsylvanians to reconsider the role of citizens in the deliberative process. Few, if any,
residents were prepared to deny that sovereignty rested with the people—the question was how
and when it should be expressed. With the country teetering on the brink of ruin, an increasing
number of men, particularly members of the gentry, began to conclude that the country suffered
from an excess of democracy.56
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Town Meetings in the Early 1790s
The adoption of the Federal Constitution in 1787 and new state constitution in 1790
altered the relationship between the people and their representatives. Both documents took a step
back from democracy and established checks and balances on the people’s will. The Constitution
created a strong federal government that remained insulated from the people. Even in the House
of Representatives, theoretically the democratic part of the new government, representatives
came from large election districts, and the sheer number of constituents and geographic distances
within those districts were significant impediments to any representative maintaining connection
with the will of his constituents. The new state constitution was modeled on the Federal
Constitution and created a bicameral legislature and a governor with the power to veto
legislation. One historian has gone so far as to call the new constitution a “counter-revolution.”57
The status of town meetings and petitioning under these governments remained
ambiguous. The federal Bill of Rights protected freedom of speech and “the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
Pennsylvania’s Declaration of Rights included similar guarantees of the people’s right to express
themselves freely and “assemble together for their common good, and to apply to those invested
with the powers of government for redress of grievances or other proper purposes by petition,
address or remonstrance.” While the right to assemble and petition was protected, the new
constitutions did not specify how much weight of influence petitions should carry or exactly
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what role the people would play in the deliberative process. In Congress some representatives
had pushed for an explicit provision allowing for the people to instruct their representatives but
were unable to gain enough support.58
Although the authority of town meetings remained uncertain, in the early 1790s some
Pennsylvanians continued to see them as an opportunity for the public to directly engage in the
deliberative process. In the summer of 1790, the new Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton proposed a tax on distilled liquors, among other things, to help fund the federal
government and pay down some of the debt. With memories of the Stamp Act still relevant, the
proposed excise met with considerable hostility. Philadelphians responded by calling a town
meeting to be held on June 23 at 7:00 pm in the State House Yard. The late starting time ensured
that mechanics and artisans could attend. Before the meeting convened, however, news arrived
from New York that the bill was not likely to pass and that a new committee had been appointed.
As a result, citizens were unclear on what the law would actually look like and chose to postpone
the meeting until they learned more. An announcement carried in the next day’s newspapers,
however, made it clear that the proposed excise law “was a high infringement of the Liberties of
the People, and ought not silently be submitted to, and that if any similar system should be
brought forward, a meeting of the citizens should be immediately called.” Despite such
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assertions, a meeting never materialized suggesting that either citizens lost interest, or chose
other methods of voicing their displeasure.59
An excise law eventually passed in 1791 that placed a tax on distilled liquors. This was
the first internal tax in the United States, and, unsurprisingly, the measure provoked a
controversy. The Revolution, after all, had been fought in part because of taxation. In
Philadelphia, the new tax resulted in public outcry and specific interest groups, such as the
Society for Promoting Domestic Manufacturers, assembled to denounce the tax, but a general
town meeting was never called.60 Philadelphians did, however, continue to assert their right to a
town meeting. As one opponent of the tax put it, “Every free citizen has a right to inquire into the
principles of governmental measures and to expose their errors or their defects.” While citizens
must adhere to the law, he argued, they were well within their rights to try to have the law
repealed. Under these circumstances, “[a]ssemblies of the people convened for the purpose of
deliberating on proper plans to be pursed for obtaining redress from public grievances—from
measures which are oppressive or subversive of the constitution of the state, are justifiable and
requisite.”61 Nevertheless, the fact remains that opponents of the excise in Philadelphia chose to
pursue other avenues of protest. That Philadelphians felt the need to defend these rights is itself
evidence that a change was underway—during the 1780s, the right of a citizen to assemble in
protest was assumed. By the early 1790s, these rights were being called into question.62
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The response to the excise outside Philadelphia was less restrained. The tax proved to be
particularly burdensome to Pennsylvania’s western farmers who relied on the sale of whiskey.
Shipping grain and corn from the west was prohibitively expensive, and the only way to make a
profit was to distill the grain into liquor, which was more easily transported. Immediately
following the passage of the tax on distilled liquors, westerners assembled to petition and protest
the law. A meeting of representatives of the four western counties convened in Pittsburgh on
September 7, 1791. The gathering resolved that the excise violated the Constitution and infringed
upon basic liberties.63 A meeting the following year went further and declared that that the
members of the meeting would refuse to do business with any man who accepted the office of
excise collector and promised to “treat [excise officers] with that contempt they deserve.” The
meeting also established a committee to communicate and coordinate protests.64 As historian
Thomas Slaughter observed, the men who gathered in western Pennsylvania in opposition to the
excise were “deeply concerned with process” and ensuring that the meetings adequately
represented public opinion. Those gathered did not seek to directly undermine the federal
government, but they did believe that citizens still had the right to participate in the deliberative
process and refuse to follow laws deemed unjust. Constitution or not, the westerners still
believed they had the right to exercise their sovereignty through a town meeting. As will be seen,
federal officials viewed the situation differently.65
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The 1790s witnessed the rise of two relativity organized political parties. A diverse
population composed of different ethnic and religious groups made the state ripe for political
conflict and factions had existed in some form or another in Pennsylvania for some time. Before
the Revolution the colony divided between the Quaker party and the Proprietary party. Following
the Revolution, opponents of the new state Constitution organized and called themselves
Republicans, while the supporters of the Constitution took the name Constitutionalists. Between
1777 and 1790, the control of the state Assembly seesawed between these two groups, with the
Republicans eventually succeeding in the overthrow of the Constitution of 1776. The new federal
and state constitutions initiated another period of realignment.66
Pennsylvania ratified the Federal Constitution on December 12, 1787 by a vote of 46 to
23. The lopsided vote masks the intensity of the battle between Federalists and Anti-federalists.
Opposition to the Constitution was widespread in the west, but Federalists proved better
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organized and acted before the Anti-federalist movement really took shape. Divisions remained
and helped lay the groundwork for the Federalist and Republican parties. Pennsylvania politics
had always been influenced by national politics, but when the seat of the federal government
moved to Philadelphia in 1790, state and national politics became even more intertwined.67
The emerging Federalist Party was the first to take advantage of town meetings for
partisan purposes. On April 22, 1793, George Washington formally announced that the United
States would remain neutral in the war between Great Britain and France. France, which was in
the midst of its own Revolution, had declared war on Great Britain in February of 1793.
Members of the nascent Republican Party responded with outrage to what they saw as a direct
violation of the Treaty of Alliance America signed with France in 1778 and an abandonment of a
sister Republic in her time of need.
In the early phase of the French Revolution, Americans were generally united in support
of the uprising. By 1793, however, many members of the Federalist Party concluded that the
French Revolution had gone too far and worried that the seeds of revolution might spread to
America. Many of the same men who turned on the French Revolution relied heavily on trade
with Great Britain, and a war would have devastated their businesses. Republicans, in contrast,
tended to be more forgiving of the revolution’s excesses and continued to support its goals.
Those who aligned themselves with the Republican Party were also more likely to have disdain
for the British and to believe that the greatest threat to America came from closet monarchists.68
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In May 1793, the merchants and traders of Philadelphia held a meeting to draft an address
to George Washington praising his Neutrality Proclamation.69 They presented the address,
which was signed by nearly three hundred men, to the president on May 16. The signers not only
promised to adhere to the proclamation themselves, “but to discountenance, in the most pointed
manner, any contrary disposition in others.” Washington responded that he was pleased his
actions gave “general satisfaction to the citizens of Pennsylvania” and that he trusted that the
“good citizens of the United States” would demonstrate to the world a firm commitment to
peace. The address was printed in the newspapers throughout Pennsylvania and the nation,
amplifying its effect. Additionally, the organizers sent a circular letter to neighboring towns
inviting them to join in their praise.70
Other addresses and similar petitions were adopted throughout the country, many of
which were sent directly to the President. In Pennsylvania, the Grand Inquest (Grand Jury) of
Chester County along with meetings in Lancaster and York Counties agreed to resolutions
thanking Washington for his stance. These addresses followed a similar pattern to the one
adopted in Philadelphia, taking a deferential tone and expressing gratitude and a commitment to
do everything possible to uphold the Proclamation. Whether or not the organizers of these
meetings envisioned the address as a general endorsement of the federal government and the
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Federalist Party, supporters of the administration, led by Alexander Hamilton, seized on the
resolutions as evidence that the people stood with the President against the Republican
opposition. Historian Christopher Young has persuasively argued that through the addresses,
Federalists learned that “public opinion could be used to render an undesirable political force
impotent” while strengthening the relationship between the president and the people.71
Federalist’s use of public assemblies and petitions to rally support for the government
represents a shift in the relationship between the people and their representatives and in the role
of town meetings in Pennsylvania’s political culture. During the 1780s, citizens remained
sovereign, and a representative was simply a conduit for the people’s will. Given this
understanding, a town or general meeting was one of the best venues for the people to come
together and express their will. Following the adoption of the new constitutions, members of the
Federalist Party began to argue that the citizen gave up sovereignty at the ballot box. A meeting
of citizens, therefore, had no real authority to speak or act on behalf of the people. According to
the Federalists, true liberty under the Constitution did not consist of “the right of the populace to
assemble and oversee the proceedings of the freely elected legislators of the nation” as some
“demagogues” claimed. Instead, “Liberty invests people with the right to elect their own rulers,
whose task it is to enact laws for the general good.”72
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Federalists still believed that private citizens were entitled to their own opinions but
thought that they should defer policy decisions to elected officials. Every citizen had a right to
express his opinions, explained one Federalist, “but it becomes us . . . to do it with some little
degree of modesty, and especially when the proper office of the government, entrusted by the
constitution to speak the sense of the Union” had already spoken. The Constitution invested the
president and Congress to speak for the people. A private citizen could only speak for himself.73
According to the Federalists, town meetings still had a place in that they could be used to
express support for the government and strengthen the bond between the people and their
government. Although this position represented a change from the 1780s, it was not entirely
new. In England, members in Parliament used public gatherings and petitions to influence public
opinion and rally support since the mid seventeenth century. Similar to what the Federalists
began to do, a select few elite men in England would organize local meetings or draft a set of
instructions which would appear to be the work of a grassroots movement. Not only did this give
the organizer the ability to speak for the people but printed resolves of the meetings could be
distributed in order to influence others. By creating the semblance of public support it was,
therefore, possible to build a real popular base. In contemporary parlance, this practice is known
as “Astroturfing.”74
Members of the nascent Republican Party in Pennsylvania saw town meetings in a
different light. As had been the case in the 1780s, Republicans believed public assemblies were
an opportunity for the people to come together, deliberate, and express their will. But they also
served another purpose as well. Large public gatherings were also a way for Republicans to
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demonstrate that they had the support of the people, thereby reaffirming their legitimacy.
Whereas the Federalists had the authority of the Constitution and, perhaps more importantly, the
people’s seemingly endless love for Washington, Republicans needed popular support to
legitimize their existence. Without the backing of the people, they had no real justification for
their opposition. The outpouring of support for Washington following the Neutrality
Proclamation therefore posed a significant challenge to the emerging Republican Party.
The different ways Federalists and Republicans used town meetings in the early 1790s
reflects their contrasting understandings of civil society. Scholars such as Albrecht Koschnik,
Johann Neem, and John Brooke have persuasively argued that during the 1790s Federalists clung
to a unitary conception of civil society. As Koschnik puts it, “Federalists could not conceive of a
separate state and public sphere and expected to see a unified, indivisible and consensual public
that extended the reach of the federal government and affirmed traditional elite rule.” Meetings
or groups that joined in support of the common good were welcomed, provided they made no
claims at representing the people as a whole. Only the established legal authorities could speak
for the people and Federalists saw meetings that challenged the constituted authorities as
inherently threatening. Republicans, in contrast, had begun to develop a pluralistic understanding
of civil society and recognize that American society was composed of a variety of different
interests. In a healthy country, they argued, a variety of interests could coexist. As a result, they
could challenge a particular law or policy without threatening the entire system. Moreover,
Republicans believed that the public had to constantly keep watch over their government. In the
early 1790s, they thought that town meetings presented an opportunity for citizens to remain
active in the deliberative process and ensure that the government adequately represented their
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will. Their attitudes towards town meetings and their understanding of the role of citizens would,
however, shift in response to the changing political landscape.75

Town Meetings and the Jay Treaty
The competing conceptions of the role of town meetings came into sharp focus during the
crisis over the Jay Treaty in 1795-1796. Tensions in Pennsylvania had continued to rise in the
years following the Neutrality Proclamation. The arrival of the controversial French foreign
minister Edmund Genêt, a new round of excise taxes, and the outbreak of rebellion in the west
fueled the flames of partisanship. During these years, both Federalists and Republicans invested
considerable time and energy in courting public opinion and building bases of support. The
infant parties’ first major clash occurred following the arrival of a new treaty with Great Britain,
known as the Jay Treaty, signed by former Chief-Justice John Jay in the summer of 1795. The
struggle over the Jay Treaty spilled into the streets and took partisanship to a new level. Beyond
simply a debate over the terms of the treaty, the fights represented a battle between two different
conceptions of the public sphere and understandings of the relationship between the people and
their government.
A number of issues between Great Britain and the United States remained unresolved in
1794. For example, in a clear violation of the Peace Treaty signed in 1783, the British remained
in control of posts in the Northwest. Additionally, England had restricted American trade with
the French West Indies, and British ships had been harassing American merchant vessels bound
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for France. Outstanding debts dating to the Revolution remained a major point of contention as
well. To deal with these, and other, issues, George Washington appointed Chief Justice John Jay
as special envoy to Great Britain. Already upset at Washington’s refusal to support
Revolutionary France, Republicans reacted with outrage to the appointment of Jay, a well-known
Federalist and anglophile. Before he had even reached Great Britain, Philadelphians burned Jay
in effigy.76
Jay signed a treaty on November 19, 1794. Rumors circulated in the United States as
early as January 1795 that a treaty had been signed, but an official copy did not reach the
Secretary of State until early March. Once it had, George Washington called the Senate into a
special session to consider the treaty. As was customary when dealing with potentially sensitive
information, the Senate discussed the treaty in a closed-door session, and the provisions of the
treaty remained secret. Republicans seized on this secrecy as evidence that the Federalists were
corrupting the meaning of a representative government. “Franklin,” a leading critic of the Jay
Treaty, acknowledged “that the President and Senate are alone the constitutional organs to make
and determine Treaties” but pointed out that their powers “are derived from the People” and that
they must therefore consult the people before making a decision of such consequence. 77 “It is
said that the Government of the United States is a representative Government” lectured another
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author, “if so, the Representatives must only personate those who delegated them. To represent is
to be placed in the room of another or others, and to do as they would do in like circumstances; if
this distinction do not apply, Representation is a paradox—it is only a name.”78 These arguments
reflect Republicans’ belief that the people retained sovereignty between elections and are in stark
contrast to Federalists’ understanding of representation and the role of the people. Despite the
protestations of the Republicans, the Senate narrowly ratified the treaty on June 17 with a vote of
20-10, barely reaching the two-thirds threshold required for treaties.79 The treaty’s fate now
rested in President Washington’s hands.
The provisions of the treaty remained secret until Senator Steven T. Mason, a
Republican from Virginia, leaked his copy to Benjamin Bache, who printed it in his Aurora
newspaper on July 1, 1795.80 The treaty immediately precipitated a major public outcry. A
disagreement exists among historians whether Jay secured the best possible deal for his country.
He had managed to ensure that the British would evacuate the forts in the northwest and had
gained access to India and the British West Indies. In exchange, however, he accepted severe
restrictions on tonnage and agreed to settle prewar debts owed to British merchants. The treaty
did nothing to address Britain’s repeated violations of America’s maritime rights. Regardless of
whether it was the best possible deal, Pennsylvania Republicans reacted with fury to what they
saw as a treaty that ensured America would remain subservient to England.81
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In Philadelphia, Republicans decided to call a town meeting on Thursday, July 23 at 5:00
p.m. to consider how to respond to the treaty. The late start time suggests that organizers sought
to maximize turnout by ensuring that mechanics and artisans could attend. A handbill
announcing the meeting implored citizens to turnout “to discuss the Momentous Question, viz:
Are the People the Legitimate Fountain of Government?”82 Clearly the meeting was about more
than just the treaty. Republicans saw this gathering as an opportunity for the people to assert
their sovereignty and push back against Federalist’s deferential conception of American political
culture.
Federalists began criticizing the meeting before it even convened. There was nothing
inherently wrong with town meetings, they argued; the problem was how the Republicans went
about them. “[W]here meetings or elections are held according to special legal appointment,”
argued a correspondent in the Gazette of the United States, “it becomes every man’s duty to
attend in person.” In contrast, the meeting to condemn the Jay Treaty was “called by a few
individuals” who had no legal right to speak for the people.83 Labeling their opponents Jacobins,
other writers sought to link Republicans’ use of town meetings with the chaos in France.
“Jacobinism relies on the populace” exclaimed another Federalist essayist, “the populace, when
agitated, rage with fury—they bear down on all before them for a moment—then disperse—go
home—reflect—and repent on their folly.”84
Republicans countered by defending the rights of a town meeting. As one Republican
pointed out, even the people of England respected the “right of the citizens to meet and
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deliberate on measures which so intimately concern their welfare and property . . . There can be
no impropriety,” he continued, “in the citizens of this large commercial town assembly on this
occasion. It is a business that concerns every class of citizens.” As for Federalist attempts to link
American Republican with French Jacobinism, it “is too stale a trick to impose any longer on the
citizens.” In spite of the criticism, Republicans remained determined to stage one of the largest
town meetings the city had seen.85
Residents crammed into the State House Yard on the afternoon of July 23. Estimates
vary, but most observers agreed that at least fourteen hundred people turned out for the
meeting.86 After coming to order, the meeting attendees selected Dr. William Shippen, Jr., a
well-known physician and prominent Republican, as chair and proceeded to “UNANIMOUSLY”
adopt a series of resolutions that affirmed “the constitutional right and patriotic duty of the
Citizens of the United States, to express on every important occasion, the public sense of public
measures” and stated that “the citizens of Philadelphia in judgment and in feeling, disapprove of
the Treaty.” The meeting then appointed a committee to draft a memorial to President
Washington “respectfully but forcibly conveying the sentiments of the City of Philadelphia.”87
The meeting participants selected Saturday, July 25 for the committee to issue its report.
Perhaps fearing that the size of the crowd and frustrations with the treaty might lead to trouble,
Bache emphasized the importance of “order and decency” on the day of the meeting.88 His pleas
were important to achieving the desired outcome. Riots and violence would detract from the
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message and would provide ammunition for Federalist critics. As will be discussed in detail in a
later chapter, by 1795 Republicans had begun to focus more on balancing popular politics with
the need for order.
Saturday’s meeting drew an even larger crowd than Thursday’s had. Bache estimated the
crowd at between 5,000 and 6,000 people, but Federalists put the number closer to 2,000. At the
appointed hour, the members of the committee mounted a temporary stage and William Shippen,
once again serving as chair, read the memorial. According to Bache, “silence was strictly
observed, while the report was read by the chairman.” The meeting then went through the
memorial, adopting each paragraph individually. At the conclusion, Shippen asked if the meeting
was prepared to adopt the memorial, and the crowd cheered, stomped their feet, and waved their
hats to demonstrate their approval. In his published account of the meeting, Bache went to great
lengths to point out that, “one and two hands were up in the negative” on a few clauses but “one
and but one” voted against the final report.89
Although the meeting had finished with its business, the crowd remained energized and
enthusiastic and showed no sign of disbanding. Blair McClenachan, a leading Philadelphia
Republican, took the stage and, while waving a copy of the treaty above his head, bellowed that
he “had one more motion to make to my fellow countrymen, and that is, that you kick this damn
treaty to hell!” With that, McClenachan threw the treaty into the sea of onlookers. The crowd
seized the treaty, stuck it to the top of a pike, and then paraded to the French Minister’s house
where they held another ceremony to denounce the treaty. Later that evening, crowds of between
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two and three hundred men assembled in front of the houses of prominent Federalist
Philadelphians and burned copies of the treaty.90
Federalists treated the meeting with predictable scorn. In private correspondence and
published accounts, they sought to downplay the significance of the gathering. Federalists
furiously debated the Republican assessment of the number of people who attended the meeting.
Correspondents even measured the space in the State House Yard and then divided it by the
average space a single person needs to stand in order to mathematically prove their estimates.
The lengths Federalists went to discredit Republican estimates on turnout suggest that, while
Federalists may have claimed that the town meetings lacked legitimacy, they recognized the
gathering as a threat.91
Federalists also attempted to characterize the meeting’s participants as unrepresentative
of the general public. “The actors generally were an ignorant mob, of that class which is most
disaffected and violent” sniffed Oliver Wolcott.92 In his report to George Washington, Timothy
Pickering assured the President that the majority of people in attendance were simply spectators
who showed up out of curiosity. Of those who were actually there to participate, Pickering
believed, only a fraction had even read the treaty.93 Fenno echoed these descriptions in the
Gazette of the United States. “There were at this meeting” he explained in one article, “as many
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persons immediately around the scaffold as arrived from the last ships from Ireland, interspersed
with about 50 French Emigrants.”94
Other Federalists took their pens up to condemn the entire idea of a town meeting. “The
constituted authorities of the country are the only organs of the national will” they asserted.95
“Contrary to their duties as members of a civil society” argued one polemicist, Republicans have
used “Town Meetings—tumultuous gatherings, where the sober and industrious citizen does not
choose to appeal; which friends of order reprobate as unnecessary, as well as illegal” to try to
subvert the “legal resolves” of the government. These meetings, which are the work of “artful
demagogues,” bring together the “idle” and “turbulent” masses and then claim to speak for the
entire public. The very nature of such meetings prevents “sober discussion.” Anyone who raised
an objection “runs a great risk of being answered by the logic of clubs and brick bats.”96 Town
meetings do nothing more than “subvert all government, and introduce anarchy and confusion.”
It was, therefore, “the duty of every well disposed citizen, to discourage town-meetings.”97
Republicans considered these attacks on town meetings as “a libel on the Federal, and
every free Constitution.”98 Bache asserted that “the constitution expressly warrants such
assemblages of the People” and have been customary for decades. The critics, he argued, were
part of an “aristocratic faction” that sought to silence the public will. “But the voice of the
people” he exclaimed, “will drown their clamors.”99 Other Republicans were quick to point out

94

Gazette of the United States, 27 July 1795.
Aurora, 1 August 1795.
96
Gazette of the United States, 29 July 1795.
97
Gazette of the United States, 31 July 1795.
98
Aurora, 1 August 1795.
99
Aurora, 4 August 1795.
95

58

that Federalists had no problem with the town meetings that met to express support for the
Neutrality Proclamation.100
Federalists did not, however, see anything hypocritical about their approach toward town
meetings. They saw nothing wrong with private citizens meeting in an orderly manner to support
their government. Indeed, an assembly of merchants and traders met in Philadelphia to draft a
memorial in support of the treaty in mid-August. Because they had a “more special interest in the
Treaty than other classes,” the merchants and traders felt it was particularly important to let
Washington know how they felt.101 For Federalists, these types of meetings were not only
acceptable but were becoming an important strategy to mobilize supporters.
Despite the public outcry, Washington signed the Jay Treaty on August 14, 1795. His
signature, however, did not put an end to the debate over the Jay Treaty or the proper role of
town meetings. Republicans howled in protest and accused Washington of blatantly disregarding
the will of the people in favor of the a few “foreigners and old tories” who supported the
treaty.102 Washington’s decision, accused “An American,” threatened to undermine people’s
trust in their government and thereby corrode the fabric of representative government. “[T]he
people must resume sovereignty and exercise it themselves,” he warned, “or they must submit to
a government in which force shall be substituted for opinion and confidence.”103 Federalists, for
their part, continued to argue that elections were the only proper way for the people to influence
government.104
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The Jay Treaty and Petition Drives
Even though the treaty had been officially ratified by the Senate and signed by the
President, it could not go into effect until the House of Representatives, where Republicans held
a 54-49 majority, agreed to appropriate necessary funds. Washington, who was more astute when
it came to popular politics than he is generally given credit for, decided to delay officially
declaring the treaty in effect until some of the passions generated during the summer diminished.
As a result, during the winter of 1795-1796, the Jay Treaty faded from the public consciousness.
Republicans, meanwhile, divided over the proper response. The public had seemed to stand with
them during the summer, but Washington remained wildly popular. A challenge to the treaty
now that he had signed it risked alienating a large swath of voters.
On February 29, 1796 Washington finally issued a declaration that the treaty was in
effect and sent it to the House of Representatives. Before the Republicans had an opportunity to
coordinate their response, Edward Livingston, a Republican from New York, offered a resolution
requesting that Washington provide the House with all correspondence and documents relating to
the Jay Treaty. The resolution was a direct challenge to the President’s authority and implied that
the House of Representatives had the right to decide on the merits of a treaty. Although not all
Republicans found this approach to be the best course of action, they backed the resolution and it
passed with a vote of 62-37. The Pennsylvania delegation voted 8-4 in favor, with all
Republicans joining in calling for the papers. After briefly considering his options, Washington
replied that, while he had no intention of hiding anything from the people, diplomacy required
secrecy and the House had no right to request such information. The Constitution specifically
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grants the President, with the consent of the Senate, full power over foreign treaties. Complying
with the House’s request, Washington concluded, would set a “dangerous precedent.”105
While congressional Republicans considered their next step, the debate raged out-ofdoors. Bache published the names of the representatives who had supported the Livingston
Resolution and called on his readers to “shew, at all future elections, that we deserve to be free,
by the attention and respect we pay to those who so particularly exert themselves to secure our
freedom.” The conduct of those who voted against the resolution, he warned, will be
remembered “when the day of election arrives.”106
Not all Republicans, however, viewed continued opposition to the treaty as the best
course of action. Alexander James Dallas, Secretary of the Commonwealth and a leading
Philadelphia Republican, believed that Washington’s decision effectively put an end to the
debate. Dallas had played a central role in the July town meetings and was a staunch opponent of
the treaty, but he was more moderate than many of his Philadelphia colleagues when it came to
popular politics. According to Dallas, the party needed to maintain a level of respect and
deference to elected officials. Success depended on balancing popular politics with order and the
rule of law. Continued opposition to the treaty, Dallas feared, threatened to undermine the
party’s legitimacy. As a result, Dallas refused to participate in the protests, a decision that earned
him the ire of some of his Republican colleagues.107
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Although they were frustrated by the Republican efforts to block the treaty, Federalists
sensed an opportunity. In the weeks following the Livingston Resolution, Federalists and
supporters of the treaty flooded Congress with petitions and memorials praying that the funds be
appropriated for the treaty. Petitions, as Federalists had learned during the debate over the
Neutrality Proclamation, were a great way to mobilize public opinion in a way that did not
interfere with their view on the role of the citizen. Petitioning was an inherently deferential form
of political mobilization because it was a request, not a direction, and an implicit
acknowledgment that the people cannot participate directly in the deliberative process.108
Federalists throughout the state organized meetings and created committees to go door-to-door
collecting signatures. A central committee in Philadelphia communicated with the other parts of
the state and coordinated efforts. Federalists’ efforts clearly paid off and between the middle of
March and the end of May, at least 44 pro-treaty petitions signed by more than 6,400
Pennsylvanians arrived in Congress. 109
Caught a little off guard, Republicans did their best to counter the wave of pro-treaty
petitions. Because they held a majority in the House, many Republicans had not worried as much
about mobilizing supporters.110 But, as the extent of the Federalist petition drive became clear,
Republicans rushed to collect signatures on petitions opposing the treaty. John Beckley, clerk of
the House of Representatives and one of the key Republican organizers in Pennsylvania, worked
tirelessly to coordinate the response. As he explained to Madison, “a regular correspondence and
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union of effort is maintained and we have already dispersed in Circular letters, all over the States
a petition to the H. of Represents. without, as yet, the smallest suspicion from our opponents . .
.”111 In the end, however, Republicans managed to generate about ten petitions with
approximately 2,600 names.112 The one bright spot for Republicans was that they managed to
collect more signatures in Philadelphia than the Federalists did. Republican John Swanwick, who
represented Philadelphia, presented the largest single petition with 1,500 names.113
Republicans struggled to understand how there could have been such a dramatic change
in public opinion. Fraud seemed the only logical explanation for some. Republicans accused
Federalists of relying on threats and tricks to get people to sign their petition. There were reports
that bank directors had threatened to cut credit if people did not sign the petitions.114 One
correspondent claimed that he was told to “EITHER SIGN THIS PETITION OR YOU WILL
HAVE A WAR” and never informed that the petition had to do with the treaty.115 Supporters of
the treaty apparently told residents that “the House of Representatives is about to declare war
against Great Britain, and will certainly do so unless their constituents petition to the
contrary.”116 Federalists in western Pennsylvania also helped spread a rumor that Pinckney’s
Treaty, an agreement that would have secured Americans navigation rights on the Mississippi,
was somehow tied to the Jay Treaty and that refusing to fund the Jay Treaty would also prevent
Pinckney’s Treaty from going into effect. Access to the Mississippi was a major issue for
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westerners and the rumor appears to have led to at least some people signing a petition calling on
Congress to fund the treaty.117 In the end, whatever methods they used, Federalist supporters of
the Jay Treaty scored a major victory in the battle for public opinion.
Under pressure from their constituents, even some of Pennsylvania’s Republican
congressmen retreated from their opposition to the treaty. Of the eight who opposed originally
opposed the Jay Treaty, only five voted against the final authorization of funds. The three who
switched sides represented commercial districts that would benefit from the treaty and had
received petitions urging them to change their vote. In addition to these three, Daniel Hiester, a
Republican representing Luzerne County who had been absent during the vote on the Livingston
Resolution, voted to support the treaty. Perhaps most frustrating to Pennsylvania’s Republicans
was the fact that William Findley, a representative of Westmoreland and Fayette Counties and
formerly an outspoken critic of the treaty, happened to step out of the room as the votes were
being taken. He later claimed that he had gone to send a chest to his family in the west and had
not realized the vote would be called in his absence. The final vote was 51-48, meaning that had
Pennsylvania’s Republicans held firm they could have killed the treaty.118
The public reaction to the Jay Treaty and Republicans’ failure to prevent its
implementation marked a shift in the role of town meetings. Republicans staged the largest
public assembly since the Revolution, but their efforts proved futile and Washington signed the
treaty anyway. Conversely, Federalists managed to mobilize supporters of the treaty in an
unprecedented petition drive that helped defeat the attempt to block appropriations. Although
they continued to assert the importance of public rallies and stress the need for the people to take
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an active role in their government, Pennsylvania Republicans slowly came to terms with the
reality of the new political culture. As Federalists had shown, the ability to control policy rested
on who controlled the levers of power. Popular support and public opinion mattered, but the
ability to affect policy hinged on winning elections. The Jay Treaty debates drove this point
home. In the wake of their defeat, Republicans turned away from town meetings and focused on
working to secure change through the constitutional system by winning elections and influencing
public opinion through petitions.

XYZ Affair and Republican Response to Town Meetings
The partisan responses to the increased tensions between France and the United States in
1798 and 1799 demonstrate the degree to which attitudes toward town meetings had changed in
Pennsylvania. Whereas Republicans had traditionally defended the rights of town meetings and
asserted the importance of public opinion in controlling the direction of government, in 1798
Republicans condemned public assemblies and accused Federalists of fomenting partisanship.
Indeed, Republicans employed many of the same arguments Federalists had previously used to
try and discredit Republican town meetings. The change in approach is further highlighted by the
fact that Republicans did not turn to large public assemblies to protest the newly passed Alien
and Sedition Acts and chose instead to focus their energy on collecting signatures on petitions.
Taken together, these events demonstrate that Republicans had changed strategies.
On April 3, 1798, President John Adams delivered reports detailing the recent
negotiations between the French Republic and American diplomats. Relations between the two
countries had steadily deteriorated following the Jay Treaty. France had initially held out hope
that the retirement of George Washington in 1796 would open the door to a new administration
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that promoted friendlier relations, but John Adams’s election ensured that would not be the case.
Shortly after the election, French privateers began attacking American merchant vessels. Eager
to avoid a major war, Adams sent an envoy to negotiate with the French Directory. Instead of
welcoming the overture, French officials issued a series of demands, including a bribe to the
French Foreign Minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, which had to be met before discussions
could even begin. Horrified at this insult to American’s honor, the envoys sent detailed reports to
Adams inquiring how to proceed.
President Adams received the first reports from the envoy on March 4, 1798. Knowing
that the French demands would cause uproar, he hesitated to make the reports public. In
Pennsylvania, Republicans continued to back the French and became convinced that Adams
refused to release his correspondence with the diplomats because it contained information that
might damage the Federalist’s reputation. Federalists remained hostile to the French and
committed to maintaining a strong relationship with Great Britain. Finally, on April 3, at the
behest of the House of Representatives, Adams delivered the reports. To protect anonymity, the
names of the diplomats involved were substituted with the letters “X,” “Y,” and “Z.” The
incident has subsequently been labeled “the XYZ Affair.”119
As predicted, the public reacted with outrage. Republicans were dumbfounded and
struggled to find a way to respond. The best defense they could formulate was that the behavior
of a few foreign ministers should not be used to condemn an entire nation.120 Gleeful Federalists
seized on the publication of the dispatches as an opportunity to further rally the public behind the
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federal government. As they had in response to the Neutrality Proclamation, Federalists staged
large public assemblies to demonstrate their support for Adams. With public opinion clearly
running against them, Republicans found themselves in the awkward position of condemning
these rallies and questioning their purpose.
The first Federalist meeting in support of the government occurred in Philadelphia at
Dunwoody’s tavern on Thursday, April 12. Colonel Francis Gurney, a wealthy and well-known
merchant, served as the chair. The participants unanimously adopted resolutions praising
Adams’s actions surrounding the negotiations with France as “wise, just, liberal, and sincere and
entitle him to the grateful acknowledgments of his country.” They subsequently appointed a
committee to draft a petition expressing these sentiments and to collect signatures.121 The
petition, which was printed in the newspapers and circulated throughout the city, asserted faith in
the federal government and outrage at the insult to national honor perpetrated by the French.122

Meetings throughout Pennsylvania adopted similar resolutions. The Grand Inquest
(Grand Jury) for the commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for example, assured the president that the
people were certain that he could to avoid this rupture with France and exclaimed that anyone
who thought otherwise, or who opposed the administration, was surely being paid by a foreign
country.123 The merchants and traders of Philadelphia also met and produced a memorial praising
Adams and stating that “although we may differ in local politics or in our sentiments, as to
particular measures . . . we shall always unite in opposing the attempts of any foreign nation to
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diminish our rights as an independent people.”124 In Reading, “the largest meeting every known
to inhabitants” approved resolutions thanking Adams.125 The citizens of Canonsburg in
Washington County; the towns of Harrisburg, Huntington, and Shippensburg; and Allegheny
County were among the other supporters to praise Adams. In his study of the public response to
the XYZ Affair, historian Thomas Ray found a total of 46 addresses from Pennsylvania, more
than any state in the nation.126 Although the meetings were technically non-partisan, Federalists
clearly saw them as a tool to build support for the party. William Cobbett, the arch-Federalist
journalist, for instance, warned that anyone who did not sign one of the addresses would be
considered “a devoted tool of France.”127
One of the largest meetings occurred on Monday, April 30, at a private residence on
Shippen Street in Philadelphia. Two days earlier, a “general meeting of the young citizens” had
appointed a committee to draft an address lauding Adams’s “wisdom, integrity, and patriotism”
and pledging to “obey with alacrity the first summons of our country, in resisting the invasion of
a foreign enemy.” Nearly 800 young men showed up on the 30th to adopt the address. The
members of the meeting then appointed a committee of three men for each ward and six for the
Northern Liberties and Southward to collect signatures of citizens between the ages of 18 and 23.
Copies of the memorial were deposited at the Library and City Coffee House. 128
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The public responded to these meetings with overwhelming support. More than 5,000
residents signed the petition produced at Dunwoody’s, and another 1,800 signed one from
Lancaster County. The Gazette of the United States reported that “in one of the wards of the city,
every individual excepting five, cheerfully and readily signed the address to the President.” On
May 7, a crowd—estimated at nearly 10,000—assembled to watch as11,000 young men
delivered their petition to President Adams. John Fenno of the Gazette of the United States called
it the most “affecting, pleasing, and animating scene” he ever witnessed.129
Somewhat ironically, Republicans reacted to the meetings in a manner similar to how
Federalists responded to the gatherings surrounding the Jay Treaty. Bache argued that the
Federalist papers exaggerated the number of people who attended the various meetings. For
example, he reported that Dunwoody’s tavern could only hold about 200 people, about half of
the number Federalists claimed. When the Gazette of the United States challenged Bache’s
reporting, a Republican correspondent replied by using geometry to prove that actually only 165
people could fit in the tavern. Just as Federalists had done to Republicans in 1795, the
Republicans now sought to undermine the opposition’s claims that the meetings were “numerous
and general.”130
Additionally, Republicans went to great lengths to discredit the meetings and petitions by
attacking the people who participated in them and their ability to hold a functional meeting. A
correspondent in the Aurora described the young men’s meeting as “a perfect chaos of clamor
and disorder . . . from beginning to end.” Moreover, these “half-fledged friends of order” were
under 21 and therefore “have nothing to do with the affairs of the nation.”131 As for the address
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from the Grand Inquest, another Republican pointed out that the members of Grand Inquest “are
the creatures of the Marshall of the district, and that the Marshal is the creature of the President.
The address must then be viewed as an address of the President himself.”132 Bache also accused
Federalists of misrepresenting petitions and tricking people into signing them by saying that the
documents were designed simply to prevent war and neglecting to mention the condemnation of
France and praise of Adams.133
For the most part, Federalists ignored these attacks. A few correspondents challenged the
Republican portrayal of the meetings, but most Federalists seemed content to let the results speak
for themselves. In Congress, however, Federalists used their popular support to push through a
series of controversial pieces of legislation. Among the new laws passed, the Naturalization,
Alien, Alien Enemies, and the Sedition Acts generated the most controversy.
The Naturalization and Alien Acts increased the number of years an immigrant had live
in the United States before becoming naturalized and invested the President with broad powers to
deport any immigrant deemed a threat. Pennsylvania had always been a popular destination for
immigrants and, during the 1790s, thousands of foreigners entered America through
Philadelphia. Many of these men and women were looking to escape the turmoil in Europe. The
French Revolution and failed Irish uprising, in particular, produced a flood of political refugees
in need of asylum. Upon arriving, some of these immigrants dove headfirst into American
politics. Most immigrants sided with the emerging Republican Party and became fierce critics of
the Federalists. Irish immigrants William Findley, William Duane, and Blair McClenachan, for
example, became prominent leaders in the Republican Party. Federalists, who considered any
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opposition to the federal government illegitimate and dangerous, saw this foreign involvement as
evidence that Republicans were un-American and the Alien Acts were designed to scare
immigrants away from the Republican Party.134
While the Alien Acts focused on foreigners, the Sedition Act targeted the growing
network of Republican newspapers. Most papers in the country tended to support the
administration, but some editors, including Bache in Philadelphia and John Israel, editor of the
Herald of Liberty printed in Washington, Pennsylvania, wielded enormous influence over public
opinion and filled their pages with attacks on Federalists. The Sedition Act sought to muzzle
these men by making it a crime to “write, print, utter, publish . . . any false, scandalous and
malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States.” Violators were
punishable by up to two thousand dollars and two years in prison. Although the law clearly
infringed on the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of speech, Federalists claimed the
Sedition Act was justified because printed attacks against the President or Congress could
weaken the federal government and undermine its credibility.135 In addition to these acts,
Federalists passed legislation that established a new standing army. A series of new taxes were
levied to help pay for the army as well.136
The Federalist war measures presented both a challenge and an opportunity to the
Republican Party in Pennsylvania. The Alien Acts threatened to weaken the party’s base of
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support, and the Sedition Act potentially deprived the party of one of its most important
weapons. The new laws were, however, extremely controversial and provided Republicans with
an opportunity to shift the country’s focus away from their support of the French. These laws
could also serve as issues to rally voters. Therefore, in the summer of 1798 Republicans set about
orchestrating a campaign to force the repeal of the new laws.137
Pennsylvania Republicans had learned from the experience of the Jay Treaty protests and
avoided large-scale town meetings. Instead, they mounted a major petition campaign while
simultaneously using the controversial legislation to muster support for Republican candidates in
the upcoming elections. Additionally, as will be discussed in chapter three, opponents of the
legislation experimented with the concept of popular nullification and used force to prevent the
collection of the new taxes. While Republicans still believed that the people must remain active
and guard against corruption, they had come to accept that change must be accomplished by
working through the constitutional system. The people, explained one Republican, “shew their
patriotism to be genuine when they declare themselves ready, on all occasions, to support [the
Constitution]; but at the same time, make use of the constitutional mode for repeal of obnoxious
laws.”138
The petition campaign began in late 1798 in northeastern Pennsylvanian and quickly
spread throughout the state. Leading Republicans in each county established committees to write
and circulate the petitions. Additionally, Republican newspapers carried many of the petitions.
These efforts paid significant dividends and by January 1799 Pennsylvania Representatives were
being deluged by petitions denouncing the Alien and Sedition Acts. In total, at least 15,200
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Pennsylvanians signed a petition that called on Congress to reconsider the controversial
legislation. Nearly every county sent a petition with the largest number of signatures coming
from Montgomery, York, and Franklin counties.139
The language and tone of the petitions clearly reflects the change in how Republicans’
understood the role of the people. Most petitions were deferential and while they defended the
right of the people to peacefully assemble and petition their government they also acknowledged
that citizens could only offer their suggestions and had no right to directly influence in the
deliberative process. A memorial from Washington went so far as to say that “on ordinary
occasions we deem it inexpedient to interrupt with petitions and remonstrances, the public
deliberations of the Nation.”140 Many of the petitions also explicitly reaffirmed the signers’ faith
and support for the Constitution. A petition from Cumberland County, for example, asserted that
“the welfare of the county almost wholly depends on a rigid adherence of the citizens to the
principles of their government and constitution.” 141
Federalists responded to the petition campaign by claiming that critics of the Alien and
Sedition Acts were primarily foreigners and that any American who signed was a traitor and/or a
threat to order. Because they were either not citizens or enemies of the country, their opinions
did not matter. A Federalist counter-petition called the whole effort to repeal the Alien and
Sedition Acts a “trick of the enemies of order and good government, to revive their almost
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extinguished party.”142 John Fenno, Jr., of the Gazette of the United States claimed that anyone
who supported men like William Duane in his effort to collect signatures on a petition urging
repeal of the Alien Acts was not only un-American but “a fit tenant only for Hell or for
France.”143 Federalists also seized on a scuffle that broke out in the yard of St. Mary’s Church
between a group of Irish-American Republicans trying to collect signatures on a petition and
Federalist congregants as evidence that Republicans were seeking to undermine law and order.
Although the incident, which involved prominent Republican leaders William Duane and Dr.
James Reynolds, resulted in no significant injuries or damage, William Cobbett labeled the
event the “United Irish Riot . ” and criticized Thomas McKean, a Republican and Chief Justice of
Pennsylvania, for interfering with the arrest of Duane and Reynolds.144
Republican leaders did their best to ignore these criticisms and remained focused on
rallying public opinion and mobilizing the people. Federalist accusations, they maintained, were
just an attempt to prevent the people from speaking out against an unjust law. “The impertinent
charge of French influence has nothing to do with this business” explained one Republican
editor. “The question is, whether the citizens shall not employ the means provided by the
constitution” for opposing a law. “Will [the people] calmly bow their necks to this yoke” he
asked, “without one manly effort towards the constitutional mode of redress?” As the quote
suggests, Republicans remained committed to challenging the Alien and Sedition Acts—but only
through legal means.145
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The steady stream of petitions did eventually force the House of Representatives, which
Federalists now controlled, to revisit the laws in late February. Federalists in Congress had
initially tried to refuse the petitions on the grounds that the people had no right to criticize the
government. Republicans, led by Pennsylvanian Republican Albert Gallatin, defended the right
of citizens to petition their government on any subject and accused Federalists of trying to
deprive the people of their basic rights. Republicans managed to have the House officially
receive the petitions, but when the question of whether or not to repeal the Alien and Sedition
Acts was put to a vote Republicans were unable to garner a majority. In February 1799, by a vote
of 52 to 48 the House passed a resolution stating that it was “inexpedient to repeal” the Alien and
Sedition Acts. A similar resolution in defending the increases in military spending passed as
well. The Pennsylvanian delegation split along party lines—four Federalists voted in favor of the
resolutions and seven Republicans voted against them.146 The petition drive had galvanized
supporters and helped Republicans identify supporters but it was not enough.
The failure to repeal the Alien and Sedition Acts provided a stern reminder that if
Republicans wanted to influence policy, they would have to win elections. Petition drives might
convince Congress to take a vote, but they could not change who held a majority of seats. The
best way to secure change was to elect like-minded men. Although Republicans still believed
that citizens had to remain vigilant and guard against corruption, they had come to believe that
the best way to accomplish this was through participation in a party. Petitions and town meetings
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were ways to mobilize supporters and influence public opinion; they were not ways for the
people to participate directly in the deliberative process.
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Chapter 2: Celebratory Politics

Parades, festivals, feasts, and other celebrations dotted the calendar of the early American
republic. Citizens and non-citizens, men as well as women, adults and children, and people from
any background could attend these festivities. These days gave the public an opportunity to take
a break from their daily toils and enjoy some revelry. As historians Simon Newman and David
Waldstreicher have demonstrated, these gatherings could also be used as a form of persuasion to
mobilize supporters and influence public opinion. While these forms of politics out of doors
clearly played an important role in the early national political culture, their significance and
relationship to more traditional forms of politics such as elections and coalition building remains
ambiguous. By exploring the rise of celebratory politics in Pennsylvania through the lens of
political mobilization, this chapter will demonstrate how partisans used public spectacle and
symbolism to secure legitimacy for their viewpoints and to build a popular base of support.147
The celebratory culture that emerged in Pennsylvania during the early republic drew on a
long tradition of popular politics in England. Scholars of English political culture have shown
that the British monarchy used ritual and symbolism to reinforce its power and legitimate the
social order. The English calendar was filled with feast days and carnivals such as Guy Fawkes
Day and celebrations of the monarch’s birthday. Many of these royal festivals filtered across the
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Atlantic during the colonial years, although colonists often appropriated them for their own
purposes.148
The form of celebratory politics that took shape in America also drew from the English
tradition of crowd action. The work of E.P. Thompson, among other historians, demonstrated
that a “moral economy of the crowd” existed in England and that the English crowd used popular
uprisings and riots as a way to police the traditional bounds of society. Activists also employed
ritualized violence to scare and humiliate people who violated custom or tradition. In the
colonies, the English crowd action and festive tradition melded during the eighteenth century to
create a dynamic form of popular culture that would echo throughout early American culture.149
In the years immediately following the Declaration of Independence, Americans
remained suspicious of centralized authority and resisted efforts by the Continental Congress to
use ritual and symbolism as a way to establish legitimacy and build support for the new nation.
Although these efforts had some success and were able to hold that nation together during the
war, the public did not always respond well to Congress’ efforts. “Time and time again,” Irvin
concludes, “the people out of doors responded to Congress in unpredictable and uncontrollable
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ways.” As a result, the Continental Congress simply gave up trying when the war finally ended
in 1783.150
Celebratory politics appeared to be fading away in the early 1780s. In Pennsylvania, the
public remained committed to localism and efforts to honor national holidays suffered from poor
planning and weak attendance. The true pioneers of celebratory politics in America were the
supporters of a stronger national government. Beginning in the late 1780s, Federalists pushed for
a strong central government in which the majority of citizens only participated in the deliberative
process through the franchise. Drawing on the British and colonial traditions, Federalists used
public spectacles such as the celebration of the Fourth of July as a way build support for their
cause. These public events allowed the people to participate symbolically in the formation of a
new nation and demonstrate their consent to the new government.151
Following the ratification of the Constitution, Federalists continued to use holidays
including George Washington’s Birthday to rally support and influence public opinion. These
events, which the Society of the Cincinnati typically organized in conjunction with volunteer
militia companies, emphasized law and order and helped build confidence in the national
government. Additionally, Federalists relied on ceremonies and displays of wealth including the
creation of a new “Republican Court” to reinforce the social hierarchy. To some onlookers, the
culture Federalists promoted seemed dangerously similar to the British court. Critics accused the
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Federalists of plotting to slowly poison the republic with aristocratic practices. Many of these
critics would join the emerging Republican partly in response to these negative reactions to the
Federalists’ celebrations.
In the early 1790s Republicans in Pennsylvania established a counter-celebratory
politics that differed from the one practiced by Federalists. Whereas Federalists used festivals to
promote a sense of nationalism and give the public an opportunity to symbolically consent to the
federal government, Republicans turned to popular political culture as a way to establish
legitimacy and to guard against the forces of monarchy and aristocracy. The concept of a
legitimate opposition had not fully taken shape, and Americans remained deeply suspicious of
factions.152 Public displays of popular support enabled Republicans to assert that they were the
true heirs of the Revolution and not just ambitious demagogues. Voluntary associations like the
Democratic and Republican Societies served as the engine of this effort. Republican leaders also
understood the importance of demonstrating their faith in law and order and tried to project an
image of controlled popular support by distancing themselves from acts of violence.
The two approaches toward popular politics clashed frequently throughout the 1790s, and
the parties staged competing festivals and wrestled for control of the major holidays. The largest
Federalist celebrations occurred on George Washington’s Birthday and the Fourth of July.
Republicans, on the other hand, staged their biggest fêtes on May first, August tenth (in honor of
the creation of the French Republic) and the Fourth of July. The two parties also adopted
different symbols and rituals. Federalist festivals, for example, used symbolism from the Roman
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republic and stressed nationalism and the Constitution, while Republicans utilized imagery from
the American and French Revolutions and emphasized the principles of liberty and equality.
Modes of celebration did not, however, remain static. The downward spiral of the French
Revolution and undeclared war between America and France in 1797 created an environment
hostile to the Republicans. Federalists seized on the possibility of war with France to rally the
public and mobilize a new generation of supporters. Republicans responded by cutting symbolic
ties with Revolutionary France, abandoning the rallying cry of “principles and not men” and
toasting individuals like Thomas Jefferson and Thomas McKean, and focused more on capturing
the mantle of “friends of order” from Federalists. In essence, Republicans turned away from
establishing a counter-celebratory culture and sought to take control of the existing forms of
celebratory politics pioneered by Federalists. This shift in tactics represents a fundamental
change in how Republicans used popular politics. Instead of relying on politics out of doors to
create a popular political culture, they focused on achieving their goals through politics in-doors.
Popular politics became the means to an end not the end itself.153

Celebratory Politics in the 1780s
By 1783 the Confederate Congress had essentially given up trying to assert its legitimacy
through the use of symbolism and ritual. They had succeeded in keeping the country together
during the war, but members of the Congress failed to establish a new popular national culture.
The Congress had attempted to craft a new national identity through new symbols and rituals but
the task proved more difficult than expected. Rendered impotent by the country’s fear of a
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central government, members of the Congress eventually stopped trying.154 Initial attempts by
state and local officials to organize celebrations to honor national events and holidays did not
fare much better. The public’s uncertain relationship with national holidays and celebratory
politics is illustrated by how Pennsylvanians approached the Fourth of July in the years
following the end of the Revolutionary War.155
In 1783, perhaps reflecting a boost in nationalism that accompanied the end of the war,
citizens used the Fourth of July to honor the young nation. In Philadelphia, the day was “ushered
in with the ringing of bells” and the ships in the harbor (excepting Great Britain’s boats)
displayed their flags. After a display of military maneuvers, members of the army joined state
leaders in “an elegant entertainment.” That evening, spectators gathered to witness a torchlight
parade arranged by a local artisan that included a “triumphal car” carrying a sofa bearing
portraits of Washington, Gates, and Rochambeau embroidered on the back. The sofa was made
by a local company and served as a testament to the young country’s manufacturing
capabilities.156 A few blocks away, a group of Philadelphians hosted a dinner at the State House
in honor of the federal army. Toasts to “The United States in Congress,” “New strength to the
union, and new honors to its friends” were echoed with cannon fire and music from a military
band. The guests, although hailing from “nearly every state in the union” behaved “like the
members of one great and happy family.”157
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In contrast to the national themes that dominated the day in 1783, celebrants honored the
state of Pennsylvania on July 4, 1784 and showed little interest in the nation as a whole. Because
the Fourth fell on a Sunday, all celebration except for the ringing of the bells of Christ Church
occurred the following day. On that Monday, John Dickinson, President of the State, hosted an
“elegant entertainment” for members of the Supreme Executive Council and other dignitaries. In
the evening, “the most elegant fire works” lit up the sky. Meanwhile, the Confederate Congress
did nothing to recognize the day, leading one disgusted correspondent to a local paper to ask “O!
INDEPENDENCE wither hast thou fled!” “[H]ave the guardians and directors of our country
forsaken thee?”158
Despite the efforts of a few residents, celebrations in 1785 were not much better. The
University of the State of Pennsylvania held its commencement ceremonies on the Fourth of July
in 1785 and invited students to prepare speeches that reflected both their academic knowledge
and a “love of civil liberty.” A massive audience turned out to hear the orations and some of the
students showed promise, but the day dragged on too long and the audience became restless. A
German choir came to the rescue and breathed some life back into the day.159 Overall, these early
Fourth of July celebrations suggest that the public had no real appetite for national celebrations.

The Society of the Cincinnati and the Origins of Federalist Popular Culture
Beginning in the mid-1780s the Society of the Cincinnati breathed new life into the
celebration of national holidays in Pennsylvania. A hereditary organization consisting of former
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Revolutionary War officers, the Society of the Cincinnati was dedicated to preserving the legacy
of the Revolution. Although the group was technically apolitical, it was composed of men
committed to a strong nation, many of whom would later support the Federal Constitution and
join the ranks of the Federalist Party.160
As former officers of the army, members of the Society of the Cincinnati understood the
art of persuasion. Symbolism and ritual are an integral part of how armies instill discipline and
ensure that soldiers respect their superiors. One of the Society’s first actions was to adopt an
insignia consisting of a gold eagle with the motto Omnia Relinquit servare republicam: “He gave
all to serve the republic.” Even the Society’s name, a reference to the Roman general Lucius
Quintius Cincinnatus, who traded his sword for the plow, is rich with meaning. Members of the
Society used their knowledge of symbolism and ritual to spearhead the effort to revive the
celebration of the Fourth.161
Although the Society of the Cincinnati had been celebrating the Fourth of July in other
cities for years, it was not until 1785 that the Pennsylvania organization gathered on the Fourth.
The group met at City Tavern, one of the most elegant buildings in Philadelphia, and proceeded
to call to John Dickinson, the President of the State, and Thomas McKean, the state’s chief
justice. Practice clearly drew on the tradition of visits by prominent members of the British
military to the King of England on holidays. Afterward, the celebrants returned to the City
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Tavern where they enjoyed an elegant dinner and drank toasts to “Prosperity to the United
States” and “The United States Congress.”162
The following year’s celebrations were even more elaborate and the local newspapers
carried accounts of Fourth of July being recognized in parts of the state other than Philadelphia.
Although 1786 may not have been the first time that citizens in towns like Carlisle or
Germantown actually observed the Fourth of July, the Philadelphia papers dedicated more space
to these descriptions than they had in prior years. In Germantown, for example, celebrants met at
the falls of the Schuylkill River and drank to “The Day” and “The United States” while “the
most respectable inhabitants of Dauphin County” gathered in Harrisburg and toasted “The
United states of America in Congress assembled” along with “Our late glorious commander
general Washington.” This coverage suggests the growing importance of the Fourth as an
American holiday.163
In addition to the number of gatherings multiplying, the festivities themselves became
more overtly political. Members of the Society of the Cincinnati started using the celebrations as
an opportunity to promote a stronger national government. In Philadelphia, the Cincinnati
attended a patriotic sermon that stressed the “indispensible necessity of strengthening the
confidence in our continental councils, and encreasing [sp] the energy of our federal
government.” The speech, which was dedicated to the leading financier and prominent
nationalist Robert Morris, concluded that “to attempt the repair of its feeble constitution, or to
change the confederated system altogether, must soon become an unavoidable alternative.” The
toasts that night included “May the Union, Friendship, and Happiness of these States be forever
162
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uninterrupted by local prejudices, or local interests” and “Confidence in our Continental
Councils, & an Increase of Energy in Our Federal Government.”164
In what would become customary, published accounts of these gathering started to deny
specifically the existence of any political disagreements. Celebrations in the early 1780s made no
reference to people agrees or disagreeing. In the 1780s, however, accounts stressed that those in
attendance had left aside “every foreign consideration” and “united in happy harmony to swell
the triumphant song of that day which fixed the liberties of Americans for ever.”165
The Society of the Cincinnati’s efforts to honor the Fourth of July and use celebration as
a way to promote a stronger national government became an integral part of Federalists’ strategy
for securing ratification of a new federal constitution. Proponents of the new Constitution,
including the majority of members of the Society of the Cincinnati believed that the nation
suffered from an excess of democracy and concluded that too many people participated in the
deliberative process. Moreover, the prevailing approach toward deliberation allowed men who
lacked virtue and who were poorly educated to participate in governance. If the young republic
hoped to survive, Federalists believed, the reins of power needed to be handed to a select group
of educated, wealthy, virtuous men. Despite what their opponents would say, Federalists were
still republicans and felt that most people were unfit to participate in the actual process of
governance. The opportunity for the people to express their sovereignty came on election day.
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Limiting the ability of most citizens to participate in government to voting meant that
Federalists needed to find other ways to ensure support for the new government. Participation in
deliberation is a form of consent. For example, by attending a town meeting, a citizen accepted
that the meeting was a legitimate body. The Constitution granted far less opportunity for the
citizen to express consent than Pennsylvanians had during and immediately following the
Revolutionary War. Celebratory politics was the Federalists’ answer to this dilemma.166 Public
celebrations of the nation as a whole gave citizens a chance to demonstrate their support.
Published accounts, which Waldstreicher and Newman show were an integral part of celebratory
politics, expanded the reach of the physical celebrations and gave readers the opportunity to
symbolically take part in the events.167
The Grand Federal Procession in 1788—a celebration of both adoption of the Declaration
of Independence and the ratification of the Federal Constitution—was the culmination of the
efforts to revitalize the Fourth of July as a national holiday. Federalists, had launched an
unprecedented public opinion campaign in the weeks following the Constitutional Convention.
With the fate of the new national government hanging in the balance, supporters of the new
Constitution used every tool at their disposal to win over undecided voters. In Pennsylvania,
Federalists left nothing to chance and forced through a call for a convention before an opposition
could mobilize. When some of the critics of the new Constitution tried to prevent a vote on
ratification during the Constitutional convention by hiding to ensure the absence of a quorum,
Federalists had the sheriff forcibly haul them to the State House. Their efforts paid off when the
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convention voted 46 to 23 to ratify on December 17, 1787, making Pennsylvania the second state
to adopt the new Constitution.
By July of 1788, ten states had voted to ratify the Constitution, thereby ensuring that the
new nation would have a strong national government. To celebrate their success, Federalists in
Pennsylvania decided to stage the largest parade the country had ever seen. Choreographed by
Francis Hopkinson, a poet and signer of the Declaration of Independence, the Grand Federal
Procession was designed to “express publically an approbation of the new constitution, by all
classes of the community, from the day laborer to the highest functionary of the commonwealth.”
The parade stretched for miles. Elaborately constructed floats that represented the young nation
and paid homage to the city’s different craft guilds awed spectators.168
As historian Len Travers argues, “[a]s a Federalist propaganda, the Grand Federal
Procession was a smashing success.” Hopkinson’s meticulous planning and attention to detail
paid off. Upward of 5,000 people participated in the parade, and another 17,000 gathered to
watch. Somewhat remarkably given the size of the spectacle, no major accidents, disturbances,
or serious problems with the crowd were reported. Even the weather cooperated. The fact that
ratification had been contested and that a large segment of the population remained deeply
suspicious of the new federal government was entirely hidden from view. Instead, the Grand
Federal Procession projected a message that the people as a whole supported the Constitution.
Federalists could not have asked for more from a public spectacle.
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The Celebration of Washington and the Republican Court
Federalist use of public spectacle as persuasion did not end with the ratification of the
Constitution. The Grand Federal Procession may have presented an illusion the new government
received universal approval, but the reality was quite different. Pennsylvania was home to some
of the most outspoken opponents of the new Constitution. Although these Anti-federalists may
have accepted that they had lost the ratification debate, Federalists feared that they would likely
remain hostile to the new government. Popular displays of power would serve as a counterweight
to this opposition voice and reinforce the new government’s authority and legitimacy.
Particularly since the Federalists were attempting to limit the ability of the average citizen to
influence or participate in deliberation, public celebrations played an important role in giving the
people a chance to offer their symbolic consent. Prominent Federalists also saw public spectacle
and ritual as an opportunity to instill proper republican values. Establishing a vibrant celebratory
culture was, therefore, and important part of Federalists’ vision for the future of the county.169
Federalists were fortunate enough to have the most powerful symbol at their disposal: the
acknowledged father of the country, George Washington. The celebration of Washington became
a key component of the Federalist strategy to rally support for the new government.
Unanimously elected to serve as the first president, George Washington seemed to be the one
individual whom all Americans revered, and his role as the first leader of the new country made
him a convenient and universally accepted symbol of the strength, hope, and promise of the new
nation. Washington embodied the young Republic in the minds of many Americans. Only
Benjamin Franklin came close to matching Washington’s popularity, but his age and democratic
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beliefs made him less appealing as a symbol for a strong central government. The General’s
success against the British had earned him the love and, more importantly, the trust of the
American people. His retirement at the conclusion of the war had only strengthened the people’s
faith in his virtue. Federalists were well aware of Washington’s influence and did their best to
harness his popularity for their cause. The importance of Washington’s presence at the
Constitutional Convention, for example, cannot be overstated. Without his blessing, the
nationalist movement would very possibly have failed to overcome the public’s suspicions of a
strong central government. Moreover, as Waldstreicher has shown, the symbol of Washington
connected the Federalist project directly with the Revolutionary War and helped establish the
new government as the culmination of the Revolution.170
Washington certainly did nothing to dissuade Federalists from using him as their national
symbol. He was an ambitious man and a keen politician and, perhaps more than many of his
contemporaries, he understood the importance of ritual and symbolism. For example, he just
happened to be the only man at the Continental Congress dressed in uniform when the time came
to decide on a commander for the army. When called upon to once again lead his nation, this
time as the first president, Washington embraced his role as national patriarch and carefully
crafted a public image he believed fit a republican president. After canvassing some of his
closest advisors on proper etiquette, Washington adopted a stiffly formal demeanor that, at least
according to some critics, was modeled after the British monarch. He traveled in an elegant
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chariot pulled by four white horses that led at least one Pennsylvanian to mistake the president
for a monarch.171
Federalists began using Washington as a symbol to rally support for the nation and the
Constitution before he had even taken the oath of office. The president-elect’s ceremonial tour
from his Mount Vernon home to the temporary seat of the federal government in New York set
the tone for how Federalists would establish Washington as the symbol of the new government
and Federalist vision for the republic. Hordes of supporters and well-wishers gathered to witness
the president-elect make his way up the eastern seaboard. Philadelphia once again turned to the
artist Charles Willson Peale to design and organize a proper welcome for Washington as he
passed his way through the city. Never one for subtlety, Peale built a triumphal arch that slowly
lowered a laurel wreath onto Washington’s head as he passed underneath, literally crowning the
new president as the father of the nation. According to one witness, “thousands of freeman,
whose hearts burned with patriotic fire” joined the procession once it entered Philadelphia.172
The celebration of Washington’s Birthday served as an annual opportunity for Federalists
to rally support for the federal government. Philadelphians gathered on February 22 for the first
time in 1786 to honor the birth of George Washington. Other communities, particularly in
Virginia, had been doing so for years, and the Philadelphia papers occasionally carried accounts,
but no evidence exists that Pennsylvanians had publically observed the day.173 The first
celebration was a small affair hosted by the “Adopted Sons of Pennsylvania,” an immigrant
group composed primarily of men from Ireland who likely saw the event as an opportunity to
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demonstrate their allegiance to their new home.174 Within a few years Washington’s Birthday
grew to become one of the most recognized holidays in Pennsylvania. Local militia companies,
in conjunction with the Society of the Cincinnati, typically took charge of organizing the
festivities. The day usually consisted of a display of military maneuvers accompanied by the
firing of heavy artillery. After the seat of the federal government moved to Philadelphia,
members of the Society of the Cincinnati waited on Governor Thomas Mifflin and President
Washington. In the evening, socialites hosted elegant dinners and soirees. While these events
were technically non-partisan, toasts accompanying the dinner often emphasized support for the
federal government. In 1789, for example, guests drank to “The friends of the federal
government around the union.”175 The following year, celebrants and national representatives
toasted “The Convention and Assembly now convened—may Virtue and Wisdom preside over
their deliberations,” a reference to the state Constitutional Convention that was in the process of
adopting a more conservative state Constitution and one that was based on the federal one.176
Initially, the celebration of Washington appears to have been universally supported.177
Even though Federalists utilized Washington image as propaganda, few people questioned the
rituals. Even Benjamin Franklin Bache, the editor of the General Advertiser and a man who
would become one of Washington’s fiercest critics, wrote in 1792 that “the anniversary of our
President’s birth day, is the most suitable occasion for demonstrations of . . . manly joy and
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decent liberty. As long as Americans feel the blessing of Liberty, and of pure republican
government this day will be remembered as one of the most auspicious in their calendar.”178
The celebration of Washington’s Birthday was just one component of a developing
Federalist culture. Washington and his Federalist allies believed that elegant displays of wealth,
elite social gatherings, and courtly manners would inspire confidence in the new government.
They also believed that a successful society required social distinctions. With this in mind,
Philadelphia Federalists constructed a “Republic Court” that combined traits of the British
aristocracy with republican values. Members of high society competed with one another for the
attention—and patronage—of government officials. Clustered around an area of the city known
as “New Society Hill,” the gentry constructed elaborate mansions, hosted extravagant balls, and
flaunted the finest of clothes. Social calendars burgeoned with invitations to dinners, card games,
theater outings, concerts, and dancing assemblies. The most prestigious gatherings were George
and Martha Washington’s weekly levées, a rigidly formal practice reminiscent of monarchical
rituals.179
Given the new nation’s professed attachment to republican values such as simplicity and
equality, the ostentatious lifestyle of the Republican Court soon drew criticism. As the political
opposition to the Federalists in power grew, some critics questioned whether the demonstrations
of wealth and prestige were appropriate in a republic. “What a pity,” lamented one observer,
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“that in America such distinctions should be ever thought of” despite protestations that “claims
of hereditary birth and honors” mean nothing. Instead of just copying French fashion and styles
of dancing, the author suggested, Americans should take note of the France’s recent “abolition of
titles and distinctions.”180
According to members of the emerging Republican Party, Federalist obsession with
social distinction reflected a secret desire to see America ruled by a monarchy. Republicans
remained committed to a more egalitarian society and began to see the pomp and pageantry of
Federalist ceremonial culture as part of a larger plot to deprive the people of their liberties.
Beginning in 1793, the celebration of Washington’s Birthday, in particular, became a target for
Republican polemicists. Benjamin Franklin Bache, who had heaped praise on Washington only a
few months earlier, led the charge. In January 1793, his paper carried a satirical piece addressed
to “the Noblesse and Courtiers of the United States” advertising an opening for a “Poet laureate”
to prepare some verse for the president’s birthday. The successful candidate must be able to
compose poetry praising “certain monarchical prettiness... such as LEVIES, DRAWING
ROOMS, STATELY NODS INSTEAD OF SHAKING HANDS, TITLES OF OFFICE,
SECULSION FROM THE PEOPLE, &c. &c.” He should also be ready to ridicule the idea of
equality and poke fun at the absurd idea that the “vulgar, namely the people, should presume to
think and judge for themselves.”181
It was not only Philadelphia journalists who feared that the Republican Court surrounding
Washington was inappropriate and a threat to the health of the republic. William Maclay, the
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acerbic Pennsylvania Senator from Chester County, filled his diary with concerns over what he
saw as un-republican behavior. The efforts by Vice President Adams and a few other Federalist
Senators to establish a formal title for the president struck Maclay as silly, unnecessary, and
potentially detrimental. Maclay feared that “if you gave [Washington] the Title of any foreign
Prince or Potentate” then soon “the Manners of that Prince and his modes of Government would
be adopted.” He was equally concerned with Washington’s levêes. Although he understood the
social pressures placed on Washington, Maclay could not condone the “frivolities fopperies” that
surrounded the president. “Levêes may be extremely Useful, in old Countries” he wrote, “But
here I think they are hurtful.”182
Members of the emerging Republican opposition believed that the idolization of
Washington and a Republican Court represented a serious threat to the future of the republic.
Washington’s levêes, explained “Sydney,” may not seem like a big deal but they strike “a
distinction between the public servant and his visitors, a distinction incompatible with a
republican constitution.” Echoing Senator Maclay’s concerns, Sydney warned that Washington
would slowly become accustomed to being treated like royalty and would soon believe he
deserved the honors. Washington would, therefore, forget that he was but a servant of the people.
“In political concerns” Sydney concluded, “liberty is my idol, and to her shrine alone will my
iron knee bend.” Leaders should be respected as representatives of the people and nothing more.
The idolatry of any man ran counter the basic principles of republicanism. 183 As “Cornelia”
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explained, “To homage anyone is to destroy the equality which constitutes the essence of our
sovereignty, and is a degradation of freeman.”184
Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality, issued on April 22, 1793, only exacerbated
tensions. Republicans believed that by remaining neutral in the war between Revolutionary
France and Great Britain, America was turning its back on her closest ally. Not only did the two
countries share a common form of government, but France had joined America against England
during the Revolutionary War. Without French military and economic support, the colonists
would have been hard pressed to triumph over the British. Members of the opposition also
worried that Washington’s decision to declare neutrality without first consulting Congress set a
dangerous precedent. In one particularly inflammatory article, “An Old Solider” spoke directly to
Washington and reminded him that “sovereignty still resides WITH THE PEOPLE, and that
neither proclamations nor royal demeanor and state can prevent them from exercising it.” The
people, he warned, will not suffer “to be the slavish received of proclamatory principles,” nor
will they be blinded by displays of wealth and power. “When the human mind was immerged in
ignorance. . . ostentation, splendor, and parade were thought necessary to impress the ‘swinish
multitude’ with ideas of superiority and sovereignty.” But “these shakels have been broken by
truth.” “Simplicity,” he concluded, “is the gem of republicanism.”185

Republicans and the Construction of a Counter-Culture
The attempt to pull Washington from the pedestal and attacks on the Republican Court
were part of a larger effort by the emerging Republican coalition to establish a counter-political
culture. In an effort to counter what they saw was an effort to undermine the republic, members
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of the opposition attempted to introduce new, republican, rituals and symbols. In order to claim
the legacy of the Revolution and establish themselves as legitimate spokesmen for the people,
Republicans celebrated “Principles not men” and used symbolism from the American and French
Revolutions. The battle between Federalist and Republican versions of popular political culture
was more than a fight over symbols and rituals. Both sides believed that popular politics helped
instill certain values and ideals. For Federalists, the Republican Court would serve as a way to
teach the public to remain deferential. In contrast, Republicans use of symbolism from the
Revolution would inspire the public to remain vigilant in defense of their liberties and rights. The
fight was, therefore, really about the role of citizens in the new country.186
Republican efforts to construct an alternative popular political culture began in earnest in
1792. In the fall of that year, James Madison anonymously published an article that formally
introduced the opposition party. The article, entitled “A Candid State of Parties,” appeared in the
National Gazette, one of the leading anti-administration papers. In the essay, Madison claimed
that, since the ratification of the Constitution, the country had divided into two parties. On one
side were “those who, from particular interest, from natural temper, or from habits of life, were
more partial to the opulent than to the other classes” and who believed “that mankind are
incapable of governing themselves” and therefore assume “that government can be carried on
only by pageantry of rank, the influence of money and emoluments, and the terror of military
force.” “Republicans,” however, are those who believe “in the doctrine that mankind are capable
of governing themselves and hat[e] hereditary power as an insult to the reason and an outrage to
the rights of man.” Although the “antirepublican party” was “weaker in point of numbers,”
Madison warned that they would use whatever means necessary. The evidence, furthermore,
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suggested that the forces of monarchy were on the march. One correspondent fretted that a
“language in praise of monarchical and aristocratical institutions, and in derogation of our
republican systems, which would not have been whispered a few years past” was now
commonplace. To save the republic, “all true friends to liberty ought to be on their constant
guard . . . and to unite firmly in checking the career of monarchy.”187
Republican voluntary societies led the efforts to fend off what they believed to be a
growing threat from the forces of monarchy and aristocracy. The Democratic and Republican
Societies, in particular, spearheaded the campaign to create a republican popular culture. The
first two societies formed in Philadelphia in 1793, and over the next two years another seven
groups took shape throughout the state. Although these organizations were not officially
affiliated with the Republican Party, many prominent Republicans such as James Hutchinson,
Michael Leib, George Logan, and John Swanwick joined. Building on the attacks on the
Republican Court, these men relied heavily on anti-aristocratic rhetoric and called for greater
popular participation. Members of the associations pledged to defend against the natural
tendency of republics to degenerate by keeping a close watch on public officials and giving
support to those “men and measures, which have an influence in promoting the prosperity of the
Commonwealth.”188
The formation of Democratic and Republican Societies represented a challenge to
Federalist conceptions of civil society. Voluntary societies were not new, but the Democratic and
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Republican societies broke with their predecessors by claiming to speak for the people and
seeking to influence public opinion through the press. Committed to a hierarchical society based
on deference, Federalists condemned these organizations as “self-created,” and questioned their
legitimacy. Federalists believed that public institutions and organizations were acceptable as long
as they supported the public good. Because the Democratic and Republican Societies acted as an
intermediary between the people and the government and challenged elected leaders, Federalists
considered them a threat to the republic’s survival. Aeneas, a correspondent in the Gazette of the
United States, summarized this view: “The very circumstance of allowing ourselves to speak
against government, has a tendency to bend our minds that way.”189 Republicans, on the other
hand, argued that such societies were not only proper but necessary to defend against
government abuse. The Democratic and Republican Societies could serve as venues for both
educating average citizens in political affairs and giving them an opportunity to participate in the
deliberative process. Despite the fact that the Federalists never accepted this argument, the
Democratic and Republican Societies helped introduce the concept of a legitimate opposition to
the American public. As historian Jason Frank explained, “in establishing spaces of insurgent
citizenship—spaces of political declamation as well as political deliberation—the societies
helped to create an assertive oppositional political culture.”190
The Philadelphia Democratic Society made its challenge to the Federalist vision of
society and the Republican Court explicit in a circular letter published on July 4, 1793. The day
before, members of the Society agreed to stop using the words “Sir” and “humble servants” in
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their communications. Instead, members would use the title “citizen.” Such measures were
necessary, the circular explained, because “[t]he seeds of luxury appear to have taken root in our
domestic soil.” The letter stated that members of the Society fundamentally disagreed with
“those who imagine that the rulers of a republic may conciliate the favors of monarchs and
despotic courts, by assuming the courtly forms, etiquettes, and manners.” These relics of
monarchy needed to be destroyed and replaced with new republican rituals.191
Revolutionary France was one area the Democratic Society could draw on in their quest
to construct and legitimize new republican customs. The French Revolution provided ample
fodder for partisan disputes in Philadelphia. Originally united in support of a sister Republic, an
increasing number of Americans were becoming uncomfortable with the growing radicalism in
France. The execution of Louis XVI and the outbreak of war between France and Great Britain
convinced many Federalists that the Revolution had gone too far. They feared that the anarchy in
France could poison the American experiment. Republicans proved more willing to overlook this
excess. Seeing the events in France as part of a global struggle against monarchy and tyranny,
Republicans vehemently defended the French cause.192
Philadelphia Republicans eagerly adopted symbolism and rhetoric from Revolutionary
France. For example, members of the Democratic Society agreed to address one another by the
title “citizen.” Other Francophiles wore tri-colored cockades and took to the streets to dance the
carmagnole and sing the Ça Ira. Beginning in 1793, citizens demonstrated their solidarity
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through public celebrations of French holidays and major military victories. Pennsylvania
Republicans hoped to establish themselves as the true defenders of the American Revolution
through this adoption of the symbolism of Revolutionary France.193
Republicans launched their new republican festive culture in a series of celebrations
designed to greet the arrival of French minister Edmond-Charles Genêt in May 1793. Genêt
landed in Charleston in early April and slowly made his way to Philadelphia through seemingly
endless festivals. On the eve of Genêt’s arrival, “A Freeman” called on all Philadelphians to
demonstrate their loyalty to the republican cause by giving the minister a “proper and joyful
reception.” On May 16, Genêt was met by scores of cheering residents. A welcoming committee,
headed by prominent Republicans such as James Hutchinson and John Swanwick, delivered a
speech that praised the French and proclaimed “cultivation of republican principles, as the best
security for the permanency” of the American Republic. The crowd erupted as Genêt expressed
his gratitude and embraced members of the committee. “It is impossible to describe with
adequate energy the scene” reported one observer. “Every man who joined in the address…had
at once testified his gratitude to a faithful ally, in the hour of distress, and demonstrated his
attachment to those republican principles which are the basis of the American government.”194
Following the address, leading Republicans hosted a massive banquet at Oeller’s tavern. Guests
were treated to a “heavily-laden table, gaily decorated with French and American flags and
liberty caps.”195 Though Genêt’s subsequent impolitic behavior certainly caused some
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embarrassment, for the time being the majority of Republicans continued to support the French
cause.196
The welcome parties for Genêt were simply an overture. Between 1793 and 1796, the
Democratic and Republican Societies, along with other Republican-leaning voluntary societies,
hosted a number of festivals and parades to rally supporters and demonstrate allegiance to
republican principles.197 The most elaborate of these events, labeled the “Feast of Reason,” took
place on August 10, 1794, in honor of the founding of the French Republic. A few days before
the celebration, “A Citizen” wrote in the General Advertiser that “Next to the 4th of July, none
has a greater claim to the attention of the American public than THE 10th OF AUGUST.” The
author encouraged all citizens to participate in the day’s festivities. Simply by “participating in
the celebration,” Philadelphians were “sensibly lending [their] aid to the cause of Liberty and
equality throughout the Universe.”198
Republicans carefully scripted their public spectacles to ensure order. Organizers of the
Feast of Reason held a public planning meeting, and the details of the day’s schedule were
printed in advance to help ensure everything went according to plan.199 The published
arrangements provide a rare glimpse into the structure of public festivals and demonstrate the
importance of order. Along with a detailed list of instructions for participants, the schedule
includes the statement that “the dignity of the people on public festivals or ceremonies should be
evinced by the decency and majesty which they give to them by their silence and respect.”
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Citizens were reminded that the “festival is to be celebrated under the auspices of fraternity” and
that they were therefore “invited to attend without arms, but with their uniforms, if possible.”200
“Several thousands” of people turned out for the spectacle. The festivities commenced
with the firing of artillery and a large procession of French and American residents. The parade
was headed by local dignitaries, providing a visual reminder of the need for some social
discipline. Following them, four men carried “an obelisk on which were painted the attributes of
liberty and equality, and surmounted by a Liberty cap.” Women dressed in white and— “adorned
with three coloured ribbons”—spread flowers around the obelisk. Participants marched to the
beat of drums, giving the procession a militaristic undertone. After winding through the city, the
parade entered the gardens of Jean Fauchet, Genêt’s successor as French minister. In the garden
they “erected an altar to liberty, with an elegant statue of the goddess of liberty on it.” After
singing the Marseillaise and a listening to a series of speeches, the crowd heard an account of
the day’s festivities that would be carried in the local newspapers. At the conclusion of the
formal celebration, the crowd took to the streets “dancing the Carmagnole to the sound of drum
and cannon.” That evening, nearly 500 residents dined at Richardet’s Hotel where they were
treated to an elaborate fireworks display and drank to “Mankind: may they be no more the
property of a few individuals” and “May death, like lightening, strike every hypocrite and false
republican.” Overall the day was a massive success. The crowd did, at one point, burn a British
flag, but otherwise the events unfolded exactly as planned.201
The Feast of Reason was a Republican counterpart to the Federalist Grand Federal
Procession. Whereas the Federal Procession celebrated the new government and Constitution,
200
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the Feast of Reason honored “liberty, equality, and fraternity.” Federalist symbols such as the
rising-sun or eagle were replaced by tri-colored cockades and liberty caps. With these symbols,
Republicans consciously sought to link their cause with the ideals of the Revolution. Both
festivals strove to mobilize the people of Philadelphia in an organized manner and, just as the
success of the Grand Federal Procession helped rally support for the new Federal Constitution,
the Feast of Reason helped Republicans establish legitimacy.

Republican Mobilization: Liberty and Order
While Republican efforts to build a new popular political culture achieved some success,
Republicans struggled to find a balance between liberty and order. News of the Reign of Terror
in France dramatically underscored the danger of unrestrained crowd action.202 Republican
leaders knew that their ability to challenge the Federalist leadership hinged on a peaceful,
nonthreatening, mobilization of common Pennsylvanians. Federalists would seize on any signs
of disorder as proof that the Republicans promoted anarchy and confusion and posed a threat to
the nation. As they became more vocal in their opposition, Republican leaders found controlling
the crowd increasingly difficult. On May 5, 1794, only a few days after a Civic Festival in
celebration of the French victory at Toulon, trouble erupted on the Philadelphia docks. Rumor
spread that a small merchant vessel was preparing “to take provisions or something else to the
English fleet.” Whether inspired by hatred for the British or support for the French, a mob
gathered, tore down the ship’s mast and dragged it ashore. The destruction would likely have
escalated had not Alexander James Dallas, a Republican leader, arrived and managed to
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convince the crowd to disperse.203 In June, protesters filled an effigy of John Jay with
gunpowder and hung it near the center of town. After a mock trial, the crowd executed Jay with a
model guillotine and blew him up.204
Even the Republican campaign against Federalist symbolism threatened to get out of
hand. In late July, a letter signed “Order” appeared in the General Advertiser expressing shock at
the discovery of a figure of King George II on the east end of Christ Church. “I think it sufficient
only to hint” the letter warned “that prudence will dictate to have it removed in a peaceful
manner.” If the officials refused to abide by this request, “it will be done for them.” Another
writer described the statue as a remaining weed from the poisonous “root of royalty.” The
destruction of the image could serve “as a sacrifice at the shrine of pure democracy.”205 After
reading the letter, Philadelphia Republican John Swanwick, who professed to “a considerable
share of democratic fanaticism” himself, “immediately conceived that this cardwriter had a
superior quantum of asses’ brains” and “censure[d] citizen Bache” for printing the piece. 206
Swanwick and other more moderate Republicans scorned such threats of violence and
destruction of property because they undermined their attempts to establish legitimacy.
The Whiskey Rebellion, which erupted in late July 1794, posed the greatest threat to
Republican attempts to establish themselves as the true spokesmen for the people. Federalists
seized on the insurrection as evidence that the Democratic and Republican Societies, along with
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their Republican allies, were promoting anarchy.207 “The Democratic Societies,” claimed one
correspondent, “are a species of the Jacobin Clubs…The one destroyed a government founded in
tyranny, oppression, and violence—and substituted another, that contemplates the peace, liberty,
and happiness of its citizens—The other appears to be emulous in assailing and battering to
pieces the best and most free of all governments—and to erect one replete with anarchy and
confusion.”208 Influential Federalists like Alexander Hamilton and George Washington added
their considerable weight to the debate and joined the chorus of denunciations.
As will be discussed in detail in chapter three, Republican leaders used the Rebellion as
an opportunity to demonstrate their faith in law and order. For the most part, Republicans in
Pennsylvania expressed sympathy for the plight of their western brethren but condemned any
unlawful action. The strategy proved effective, and most of the leaders escaped unscathed.
Conversely the Democratic and Republican Societies began to slowly wilt following
Washington’s public criticism.

Popular Politics in Conflict: The Fourth of July
Federalists viewed the rise of this opposition culture with a mixture of contempt and
alarm. Just as Republicans believed Federalists were plotting to undermine the republic,
Federalists saw Republicans as a threat to the country. As members of the federal government,
Federalists considered themselves as the only legitimate spokesmen for the people. Republicans,
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they feared, were part of a larger democratic conspiracy that, if unstopped, would plunge the
country into anarchy. The Republican leaders were nothing more than “ambitious knaves” and
demagogues who preyed on the ignorance of the masses. These self-styled “friends of the
people” explained one Federalist “use every means to make the people abhor the laws, the
constitution, and the executive officers.”209
Thus, despite the fact that by the mid-1790s two clearly defined parties existed, neither
side admitted to party building nor acknowledged their opponent’s legitimacy. Instead, both saw
their efforts as necessary to defend the country against the machinations of groups of men bent
on destroying the republic. Both groups saw popular politics as an opportunity to demonstrate
popular support and claim the mantel of defender of the Revolution. As a result holidays and
celebrations, particularly the Fourth of July, became key battlegrounds in the struggle for
legitimacy.210
As mentioned previously, the Society of the Cincinnati established the Fourth of July as a
day to celebrate the nation and, beginning in the late 1780s, Federalists used the holiday as a way
to promote the Constitution and build support for the national government. In contrast,
Republican Fourth of July celebrations emphasized the principles of the American Revolution.
Perhaps just as important, Republicans used the day as a chance to demonstrate loyalty to the
nation. By cloaking themselves in the rhetoric of nationalism, Republicans could ward off
accusations of being a faction or promoting French-style anarchy.
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Newspaper evidence indicates that opponents of the Federalists held their own
celebrations on the Fourth of July as early as 1789 in Carlisle, but Republicans did not regularly
gather separately in Philadelphia until 1792.211 That year the National Gazette carried an article
on the Fourth of July entitled “Rule for changing a limited Republican Government into an
unlimited hereditary one.” “It being necessary,” the article began, “in order to effect the change,
to get rid of constitutional shackles, and popular prejudices, all possible means and occasions are
to be used for both these purposes.” The “rules” suggested beginning by instilling the public with
veneration of public officials and teach them to refrain from questioning authority.212 Federalists’
popular political culture was, therefore, clearly the first step in undermining the republic.
Republicans hoped to prevent this subversion by staging their own celebration. As one
Republican explained, “At a time when some of our Citizens appear disposed to view
Monarchial Power. . . different. . . [than] . . . they viewed it in 1776, we hope it will not be amiss
to remind them of the principles and feelings of the Citizens of the United States in that
memorable Year.” Instead of celebrating the Constitution and venerating public officials,
Republicans wanted use the Fourth of July as an opportunity to remind the public of both the
dangers of excessive centralization and the strength of collective action. Honoring the
Revolution also helped Republicans reaffirm their patriotism.213
A heavy thunderstorm on the afternoon of July 4, 1792 forced celebrants to postpone a
fireworks display. Seeing an opportunity, Republicans decided to reschedule the show for the
Fourteenth of July to coincide with a planned celebration of the anniversary of the fall of the
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Bastille. By combining the two holidays, Republicans highlighted the shared principles of the
French and American Revolutions. On the Fourteenth, Philadelphians awoke to the sound of
cannon fire from various ships draped in the colors of the French and American flags. Following
a “brilliant display of Rockets and other fire-works” a select few retired to Oeller’s Hotel to
enjoy a “splendid repast.” Following the feast, guests toasted “The French Nation; the
Constitution, and King,” “Liberty or Death,” “The Rights of Men,” along with “The President of
the United States.” Following the celebration, one Republican mused that, in the future,
Americans might celebrate the Fourteenth of July “as our second day of eminence in the calendar
of Liberty.”214
Republican efforts to claim the Fourth of July did not go unnoticed. John Fenno, the
editor of the Federalist Gazette of the United States, responded to the idea of celebrating the
Fourteenth of July as a second national holiday with an article that defended the Fourth of July as
the day that rightly “receives more pointed attention from the citizens of the United States” than
any other day. “It is the birth-day of a nation—it is the triumph of reason and liberty.” But, as
Fenno was quick to point out, Americans only “realized what the word Independence imports—
Laws and Rights—Peace and Prosperity—Credit and Confidence are the rich possession we now
enjoy” after the ratification of the Federal Constitution. Lest anyone miss the point that the new
federal government deserved the credit, Fenno concluded by noting that “every anniversary
return since March, 1789 [when the federal government first convened] is noticed with additional
demonstrations of joy festivity, and splendor.”215
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Over the next few years, the two parties continued to stage separate celebrations on the
Fourth of July. Because both sides denied that their activities constituted party building, accounts
of the celebrations often downplayed differences. Nevertheless, the increasingly partisan nature
of these meetings is clear in the published list of toasts. These salutations were not simply a way
to drink more, they were an opportunity for a group to assert their principles. Typically, a select
group drew up a list of toasts before the event, and guests offered their consent to the toast by
raising their glasses. The number of set toasts often carried significance. For example, Federalists
would drink thirteen toasts in honor of each of the original states. In some instances, after
drinking to the pre-approved tributes, guests had the chance to offer “volunteer” toasts. Guests
sometimes ended up raising their glasses to upwards of twenty toasts. Passing along the list of
toasts to the local newspaper editor allowed the group to broadcast their message to a wider
audience.216
By the mid-1790s, lists of toasts consumed throughout the state and nation filled the
newspapers in the weeks following the Fourth of July. Each year the salutations became more
blatantly partisan. In 1794, for example, Republican groups such as the Democratic Society
drank to “The genuine republicans of all nations,” “Democratic associations,” “the Jacobin Clubs
of America,” “our allies, and brethren, the Sans Culottes of France,” and reminded the
“representatives of the people…[to] never forget the source of their power and the end of the
appointment.” Groups more aligned with the Federalists, however, such as the Society of the
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Cincinnati, toasted “the United States of America,” “The Fair Daughters of Columbia,”
“Universal liberty” and “the President of the United States.”217
As the competing lists of toasts suggests, the battle over the Fourth was waged in print as
well as in the streets. Printed accounts amplified the event’s message and allowed a much wider
audience to participate. Particularly because the celebrations occurred in Philadelphia, home to
the federal government and where the Declaration of Independence had been signed, the printed
account would often be reprinted throughout the nation. In some ways the published account was
more important than the actual event. Not only would it be how the majority of people learned of
what happened, but it would shape how the event was remembered. Both Federalists and
Republicans understood the importance of published accounts, and the organizers often
appointed a specific person to take notes on the day’s events. As had been happened at the Feast
of Reason, some events even concluded with a reading of the description that would appear in
the newspaper.218
The importance of the public accounts of the proceedings often led to conflicting
accounts of how many people attended, what toasts made and whether or not the festivities
remained peaceful. For example, Federalist and Republican newspapers gave remarkably
different versions of what transpired on July 4, 1795. As mentioned in ch 1, in the summer of
1795 Republicans were incensed with the news of the Jay Treaty. Tensions, which had been
building for months, spilled over when Bache published the previously secret provisions of the
treaty on July 1. The Senate had already ratified the treaty, but Republicans nevertheless held out
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hope that Washington would refuse to sign. Fourth of July celebrations thus took on added
significance as Republicans hoped to use the day as an opportunity to broadcast their
disapproval.219
Federalists and Republican newspapers struggled to define the tone of celebrations before
the Fourth had even arrived. The pages of the Republican Aurora teemed with articles attacking
the Jay Treaty, and on July 3 “A Militia-Man” encouraged his fellow militiamen to demonstrate
their opposition to the Treaty by refusing to participate in the regular parade. Instead, soldiers
“ought to be clad in mourning to manifest your sorrow at the last anniversary of American
Independence” because the Jay Treaty “had again made you the colonies of Great Britain.”220 A
Federalist correspondent responded in the Gazette of the United States, claiming that “[t]o judge
from what the eye sees, the ear hears, the mind understands, and the federal grateful heart feels—
no people were ever so favored in a government, and so happy, as the people of the United
States.” Based on the representations of the Republicans, however, “the people of no country
ever had greater cause of mourning, discontent, mobs, seditions, and treason, that the citizens of
the United States.” Despite these efforts, the author concluded that all signs point to the fact “that
the Anniversary of Independence will be honored tomorrow with demonstrations of felicity and
congratulation superior to those which have distinguished any proceeding celebrations.”221
Both sides claimed to have correctly predicted the tone of the celebrations. The
Republican leaning Independent Gazetteer declared that “the birth day of American liberty was
celebrated in this city with a funeral solemnity.” Citizens looked “dejected” and the entire day
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felt “more like the interment of liberty than the anniversary of its birth.” A somber procession of
a large effigy of John Jay replaced the usual festive parade. The effigy of Jay held a pair of scales
in his right hand in which “British Gold” weighed more than “American liberty and
Independence.” In his left, he carried a copy of his treaty “which he extended to a group of
Senators, who were grinning with pleasure and grasping at the Treaty.” A label coming from
Jay’s mouth said “Come up to my price and I will sell you my Country.” According to the
Independent Gazetteer “a great concourse of People” took part in the procession that marched
from Kensington in the outskirts\ through the center of the city. Spectators remained absolutely
silent “and scarcely a whisper was heard” until the procession made its way back to Kensington,
a heavily Republican neighborhood. The crowd then burned the effigy “amid the acclamation of
hundreds of citizens.” The Republican account finished by affirming that “[n]ever was a
procession more peaceably conducted, no noise, no riot. The citizens seemed to vie with each
other in decorous behavior.”222
The Federalist Gazette of the United States gave a remarkably different version of what
transpired. Unless “we are strangers to those demonstrations of satisfaction and joy” explained
one Federalist, “we never witnessed more heartfelt happiness than beamed from the
countenances of our fellow citizens on that auspicious day.” As usual, he claimed, the city
echoed with cannon fire and the ringing of bells as residents partook in various “civic and
military processions.” Militia groups dined together and drank toasts such as “The Citizens of the
United States: May their love of freedom be equaled by nothing but their respect for laws” and
“Governor Jay.” According to this account, the processions described in the Independent
Gazetteer did not occur until “a very late, and silent hour of the night, when the sober citizen had
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retired to rest” and consisted of no more than “a few idle and ill-intentioned persons” who were
clearly “ashamed of their conduct.” After sneaking through a few side streets, the small group
retreated to “a remote corner” of the city to burn what they claimed to be an effigy. The actions
of these few men, concluded the author, hardly constituted a large procession. Nor did they
reflect the views of the majority of Philadelphians.223
The Republican version of what happened, Secretary of the Treasury Oliver Wolcott
explained, was nothing more than “a good story” and a “lie, told for the purpose of deceiving the
people at a distance.” The silence and solemnity of the Republican celebrants described in the
Independent Gazetteer stemmed from cowardliness and shame. A Federalist from Pittsburgh
suggested that not only did the Republicans not act in an orderly and dignified manner, but their
actions were reminiscent of the events leading up to the Whiskey Rebellion. He therefore
predicted that “we may expect shortly to hear of an insurrection in Philadelphia.”224
Ascertaining which version is correct is impossible and the truth likely lies somewhere in
between, but the incident highlights the importance of the press and control of the narrative. Both
Federalists and Republicans in Philadelphia understood that people from across the country
would read about their actions. In the end, however, what really mattered was whether
Washington decided to sign the treaty. Despite their attempts to rally public opinion and
demonstrate popular outrage, Republicans failed to change the president’s mind. They
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successfully organized some of the largest rallies in cities and towns across the country, but
Washington ultimately determined that the treaty was the best Americans could hope for.

Volunteer Militia Companies and the Federalist Cultural Offensive
Beginning in approximately 1796, Republicans in Pennsylvania changed how they
approached popular politics. Their inability to stop the implementation of the Jay Treaty, in
conjunction with the decline in the Democratic and Republican Societies and increasing tensions
between the United States and France, forced them to reevaluate their previous strategy.
Additionally, the Whiskey Rebellion and the Reign of Terror in France dramatically illustrated
the potential dangers of an excess of democracy. As a result, Pennsylvania Republicans moved
away from relying on volunteer societies dedicated to protecting the principles of the American
Revolution and organized militia companies, tempered their support for France, scaled back the
use of Revolutionary imagery, moved away from the celebration of “principles and not men” and
began promoting individuals. Once he retired from office, Republicans even reversed themselves
on the cult of Washington and competed with Federalists to claim the General’s legacy. Finally,
the young party invested more time and effort in electioneering, and many of the leaders of the
Democratic and Republican societies ran for public office. These changes did not represent a
fundamental shift in the party’s principles. Members remained committed to protecting liberty
and supported popular participation in government. The major difference was that, instead of
competing to create a separate form of celebratory politics, Republicans in the latter part of the
1790s focused on gaining control of the existing political culture.
The absence of the Democratic and Republican Societies and rise of Republican militia
groups was one of the most conspicuous changes in how Pennsylvania Republicans approached
115

popular political culture in the latter part of the 1790s. The Democratic and Republican Societies
had been the primary organizers of many of the Republican festivals and parades. The groups
had provided a structure and helped the nascent opposition develop its own rituals and symbols.
By 1796, however, the Democratic and Republican Societies had ceased to meet. Members had
done their best to distance themselves from the Whiskey Rebellion but Washington’s public
denunciation of the Democratic and Republican Societies as “self created” and a threat to the
republic effectively killed the groups. Although other Republican-leaning voluntary societies
such as the Society of St. Tammany, continued to meet and Republicans formed new groups
including the “True Republican Society,” the collapse of the Democratic and Republican
Societies left a void. Over the next few years Republicans formed a series of volunteer militia
companies and new, more overtly-partisan voluntary societies, as one way to fill this void.225
State and federal militia law required all able-bodied white males between the ages of
eighteen and forty-five to enroll in the militia. Under the 1793 Pennsylvania Militia Act, citizens
could fulfill this requirement by serving in the state militia or in a separately created volunteer
company. Men who signed up with the state militia could appear on muster days in plain clothes
and without a weapon, but members of the volunteer companies had to purchase a special
uniform and supply their own equipment. Volunteers also met more frequently which meant that
they had to have a significant amount of leisure time. As a result, volunteer companies tended to
attract the wealthy and upper classes.226
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During the early 1790s, most volunteer militia companies aligned themselves with the
Federalists. Prominent Federalist leaders such as William Bingham and Robert Wharton served
as officers. A significant overlap also existed between men who joined volunteer companies and
members of the Society of the Cincinnati. As mentioned previously, the militia played a central
role in Federalist holidays. Volunteer militia groups tended to do much of the organization for
Federalist celebrations and the display of various maneuvers often served as the main attraction.
Volunteer companies also joined with the Society of the Cincinnati to visit George Washington
and Governor Mifflin on holidays.227
One of the most prominent Federalist militia companies was “MacPherson’s Blues,”
organized by William MacPherson during the Whiskey Rebellion. A veteran of the
Revolutionary War and officer of the Society of the Cincinnati, MacPherson had served as a state
legislator and in the Pennsylvanian ratifying convention. He supported the Constitution and
became a confidant of Alexander Hamilton. Nearly 600 men joined the Blues during the
Whiskey Rebellion. Although the group was officially non-partisan, published toasts and voting
records demonstrate that the majority of members supported the Federalists.228
The emerging Republican Party took notice of the Federalist sympathies of the volunteer
companies and began to criticize them as elitist and part of the Republican Court.229 Republicans
took particular joy in begin able to criticize companies such as MacPherson’s Blue as “selfcreated.” Since President Washington had weakened the Democratic and Republican Societies
by publically denouncing them as self-created, Republicans took every opportunity to challenge
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various Federalist groups on the same grounds. In August 1795 “Senex,” a correspondent in the
Republican Aurora, pointed out that the Blues had been “raised for a specific purpose”—to help
quell the Whiskey Rebels. Why, he asked, was the company still needed? “The law no longer
acknowledges it, and if it is continued the law notwithstanding, it will be a self-created body of
the most dangerous kind.” Tapping into deep-seated fears of a standing army, Senex warned that
the group threatened the republic. The Blues were particularly dangerous because the company
was “made up of men possessing the same political sentiments. Senex concluded that if the Blues
did not soon disband, other, presumably Republican, companies would form in opposition.230
The criticisms fell on deaf ears, and the increasing tensions with France and the fear of
war led to the organization of more voluntary companies. Hordes of Federalists joined volunteer
companies and pledged to defend their country. As one observer recalled, throughout the spring
and summer of 1798 “[w]arlike excitement was so extreme that not to signalize alacrity to fight
the French was a defect of patriotism, or even courage.”231 Young men in particular flocked to
the volunteer militia companies. With no actual combat occurring, the militia units and partisan
warfare offered these men the next best opportunity to assert their manhood and patriotism. An
address circulated among the working class neighborhood of the Northern Liberties called on the
“youthful arm of America” to “rise up, gird on the armor of defense, stand before your aged
parent and your wives” and defend the nation.232 Although the address called on all young men,
as historian Albrecht Koschnik explains, “the young Federalists practiced an exclusionary
patriotism: they invited volunteering and demanded patriotic action, but accepted volunteers only
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on their own partisan terms.” The officers of McPherson’s Blues, for example, screened
applicants and rejected those whose commitment to Federalism was suspect.233
The volunteer companies used symbolism as a way to demonstrate their partisanship. At
the behest of the arch-Federalist journalist William Cobbett, the Federalist companies began
wearing a black cockade in their hats. Soldiers during the Revolutionary War had occasionally
donned the black cockade, and the Society of the Cincinnati adopted the emblem after the war.
Cobbett believed that the black, or “American,” cockade was a great way for Federalists to
demonstrate their patriotism and single out those Republicans who still supported France.
Signatures on a petition are important, he explained, but only a few people actually see them. A
cockade, on the other hand, “will be seen by the whole city, by the friends and the foes of the
wearer.”234
In addition to the display of black cockades and organization of new volunteer
companies, Federalists composed songs and odes that expressed reverence for the federal
government and condemned the French. Songs such as “Adams and Liberty” and “God Save
George Washington” echoed throughout the state. Joseph Hopkinson, a Philadelphia attorney,
wrote “Hail Columbia” in early 1798. The song, which was set to the tune of the “President’s
March,” was met with “unbounded and repeated plaudits” when it debuted in Philadelphia.
According to one witness, there had never been such excitement “witnessed in a public place; not
even at France at the commencement of the revolution.”235
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Federalists also sought to remove Republican and French songs from the repertoire. In
the early 1790s, Republicans and proponents of the French Revolution had frequently used song
and dance as a way to express their support for the French cause. The Ça Ira, the Marseillaise,
and the Carmagnole were the most popular. As historian Simon Newman pointed out, while the
songs were meant simply to entertain on one level, “it was all but impossible for contemporaries
to ignore their political nature.”236 The political climate changed so dramatically that, by 1798,
theatergoers hissed and booed when the Philadelphia orchestra played Ça Ira. One Federalist
correspondent demanded the theater cease playing any song “that bears the least tincture of
French principles.” Refusing to heed the request, another Federalist warned, could be
dangerous.237
While Federalists flaunted their popular support, Republicans struggled to hold their
ground. With the Democratic and Republican Societies defunct, the opposition lacked
organization and their efforts at creating a separate popular political culture floundered. In the
early 1790s, for example, Republicans had proudly worn red, white, and blue cockades to
demonstrate their support for France. In 1794 Bache even suggested a design and asserted that
the cockade would “properly distinguish Republicans, when they meet on days of civic
rejoicing.”238 The French minister Pierre-Auguste Adet echoed the call in 1796 and suggested
that all Frenchmen residing in America wear a tricolored cockade.239 By 1798 Bache had
concluded that the cockade was no longer serving its purpose. “Citizens have no business with
cockades,” he wrote, “it is a military emblem which ought only to be worn by a soldier.” Bache,
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therefore, “earnestly recommended to the Republicans, the real friends of order, not to think of
assuming any badge liable to misconstruction.” In short, it was time for Republicans to abandon
any symbol that might link Republicans to the French.240
Bache was not alone in thinking that Republicans needed to distance themselves from
France. When members of the “True Republican Society,” a new Republican voluntary society,
considered displaying a French flag, a Revolutionary War veteran stood up and declared, “I was
one of those who pulled down the Flag of Britain in ’75, and I now inform you that if that of
France is hoisted, I shall pull it down.” The group took “this broad hint” and rejected the idea.
But it would take more than removing the French flag for Republicans to disassociate themselves
from France.241
Despite these attempts to change their image, Republicans suffered for their previous
support for France. Although the country had originally stood united with the French, by 1797
public opinion had changed dramatically, and being associated with France had become a
liability. The XYZ Affair, in particular, severely damaged Republican efforts to establish
themselves as a loyal (and legitimate) opposition. When the public learned that President Adams
was withholding dispatches from a diplomatic envoy sent to France to resolve the growing crisis,
Republicans became convinced that the letters contained information that would damage
Federalist efforts to use the threat of war to mobilize supporters. In reality, Adams knew that the
contents of the letters were so damning that the public might demand war. The dispatches told
the story of how the French Foreign Minister Charles Maurice de Talleyrand had demanded
bribes and promises of loans before he would even officially receive the diplomats. Shocked by
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the minister’s impertinence, the diplomats had written Adams to find out how they should
respond to the insult. With no knowledge of Talleyrand’s actions, Republicans assumed that the
dispatches portrayed France in a positive light. At least one Pennsylvania Republican, however,
Representative Albert Gallatin, sensed that the dispatches might contain some damaging
information. He was overheard telling a colleague that, “You are doing wrong to call for those
dispatches. They will injure us.”242
Adams released the dispatches on March 20, 1798. The information stunned Republicans
and infuriated Pennsylvanians. From Philadelphia, Abigail Adams noted that “The public
opinion is changing here very fast, and the people begin to see who have been their firm
unshaken friends, steady to their interests and defenders of their Rights and Liberties.” Anyone
who dared appear in public with a tricolored cockade risked being assaulted. The wife of a
prominent Philadelphia Republican described the atmosphere as “a state of society destructive of
the ties which ordinary times bind one class of citizens to another” where “friendships were
dissolved, tradesmen dismissed, and custom withdrawn from the Republican party.” Women
ripped partisan badges off one another’s dresses, and a Federalist mob attacked Benjamin
Bache’s home.243

242

Raymond Walters, Jr. Albert Gallatin: Jeffersonian Financier and Diplomat (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 1957), 107. On the XYZ Affair see, Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the
Undeclared War with France, 1797-1801), 36-73; Thomas M. Ray, “’Not One Cent for Tribute’: The Public
Addresses and American Popular Reaction to the XYZ Affair, 1798-1799” Journal of the Early American Republic
3:4 (Winter, 1983), 389-412.
243
Abigail Adams to March Cranch, 13 April 1798 in Stewart Mitchell, New Letters of Abigail Adams, 1788-1801
(Charleston: Nabu Press, 2011), 155-157; Rosemarie Zagarri, Revolutionary Backlash: Women and Politics in the
Early American Republic (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 86-87; Susan Branson, These
Fiery Frenchified Dames: Women and Political Culture in Early national Philadelphia (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2001); Frederick B. Tolles, George Logan of Philadelphia (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1953), 149; DeConde, The Quasi-War, 74-84. These themes will be explored more in ch. 3.

122

The hostile political environment caused Republicans to reevaluate their previous
positions on volunteer militia companies. Beginning in 1798 Pennsylvania Republicans
organized their own volunteer militia companies. Federalists had already demonstrated how
effective they could be at building a popular base of support. Perhaps more importantly, unlike
the Democratic and Republican Societies, Federalists would not be able to denounce these
groups as illegitimate. By taking up arms and pledging to defend the nation, Republicans could
demonstrate their commitment to law and order and prove their patriotism. Finally, particularly
for outspoken Republicans like Bache and his successor as editor at the Aurora William Duane,
the militia companies could serve as protection from the angry Federalist mobs. As will be
discussed later, they had good reason to want protection.244
Although a few volunteer companies supported Republican positions in the mid-1790s,
Republicans mobilized on a scale approaching that of the Federalists beginning in 1798. 245 That
year, leading Philadelphia Republicans such as Blair McClenachan, one of the officers of the
Pennsylvania Democratic Society, and William Bache, the brother of the editor of the Aurora,
formed the Republican Blues to serve as a counterweight to McPherson’s Blues. Like the
Federalist companies, Republicans made their politics apparent. An advertisement recruiting new
members for the Southwark Light Infantry stated that “REPUBLICANS ONLY are admitted.”
Applicants were also required to declare their support for the principles of the Republican
Party.246
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These new volunteer militia companies helped fill the void in Republican popular
political culture left with the collapse of the Democratic and Republican Societies, and they
played a central role in Republican celebrations. The Republican companies selected Easter
Monday, May First, and the Fourth of July as official parade days. On these days, the various
militia units met at a central location such as the State House and then marched through the city.
The parades usually concluded with a display of military maneuvers. Following the parades, the
troops would retire to a local hotel or pub for dinner and toasts. Again, like their Federalist
counterparts, the Republican companies used these salutations as a way to broadcast their
political beliefs. For example, the First Light Infantry Company, also known as the Sans Culottes
Company, drank to the health of “Those who established our Liberty, the patriots of ‘76” and
“Sans Culottes—May they be the advance guard to the defense of their country’s liberty.”247
The inclusion of Republican volunteer militia units was not the only change in
Republican celebrations. A clear difference exists between the toasts Republicans drank in the
early 1790s and those in the latter part of the decade. “Principles and not men” and the closely
related “Measures and not men” were two of the most common Republican toasts in early in the
decade.248 The phrases capture both Republican’s rejection of the Cult of Washington and their
commitment to what they believed to be the true principles of the American Revolution.
Beginning in about 1797, Republicans stopped using the phrases. And, as Pennsylvanian
Republicans ceased raising their glasses to salute “Principles and not men,” they and other
Republican groups began toasting individual men more frequently. Republicans had occasionally
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toasted specific people in the early 1790s, but in the late 1790s they regularly drank toasts to men
like Vice President Thomas Jefferson and Thomas McKean.249
Republicans also changed how they viewed George Washington. In 1797 the Aurora had
attacked Washington as a “man who is the source of all the misfortunes of our country” and
concluded that “if want of respect for Mr. WASHINGTON is to constitute treason, the United
States will be found to contain very many traitors.”250 When news of Washington’s death
arrived in December 1799, however, the Aurora struck an entirely different tone. The paper
eulogized Washington as a “distinguished character” whose “name will live to the latest posterity
among the greatest men who have ornamented history, by the support or liberty and their country
against tyranny.” The Republican militia companies turned out to march in a funeral procession
held in Philadelphia on December 26. In its coverage of the event, the Aurora listed the names
and party identification of each of the militia companies. Republican companies, according to
this account, marched first and outnumbered Federalists fifteen to eight. The number of men in
each company is not listed, and it is likely that more Federalists participated. Coverage in the
Aurora, however, leaves the impression that Republicans were in the majority. The account of
the services printed in the Gazette of the United States, on the other hand, does not list the
individual companies and focuses on the public officials who participated and on Washington’s
horse, which was rider-less and draped in black with a reversed pair of boots in the stirrups, a
custom in military funerals. The Aurora coverage ignored the presence and symbolism of the
horse completely.251
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Republicans did not, however, blindly embrace all aspects of the Federalist celebration of
individual men. Republican militias, for example, refused to participate in a ceremony honoring
President John Adams’s return to Philadelphia after an extended absence. Republicans writing
under pseudonyms like “No Idolater” in the Aurora angrily rejected a call by the adjunct general
of the volunteer militia to participate in the parade to show “respect” for the president. “An Old
Solider” pointed out that Federalists justified treating Washington in a similar manner because he
“had saved his country, and therefore extraordinary honours were due to him.” If that were the
case, he continued, “What is now to be the excuse?” In response to claims that the militia should
march out of respect for the office, one Republican pointed out that no parade or festivities
marked Vice President Thomas Jefferson’s return.252
In addition to organizing militia groups and moving away from “principles not men,”
Pennsylvania Republicans in the late 1790s celebrated for different reasons from their Federalist
counterparts. As will be expanded upon in later chapters, Republicans began to focus more on
electoral politics in the aftermath of the Jay Treaty. The public demonstrations and symbolic
display of opposition to the treaty proved insufficient. Change had to come from within the halls
of government. As a result, Republicans put more effort into winning elections. This change of
focus is reflected in what Republicans celebrated as well as in how and when they celebrated.
Whereas Republican fêtes in the early 1790s tended to honor principles and/or the French
Revolution, the Grand Jubilee in 1799 celebrated the recent election of Republican Thomas
McKean as governor.253
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The Grand Jubilee occurred on October 24, 1799 at Zeigler’s Plains in the northern part
of the city. Like many other celebrations, the jubilee was steeped in classical symbolism
designed to recall the glory of ancient Rome. The event included the ritual sacrifice of a “fine fat
steer…on the altar of liberty beneath the flag of America and surmounted by the classical
emblems of liberty and peace” A temporary amphitheater was constructed to enable the crowd to
witness the spectacle. Following the sacrifice, “libations of red and white wine were poured out
on the altar, and the classical mind was regaled with inhaling the mixed odors of the libation and
sweet savors of the victim.” In the afternoon, celebrants fired two British cannons that had been
seized during the Revolutionary War and fired guns in honor of the counties that voted for
McKean. That night, the party marched to the houses of leading Republicans and serenaded them
with the “song of 1776.”254
The Aurora described the jubilee as a celebration of “the triumph of the principles of
republicanism over foreign factions—the success of American principles and integrity.” The
event symbolically linked McKean’s victory with the ancient struggle between liberty and
tyranny in general and the colonists’ triumph over the British in particular. The battle they were
celebrating, however, had not taken place on the streets or in the press. It occurred at the ballot
box. Republicans, by the end of the 1790s, had concluded that the best way to defeat the forces
of monarchy and aristocracy was by winning election.255
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The Mob tumultuous instant seize
With venom’d rage on whom they please;
The People cannot err!
Can it be wrong, in Freedom’s cause,
To tread down justice, order, laws,
When all the mob concur?
--Joseph Stansbury, 1779

Chapter 3: Popular Uprisings

Riots and popular uprisings are some of the post powerful forms of political expression.
They allow the voiceless to be heard and, when wielded carefully, can often achieve results
where other methods failed. Crowd action, however, is also one of the most unwieldy weapons.
As examples throughout history demonstrate, even small acts of political violence can escalate
into wide-spread rebellion. Despite their uncertain nature, however, popular uprisings provide
groups and individuals with an important avenue for asserting their will.256
A number of historians have explored crowd action and rioting in early America.
Building on E.P. Thompson’s work on the “moral economy of the crowd” in England, scholars
including Alfred Young and Pauline Maier have demonstrated that mobs in colonial America
helped enforce the will of the community. These uprisings tended to be limited to specific targets
and rarely resulted in the loss of life. Thomas Slaughter found, however, that riots in rural areas
were more likely to be violent and result in casualties. According to Paul Gilje, the tradition of
crowd action broke down in the decades following the American Revolution as America’s
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corporate/communal values gave way to individualism. Gilje also noted that riots in the
nineteenth century, unlike crowd action in the eighteenth century, were fueled by racial and
ethnic tensions. Terry Bouton, who focused on popular uprisings in Pennsylvania, likewise found
that attitudes towards popular uprisings changed in the late 1700s. Bouton argued that rural
farmers turned to popular uprisings in the 1780s and 1790s to “defend their idaes of political and
economic equality.” These protests, Bouton claims, helped fuel a conservative backlash and led
to creation of “more permanent ‘barriers against democracy.’”257 These writers have made
significant contributions to clarifying the role of mobs and riots in the late eighteenth century,
but important questions remain. The relationships between popular uprisings, the debate over the
role of citizens in a representative government, and the rise of political parties, for example,
remains underexplored. Gilje notes that Republicans and Federalists differed in their view of
popular uprisings but does not investigate how these attitudes changed over time. Moreover, he
does not distinguish between town meetings, public demonstrations, and riots—they all fall
under the category of “politics out-of-doors.” As a result, Gilje’s work does not address the
different ways partisans used each form of political mobilization. Bouton puts crowd action
along a continuum of different forms of political mobilization and notes that Pennsylvanians
used it only when other methods failed, but his focus is on popular uprisings and does not
explore how changing attitudes towards popular uprisings related to broader trends in political
mobilization and evolving views on the role of citizens. Popular uprisings helped shape the
development of political parties in Pennsylvania and forced members of the emerging
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Republican Party to accept petitioning and voting as the only legitimate ways citizens could
participate in the deliberative process. 258
Pennsylvanians inherited the concept of “moral economy of the crowd” from England
and many residents accepted limited riots and popular uprisings as legitimate forms of political
mobilization. At a time when the people were shut out of the deliberative process and the
institutions of the state were weak and often ineffective, mobs acted as the police for the will of
the community. Mobs also formed in response to laws considered unjust or when locals felt that
their basic rights and liberties had been violated. Participants often used ritualized violence as a
way to differentiate their actions from random acts of violence and emphasize that they targeted
an idea or principle, not just an individual. Although these crowds acted outside the law,
participants rarely faced consequences. Local militias often joined the protests, which added to
their legitimacy and made the regulation of them difficult. The few instances where rioters were
jailed often led to another mob forming to free the prisoners.259
This tradition of crowd action and political violence played a central role in the years
leading up to and immediately following the Declaration of Independence. During the 1760s and
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1770s, mobs took to the streets to fight against new taxes and against a perceived conspiracy to
deprive Americans of their basic liberties.260 Following the Revolution, some Pennsylvanians
began to question the moral economy of the crowd. The institution of a representative
government meant that citizens had legal means of redressing any grievances. In addition, the
Revolution demonstrated the potential power of crowd action and incidents like the Fort Wilson
Riot and the Philadelphia Mutiny convinced many elite Pennsylvanians that crowd action posed
a threat to order. Nevertheless, some residents continued to turn to mobbing to protest laws
deemed unjust.261 Particularly in western parts of the state, Pennsylvanians attacked tax
collectors, shut-down court houses, and blocked main roads to protest taxes. These incidents, in
turn, fueled the movement to strengthen the institutions of state. The result was the adoption of
new state and federal constitutions. Pennsylvania ratified the Federal Constitution quickly, but a
number of citizens saw the new government as a retreat from the ideals of the Revolution, and
violence and insurrections continued.
Resentments over the Constitution and Federalist policies culminated in the Whiskey
Rebellion in 1794. While the insurgents believed they were fighting to defend their rights and
liberties, George Washington and other Federalists considered the rebellion treason and called up
a force of 13,000 militiamen to demonstrate that the new government would not tolerate popular
violence. Members of the nascent Republican Party joined the condemnation of the rebels and
tried to use the opportunity to differentiate their legitimate opposition to the Federalists with the
illegitimate actions of the activists in the west. While President Washington managed to quash
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the Whiskey Rebellion and restore law and order to the western parts of the state, his
administration created deep political divisions that only intensified after his retirement. Political
parties were still in their infancy and had not developed sufficiently to contain the partisan
animosity. Fueled by changes in the political rhetoric, partisan battles often spilled into the
streets. In an attempt to undermine the growth of the Republican Party, Federalist passed the
Alien and Sedition Acts in 1798. Republicans viewed these laws as unconstitutional and
experimented with popular constitutionalism and nullification. The outbreak of Fries’s Rebellion
in 1798 and 1799, however, caused Republicans to reevaluate their approach and led them to
commit to legal forms of protest. This tumultuous end to the decade helped solidify the existence
of political parties as a way for Pennsylvanians to legally and peacefully participate in the
deliberative process.

Mobbing During the Revolutionary War: Fort Wilson’s Riot
Popular uprisings in response to unpopular legislation such as the Stamp Act marked the
opening salvos of the American Revolution, and crowds played an important role throughout the
showdown between the colonists and Great Britain. During the war years, Philadelphians relied
on mobs to enforce price controls and to punish suspected Tories. While the system of town
meetings and crowd action worked well for laborers and artisans, wealthy Philadelphians began
to see the potential danger of popular violence. Ft. Wilson’s Riot, a violent clash between a
Philadelphia mob and a few well-known state officials, only confirmed this fear.262
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In October 1779, a period one historian refers to as “the highwater mark of Radical
democracy in Pennsylvania during the revolutionary period,” radicals in Philadelphia began to
conclude that their more conservative political opponents might be a threat to the Revolution,
and some radicals began to discuss driving their opponents from town.263 After receiving word
that they could be in danger, a few well-known conservative politicians met at the house of the
James Wilson, a prominent attorney and politician. Wilson had signed the Declaration of
Independence and supported the Revolution, but he also defended the rights of Loyalists and was
accused of aiding the British during their occupation. Over the protestations of leading radical
politicians such as Charles Peale and Dr. James Hutchinson, the militia and a growing crowd of
angry citizens gathered in front of Wilson’s residence. Accounts of what happened next are
inconsistent, but witnesses in the street reported that someone from the house opened fire on the
crowd. Troops returned a volley, and a few men from the crowd rushed the house. In the ensuing
mêlée, at least one militiaman was killed, and a number of men from both sides suffered injuries.
Only the arrival of federal soldiers prevented any worse consequences. The threat of violence
hung over the city for days, and many of the men who had taken refuge in Wilson’s house were
forced to leave town for their safety. Although some members of the mob were arrested, a crowd
that gathered in front of the jail forced their release.264
Fort Wilson’s Riot illustrates one of the dangers of accepting the legitimacy of mob
action. Political leaders who had happily stood by as crowds vented their anger on the British
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found that, once unleashed, popular violence proved extraordinarily difficult to control. This
struggle to strike a balance between acceptable crowd behavior and the need for order is a theme
that would continue in the years following the Revolution.265

Crowd Action after the Revolution
The end of the Revolutionary War and the institution of a representative government led
Pennsylvanians to reconsider the legitimacy of riots and popular uprisings. Communities had
accepted popular uprisings as legitimate because the people did not have a voice in the
deliberative process. Under the new government, citizens were represented by elected officials
who theoretically embodied the public will. This system should, therefore, remove the need for
crowd action. Should a perceived injustice occur, citizens and communities could petition their
representatives. If the problem continued, voters could theoretically express their will by voting
for a different representative at the next election.266
The Revolution altered people’s perception of popular uprisings in other ways as well.
Riots in the colonial era were usually contained, and most people accepted them as a normal part
of life without giving much thought to the potential for serious harm. The mobs and riots of the
Revolution forced Americans to reconsider the power of the masses. A general belief that
republics were weak by nature exacerbated this growing fear of crowds. Political theorists argued
that republics were inherently unstable and prone to decay and Americans were keenly aware
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that their experiment could fail. Broadly speaking, two threats to the health and stability of a
republic existed: tyranny and mobocracy. Republics failed because power became overly
concentrated in either the hands of the few or in the hands of the many. After waging a war
against the perceived tyranny of the British crown, some Americans—particularly members of
the gentry—began to worry that the new threat to a successful nation might come from below in
the form of the lower classes. As Benjamin Rush explained, “In our opposition to monarchy, we
forgot that the temple of tyranny has two doors. We bolted one of them by proper restraints; but
we left the other open, by neglecting to guard against the effects of our own ignorance and
licentiousness.”267
The unease of the nation’s elite and the fact that a representative government
theoretically negated the need for crowd action did not, however, stop some Pennsylvanians
from concluding that they needed to take action into their own hands. Popular uprisings
continued to occur both in Philadelphia and in the western parts of the state, and many
Pennsylvanians still accepted at least the threat of violence as a legitimate form of political
expression.
The smoke had barely cleared from the battlefield when the new representative
government faced its first major popular uprising. In the summer of 1783, with the war over, the
new nation faced the difficult task of disbanding the Continental Army and dealing with the
soldiers’ pay. Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance, concluded early on that the process of
untangling the various accounts might take years. The Confederation Congress had hoped that
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soldiers would accept furloughs as a compromise, but some soldiers refused to lay down their
arms until they knew for certain that they would be paid. On June 13, soldiers stationed at the
Philadelphia barracks sent a strongly worded petition demanding that Congress settle their
accounts. Some of these troops belonged to the Pennsylvania Line and had participated in
another mutiny in 1781.268 Meanwhile, a contingent of about eighty soldiers stationed in
Lancaster, fearful that they would be sent home with nothing, ignored orders from their
commanders and began to march toward Philadelphia. With a crowd of citizens cheering them
on, the Lancaster soldiers arrived in Philadelphia on Friday, June 20 and joined the other
troops.269
When the first reports of the march reached Philadelphia, Congress, which met one floor
below the Pennsylvania Executive Council in the Pennsylvania State House, appointed a
committee to confer with John Dickinson, the president of the state, and the Supreme Executive
Council. The committee requested that the state take immediate steps to ensure Congress’ safety.
Much to the committee’s dismay, Dickinson and the Council refused to summon the Philadelphia
militia. Pennsylvania officials knew that calling out the militia might exacerbate the situation.
Considering the part the militia had played in the Fort Wilson’s Riot, the state could not be sure
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the militia would actually respond to orders to appear. Of even more concern to Dickinson and
the Council was the thought that the militia might join the mutiny.270
The mutiny reached its climax on Saturday, June 21. Around noon, between 250 and 300
soldiers marched (without their commanding officers) from the barracks to the State House and
surrounded the building. Congress did not regularly meet on Saturday, suggesting that the
soldiers intended to confront the Pennsylvania Executive Council, which had just gathered. As
historian Kenneth R. Bowling has argued, the soldiers likely concluded that they would have
more luck receiving their pay from the state of Pennsylvania than from the financially strapped
Congress. The troops sent the Council a hastily written address demanding the right to appoint
new officers and warned that if they did not receive a response in 20 minutes “we shall instantly
let in those injured soldiers upon you and abide by the consequences.” Because they saw the
soldiers’ actions as illegitimate, Dickinson and the Council simply ignored the letter. Meanwhile,
members of Congress, who had been called into a special session, filtered past the growing
crowd and into the State House. Surveying the scene, James Madison determined that “No
danger from premeditated violence was apprehended” but he noted “that spirituous drink from
the tipling houses adjoining began to be liberally served out to the Soldiers & might lead to hast
excesses.” The soldiers, however, refrained from doing more than hurling insults and
occasionally pointing their weapons at the building. The crowd eventually allowed the officials
to leave the State House, but the militia remained unsatisfied.271
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Following the tense stand-off at the State House, Elias Boudinot, President of Congress,
dashed off a letter to General Washington, who was then stationed in Newburgh, New York,
informing him of the situation and requesting that he send troops. That evening, members of
Congress once again gathered and demanded that Dickinson and the Executive Council take
steps to protect them. If the state refused, Congress would leave Philadelphia and seek refuge in
Princeton. 272
Despite this threat of Congress moving to Princeton and rumors of further violence,
Pennsylvania officials concluded that no real danger existed. Members of the Executive Council
spoke with citizens and found that most “were impressed with an opinion of the pacific
disposition of the soldiery in the Barracks” and saw no need to call out the militia. In fact, the
Executive Council reported that “the citizens considered [the soldiers] as objects of compassion
rather than terror or resentment.” State officials likewise spoke with members of the militia and
found that they were “disinclined to act upon the present occasion.” Thus, while the Executive
Council “regretted the insult which had happened” they saw no reason respond with force. 273
Boudinot and other nationalists such as Alexander Hamilton, already irked by
Pennsylvania’s initial refusal to call out the militia, were furious with this response. To them, the
honor and dignity of Congress and been grossly insulted. Unlike the Philadelphia residents who
cheered the mutiny, Hamilton and Boudinot believed that the soldiers constituted an unruly and
illegitimate mob that threatened to undermine the government’s authority. Moreover, by not
taking immediate action, Pennsylvania officials implied that the mutiny was a legitimate tactic.
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Boudinot, therefore, took action himself and, on the morning of June 24, issued a

proclamation calling on Congress to withdraw from the city immediately and to assemble in
Princeton two days later. The mutiny quickly fizzled following the departure of Congress and
many assumed that, having made his point, Boudinot would recall members to Philadelphia
shortly. He did not, and the Confederation Congress never returned. 275
The public’s response to the mutiny and decampment of Congress illustrates
Pennsylvanians’ complex relationship with popular uprisings at the end of the Revolutionary
War. As historian Gary Nash argued, “Insubordination and direct defiance of officers’ authority
is the most radical action any man under arms can take.”276 But, throughout the demonstration,
Philadelphians seemed more inclined to support the mutinous soldiers than their elected
representatives in Congress. Philadelphians did not appear to regret the way they had behaved
either. Instead, residents blamed Congress for overreacting and were only “sorry that better
reasons were not assigned for their removal.” A few prominent men felt differently and
organized a petition drive to prove that the people stood ready to do whatever Congress needed
to prevent another incident. The petition, however, garnered only 873 signatures, well below the
2,000 names the organizers had anticipated. According to one witness, the entire address was
little more than a farce and while “it is pretended to be from the citizens of Philadelphia” those
who did sign only did so because influential men like Charles Willson Peale went “about from
house to house.” Boudinot found the effort almost insulting and heard that “5 to one could be
obtained to keep Congress out of the City.” Thus, the Mutiny and the public’s response suggest
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that, even with a representative government, many citizens still supported the people’s right to
use crowd action to influence the deliberative process.277

Crowd Action in the West
The tradition of popular uprisings continued in the western parts of Pennsylvania
following the end of the Revolution as well. As historian Thomas P. Slaughter has observed,
individuals who lived on the fringes of civilization occupied a “liminal” state and engaged in
collective violence more frequently than those who lived in more developed and populated parts
of the state. Far removed from the center of power and civilization, Pennsylvanians living on the
frontier embraced a form of democratic localism that emphasized the community over the
individual. Settlers in the west were under constant threat of attack from Native Americans and
were prey to the whims of Mother Nature. They needed to work together to survive. In the
absence of any real state power because of their locale, residents turned to extra-legal forms of
political mobilization to enforce the will of the community and protect their rights.278
Although they had wholeheartedly supported the patriot cause, the Revolutionary War
left many rural Pennsylvanians broke and bitter. In addition to long-standing grievances
stemming from lack of protection from Native Americans, westerners were frustrated with what
the American Revolution had not accomplished. They had hoped the Revolution would lead to
more egalitarian society and that life would get better. Instead life became harder following the
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Revolution. The economy sunk into a depression, and formerly prosperous farmers found
themselves teetering on the edge of destitution. Falling prices for crops—coupled with a scarcity
of cash—led to chronic debt which, in turn, led to foreclosure. Meanwhile, a small group of
wealthy speculators took advantage of the crisis and purchased a vast amount of land for a
fraction of what it was worth. As a result, wealth and property became even more
concentrated.279
Distressed westerners initially sought a political remedy to their situation. They elected
strong democrats like William Findley and John Smilie who fought for reforms that would make
cheap land and credit readily available.280 Communities held meetings and sent a steady stream
of petitions pleading for help to Philadelphia. These efforts to work within the political system
were, however, hampered by the social conditions that existed within the backcountry. Western
Pennsylvania was an ethnically and religiously diverse region and, despite often sharing similar
goals, the differing groups did not always work well together. Even had they been willing to
mount coordinated efforts, poor roads and sparse settlement made travel and communication
difficult. As a result, westerners struggled to create a broad political movement, and they were
unable to bring about real change. 281
Unable to influence policy through political channels, frustrated westerners turned to
other forms of protest. As the historian Terry Bouton has demonstrated, during the 1780s

279

Bouton, Taming Democracy, 88-104; Thomas P. Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the
American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 46-89.
280
John Caldwell, William Findley from West of the Mountains: A Politician in Pennsylvania, 1783-1791 (Gig
Harbor, WA: Red Apple Publishing, 2000); Edward Everett, “John Smilie, Forgotten Champion of Early Western
Pennsylvania,” Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, 33:3 and 4 (Septmber-December 1950): 77-89.
281
The best discussion of the economic situation in Pennsylvania following the Revolution is R. Eugene Harper, The
Transformation of Western Pennsylvania, 1770-1800 (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991). See also,
Dorothy Elaine Fennell, “From Rebelliousness to Insurrection: A Social History of the Whiskey Rebellion, 17651802” (Ph.D. diss, University of Pittsburgh, 1981). On efforts to work within the political structure see, Bouton,
Taming Democracy, 105-144. On the movements to create a new state see, Slaughter, The Whiskey Rebellion, 26-45.

141

“ordinary” men and women in western Pennsylvania employed diverse forms of crowd action to
protect suffering families from tax and debt collectors. Communities would form associations
and pledge to take whatever steps necessary to prevent the collection of taxes. Tactics included
excise officials refusing to collect taxes from poor families, justices of the peace declining to
hear cases relating to taxes, juries declining to convict delinquent taxpayers, and officials who
refused to collect money from their struggling neighbors. Although resistance often took the
form of nonviolent civil disobedience, violence remained an option. 282
Tax collectors who attempted to do their job, in particular, regularly faced the wrath of
rural mobs. Between 1784 and 1790, westerners forced at least three excise collectors to resign
their position. These incidents were ritualized and followed traditional patterns that can be traced
back to England. Attackers usually donned disguises and struck at night. Tactics to obscure
identity were less about preventing perpetrators from being caught than they were a way for
assailants symbolically act on behalf of the community. The ritualization also helped establish
that the attack represented something larger than a random act of violence or a personal
vendetta.283 Targets typically received at least one warning and were given time to repent;
oftentimes, this opportunity was accepted. For example, in Fayette County in 1784, a group of
disguised men broke into the house of a newly appointed excise collector and warned of severe
consequences if the tax collector did not immediately turn over the account books and resign his
position. The collector agreed, and the crowd left without further incident. Excise officers brave
(or stupid) enough to ignore the warnings were punished. In 1786, an angry crowd surrounded a
Washington County collector who stubbornly continued to collect taxes and forced him to
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“Imprecate curses on himself, the Commission and the Authority that gave it to him.” The mob
then “cut off half his hair,” put the other half in a pigtail, and forced the collector to march
through nearby towns. Finally, the mob marched to the border of Westmoreland County and
released the officer “with Threats of utter Desolution should he dare to return.”284
Popular uprisings such as these proved extraordinarily effective. Officials from
throughout the state reported that they were unable to collect taxes and warned that if they
continued to try, their efforts would likely lead to violence. In 1784, the state treasurer reported
that “there seems to be almost a total stop in the Collecting of Taxes.” Under normal
circumstances, state leaders could have turned to the militia but, considering the mood of the
general public, leaders were concerned that the troops would refuse to march against their
neighbors. Thus, despite their lack of influence in the representative government, the people of
western Pennsylvania managed to repeal the burdensome taxes and assert their will through
crowd action.285
The situation in western Pennsylvania was not unique. Incidents of crowd action and
violence against tax collectors occurred throughout the nation. Most notably, farmers in western
Massachusetts rebelled against new taxes and forcibly shut down courts. The men who
participated in Shays’s Rebellion, like the members of the Pennsylvania Munity and the farmers
in western Pennsylvania, considered their actions justified. The insurgents argued that they were
exercising their basic rights of self-government and that their lack of influence over the
deliberative process left them with no other choice. Other citizens, however, believed that the
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existence of a representative government provided a peaceful and legal way of addressing any
concerns and that there was no longer a place for mobs. As historian Jason Frank has shown, for
some Americans “mobbing was the most direct manifestation of the democracy that the
representative principle was meant to blunt.”286

The Constitution and Carlisle Riot
The number of popular uprisings along with irresponsible, but popular, policies such as
debt-forgiveness and printing of paper money that some states pursued convinced many elite
Americans that the Revolution had gone too far. To them, democracy seemed to be poisoning the
republican experiment. With the economy on the verge of collapse, nationalists and supporters of
a strong central government called a convention ostensibly aimed at amending the Articles of
Confederation. Instead of building on the existing government, however, the delegates began
creating a new one that invested the national government with more power and the strength to
crush popular uprisings.287
The resulting Federal Constitution represented a clear attempt by the elite and wealthy to
put an end to the type of tumults seen in western Pennsylvania. In order for the country to
succeed, they argued, liberty must be balanced with order. The framers embraced the concept of
popular sovereignty, but argued that the government needed to be insulated from the twists and
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turns of public opinion. Economic policy, in particular, must be dictated by what was best for the
nation long-term and not simply by what was popular at the moment or in a particular area.288
Federalists in Pennsylvania launched a massive publicity campaign and managed to force
a vote on the new Constitution before the opposition had time to mobilize. Critics of the
Constitution did their best to stall—even hiding to prevent a quorum—but were unorganized and
unable to prevent the inevitable: on December 12, 1787, Pennsylvania became the second state to
ratify the Constitution by a vote of 46 to 23.289
Even with the new Constitution ratified, the public remained deeply divided. Residents,
particularly those in the west, saw the Constitution as an assault on their rights and an attempt to
further deprive them of a voice in government. Frustrations erupted into a riot in Carlisle, a
center of Anti-federalism. The Carlisle Riot, began when a group of local Federalists gathered on
December 26, 1787, “to testify their approbation of the proceedings of the late Convention.”290
Festivities had just commenced, and the celebrants were preparing to fire a cannon when “a
number of men armed with bludgeons” began to circle the Federalists. The crowd, which
included many well-known critics of the Constitution, demanded that the Federalists
immediately disperse because “their conduct was contrary to the minds of three-fourths the
inhabitants.” Major James Wilson, a well-known Federalist and the event’s organizer, attempted
to respond that they had every right to assemble peacefully, but before he could finish a few men

288

Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1969).
289
On ratification in Pennsylvania see, Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010), 97-124.
290
For a discussion of the Carlisle Riot in the context of the broader Anti-federalist movement, see, Saul Cornell,
The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism & the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1999), 109-120 and Saul Cornell, “Aristocracy Assailed: The Ideology of Backcountry
Anti-Federalism,” The Journal. Of American History, 76:4 (March 1990): 1148-1172.

145

attacked him, continuing to beat him even after he fell. Outnumbered and unarmed, the
Federalists helped Wilson to his feet and retreated. Meanwhile, the mob proceeded to build a
large bonfire and burn the cannon along with a copy of the new Constitution. 291
Federalists returned the following day carrying arms and determined to have their
celebration. Crowds of armed men appeared during the festivities but made no attempt to
interfere with the celebrations. After about two hours, the Federalists concluded their festivities
and went home. As soon as they had departed, a drum began to beat and an armed mob
assembled. In addition to their weapons, the crowd carried effigies of Chief Justice Thomas
McKean and James Wilson, both prominent Federalists. After marching the effigies through
town, the demonstrators burned the effigies in the town square.292
In response to the uprising, Chief Justice Thomas McKean issued a warrant for the arrest
of 21 of the men who had participated in the attack on the Federalist celebration and in the
burning of effigies. These men were accused of engaging in riotous behavior, assault and battery,
and causing “great terror and disturbance” to the residents of Carlisle. After some confusion over
jurisdiction, a local judge offered the accused men the opportunity to make bail to avoid
spending time in jail. While the majority of them accepted the offer, seven of the rioters refused,
claiming that they had done nothing wrong. They demanded an opportunity to defend themselves
in court. The judge was left with little recourse and sent them to jail.293

291

Carlisle Gazette, 2, 9 January 1788 in Merrill Jensen, et al, ed. Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution (Madison: The Historical Society of Wisconsin) [hereafter DHRC] 2:604-610,670-678; Maier,
Ratification, 159.
292
Carlisle Gazette, 2,9 January 1788, DHRC, 2:604-610.
293
Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Sheriff Charles Leeper, 23 January 1788, DHRC, 2:684-685.

146

News of the arrest and jailing of the rioters spread quickly. According to one prominent
Anti-federalist, the opponents of the Constitution had been forming societies since the riot for the
“purpose of opposing this detestable Fedrall conspiracy” and had been establishing committees
of correspondence.294 These societies spread word of the arrests throughout the backcountry.
Tensions in Carlisle, meanwhile, remained high. One Federalist recalled that each night after the
jailing, “[a] party consisting chiefly of such boys and fellows of dissolute character” paraded
through town banging drums.295
The militia mobilized and took charge of organizing a response to the jailing. After a
meeting of representatives from the various companies in the area, the militia selected a few men
to meet with local officials. Federalists from the region gathered as well and discussed the
growing crisis. “Meetings of the friends of good order were had” reported one Federalist, “where
it was proposed by some ardent men to oppose the rescuers by force.” The Federalists realized,
however, that if they responded with force they risked the loss of “many lives” and might plunge
the region into a civil war. Unwilling to take this risk, local Federalists and town officials made
no attempt to stop the militia from entering the city to free the prisoners. On March 1, 1788,
companies from throughout the state marched into Carlisle to the sound of ringing bells and
cheering crowds. Reports of the number of people who joined in the procession range from 250
to 1,500. The men paraded throughout town and assembled at the courthouse, where the sheriff
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delivered the prisoners. Having succeeded in their mission, the troops peacefully marched out of
town.296
The Carlisle Riot illustrates that the tradition of popular justice and crowd action
continued in western Pennsylvania into the late 1780s. As had been the case during the mutiny in
1783, the public cheered the rioters. The episode also points to the potential for political
differences to lead to fighting and rioting and foreshadows some of the partisan violence of the
late 1790s. Anti-federalists in Carlisle believed that rioters were justified in their use of force
because Federalists had behaved contrary to the will of the community. Effigy burning, parades
and jail-break were all rituals of crowd action that Pennsylvanians had used for decades. Local
Federalists’ response and McKean’s decision to have the rioters arrested, however, demonstrate
that the “moral economy of the crowd” could no longer be taken for granted. For Federalists, the
new political institutions obviated the legitimacy of popular uprisings. The people had
constitutional instruments to implement change and voice their dissent.297

Rural Violence in the 1790s: The Whiskey Rebellion
The ratification of the Federal Constitution and Pennsylvania’s decision in 1790 to
abandon the Constitution adopted in 1776 in favor of a more conservative one marked a retreat
from the democratic principles that had flourished in the late 1770s and early 1780s. The men
behind the new constitutions believed that the stronger, more centralized, form of government
would lead to more stability. Moreover, a stronger state could better satisfy the needs of the
people. The more people gained confidence in the state and felt that they had a voice in
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government, the more they would be willing to work within the confines of the republican
institutions and, therefore, the need for popular uprisings would diminish. But, should riots or
insurrection occur, the new government would have the power to respond quickly and
forcefully.298
Ambiguity remained, however, about the people’s role in the deliberative process and
whether the people retained the right to use force as a last resort. Although proponents of the new
government viewed riots and crowd action as dangerous and threatening to the country, they
could not ignore that popular uprisings had led to American independence in the first place.
Federalists had to walk a fine line between condemning unlawful crowd action and recognizing
the right to revolution. In Federalist #28, for example, Alexander Hamilton asserted “that
seditions and insurrections are unhappily maladies as inseparable from the body politic, as
tumors and eruptions from the natural body” and argued that the only remedy was force. In the
same essay, however, Hamilton admitted that “If the representatives of the people betray their
constituents, there is then no recourse left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defense
which is paramount to all positive forms of government.” Of course what constituted betrayal by
a representative was open to interpretation and, as would become clear in the 1790s, Hamilton’s
understanding of justified popular violence was considerably different than that of the men living
on the frontier of Pennsylvania.299
Frustrated by their lack of influence in the federal government and facing economic ruin,
westerners turned to violence. In the fall of 1791, mobs attacked at least three men alleged to be
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related to the collection of the tax. The assailants relied on the same painful and humiliating
rituals used for decades to punish those who violated the will of the community. For example,
Robert Johnson, the collector for Alleghany and Washington counties, was abducted by a crowd
of men who cut off his hair and tarred and feathered him. The mob then left Johnson, without his
horse, miles from the nearest town. Johnson pressed charges against his attackers, but the
messenger tasked with delivering the warrant was captured by another mob. After tarring and
feathering the messenger, the mob left him blindfolded and tied to a tree.300
Well aware of the unpopularity of the excise, Congress made some minor amendments to
the law in the spring of 1792 with the hopes of making it more palatable. The changes, however,
did little to stem the growing opposition in western Pennsylvania. General John Neville, the
inspector of the revenue, struggled to find anyone who would rent him space to open an office.
Those who did risked retaliation from the community. William Faulkner of Washington County
initially agreed to rent part of his residence to Neville, but was attacked by a group of men who
put a knife to his throat and threatened to scalp him and burn his house if he did.301
Not all western Pennsylvanians approved of these tactics, and some opponents of the law
attempted to work through the constitutional system to secure a repeal of the law. In the fall of
1792, delegates from the various western counties gathered in Pittsburgh and agreed to
resolutions denouncing the excise tax and promising to take every “legal measure that may
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obstruct the operation of the Law until we are able to obtain its total repeal.” Although Hamilton
would later call this meeting treasonous and mock the idea that the law could be legally
obstructed, meeting organizers viewed their gathering as a way to contain the spread of violence
and hopefully channel resistance through the constitutional structure.302
From the temporary seat of government in Philadelphia, Federalists followed the events
in western Pennsylvania closely. With the new federal government still in its infancy, many
believed that he must stand firmly behind the rule of law and demonstrate that popular uprisings
would not be tolerated—particularly those that occurred in such close proximity to the federal
government. Hamilton warned President Washington that if he did not take steps to “exert the
full force of the Law against the Offenders” then the “the spirit of disobedience . . . [would]
naturally extend and the authority of the Government will be prostrate.”303 Heeding Hamilton’s
advice, on September 15, 1792, Washington issued a Presidential Proclamation that called the
recent attempts to obstruct tax collection “subversive of good order . . . and of nature dangerous
to the very being of government.” The new government simply would not tolerate popular
uprisings, he said, and called on all citizens to respect the laws. He further ordered government
officials to ensure that anyone breaking the law be brought to justice.304
In response to Washington’s proclamation, Pennsylvania officials renewed their efforts to
enforce the laws and punish the insurgents, but the public did not always cooperate. Governor
Thomas Mifflin reminded citizens that the constitution and laws were expressions of the popular
will and that “every irregular and illegal opposition to the existing laws will not only embarrass
the operations of Government, but eventually undermine the only real security for the liberty and
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property of the individuals.”305 Judge Alexander Addison tried to convince westerners to
“inculcate that constitutional resistance, which alone is justifiable in a free people.”306
Nevertheless, many Pennsylvanians still saw the attacks as a legitimate form of protest. A Grand
Jury charged with reviewing the situation in the west found no evidence of widespread
opposition to the laws. Even when officials managed to bring charges against rioters, the accused
men often managed to escape punishment because sheriffs refused to make arrests or because
they had fled the area.307 Meanwhile, some critics of the Washington administration claimed that
the opposition to the excise had been blown out of proportion. Republican Congressman William
Findley of Westmoreland surveyed public opinion and found “that a disposition to maltreat the
public officers or to make riotous opposition to the execution of the Excise Law is neither
manifested nor patronized by the leading Citizens who inhabit the Western Counties of this
State.” Only a small minority of residents, he asserted, supported crowd action.308
Whether or not they had the support of the “leading Citizens,” mobs continued to threaten
and attack excise officers and local residents who complied with the law. In April, 1793, a pack
of men with blackened faces broke into the house of Robert Wells, a revenue collector in Fayette
County, and, finding that Wells was not at home, terrorized his family. The sheriff, fearful of
retribution, refused to deliver warrants against some of the men accused of participating in the
attack. The mob returned in November and forced Wells at gunpoint to surrender his account
books and renounce his position. John Lynn, collector for Washington County, had his hair cut
off, was tarred and feathered and, after being forced to swear that he would never take another

305

Thomas Mifflin to Judges of the Supreme Court, 21 March 1794, Pennsylvania Archives, ser. 2, vol. 4, 58.
Alexander Addison to Thomas Mifflin, 31 March 1794, Pennsylvania Archives, ser. 2, vol. 4, 60.
307
Charge of Chief Justice McKean, and Reply of Grand Jury, 8 November 1792, Pennsylvania Archives, 2 ser. vol.
4, 41-43; James Brison to Thomas Mifflin, 9 November 1792, ibid, 45.
308
William Findley to Thomas Mifflin, 21 November 1792, Pennsylvania Archives, ser.2, vol.4, 48-50.
306

152

position associated with the excise, was left naked and tied to a tree. Crowds also burned down
the barns and/or destroyed farm equipment of distillers who cooperated with the law. Victims
were often told to publish accounts of what happened in the newspaper as a warning to others
who considered paying the tax. Crowd action, once again, proved extraordinarily effective, and
by the spring of 1794 the collection of the excise had virtually ceased in western Pennsylvania.309
In an effort to diffuse the situation, Congress passed legislation designed to make the tax
less burdensome. In June 1794 Congress passed amendments to the excise that, among other
things, gave the state courts jurisdiction over the enforcement of the tax. A major complaint
against the original law had been that distillers charged with not paying the tax were forced to
travel to Philadelphia—an expensive and time-consuming trip—in order to appear in federal
court. Giving the state courts jurisdiction meant less travel for delinquent distillers and therefore,
Congress hoped, less opposition to the law. With the changes in place, federal officials renewed
their efforts to collect the tax and prosecute distillers who refused to pay.310
The changes to the law did little to stem the opposition and, by attempting to arrest some
of non-complying distillers, the government effectively threw gas on what was, up until that
point, a relatively minor fire. Prior to 1794, mob action had been limited and focused only on
men associated with the excise; insurgents used the same tactics that Pennsylvanians had relied
on for decades. This small-scale and traditional approach to violence changed when federal
officials began issuing warrants in the summer of 1794.
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Well aware of the potential for violence, David Lenox, a federal marshal, and General
Neville, inspector of the revenue, agreed to deliver some the first warrants personally. Neville
was a polarizing figure in the west. After securing the votes of his neighbors based on the
promise that he would do everything in his power to end the excise, Neville accepted the position
of inspector of the revenue and grew wealthy on the collection of the hated tax.311 Lenox and
Neville issued the first few warrants without incident but, on July 15, a scuffle broke out when
they tried to deliver summons to William Miller, a poor farmer who had refused to register his
stills for the excise. Miller, once a supporter of Neville, was particularly incensed that he had
accompanied Lenox and began screaming and cursing at the two officials. Nearby farmers spread
news of the confrontation and erroneously claimed that “the Federal Sheriff was taking away
people to Philadelphia.” Within minutes, a company of thirty to forty militiamen appeared and
opened fire on Lenox and Neville, who barely managed to escape unscathed. They were,
however, not free from danger.312
The following morning, July 16, approximately 100 men, many of them carrying
weapons, descended on Neville’s mansion, which was known as “Bower Hill.” Neville had
received numerous threats over the years and had taken steps to protect himself by boarding
windows shut and storing guns and ammunition. When the mob reached the house, they
demanded that Neville and Lenox come out. Neville responded by opening fire. Some of the
rioters returned shots but the group was attacked from behind by slaves who had been hiding
nearby. The mob was forced to retreat. Enraged by the surprise attack, 500 men returned the next
day. When they arrived at Bower Hill, the men learned that federal troops had arrived at the
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house the previous night and that Neville had fled. As word of Neville’s disappearance filtered
back to the waiting crowd, one of the rebels opened fire on the mansion, and a heated gunfight
ensued between the two sides. After about 15 minutes, the troops in Bower Hill ceased firing.
Assuming surrender was imminent, Captain James McFarland, one of the rebel leaders, stepped
out from behind a tree and was promptly shot. Furious, the rebels resumed firing. The soldiers
did their best to defend the house but, outnumbered and surrounded, they eventually surrendered
and were allowed to leave without further injury. After ransacking the wine cellar, the mob
torched the mansion.313
The violence at Bower Hill and death of a leading rebel radicalized the insurgents. While
some political leaders, including Hugh Henry Brackenridge, warned that the attack on Bower
Hill and gunfight with federal troops exceeded the acceptable forms of popular protest and that
Washington had the right to call out the militia, other rebels called for a Revolution. Radicals
such as David Bradford claimed that the entire federal government only benefited the wealthy
and argued that the Constitution was a betrayal of the principles of the American Revolution.
This faction called for the creation of a new country. After seizing the mail and learning that
some residents of Pittsburgh were communicating with the federal government, leading rebels
decided it was time to act. At the end of July, Bradford and other radicals issued a circular letter
stating “that every citizen must express his sentiments not by his words, but by his actions” and
calling for a mass muster at Braddock’s Field on August 1. What began as a series of popular
uprisings protesting a specific law had escalated into an open rebellion against the federal
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government. The rebels had moved beyond traditional forms of popular violence and stood at the
precipice of civil war.314
Nearly 7,000 men turned out for the muster at Braddock’s Field. Although Bradford had
not specified the exact purpose of the muster, many rebels clearly saw it as the first step in a
second revolution. Some of the insurgents had even created their own flag which bore six stripes
representing the counties of western Pennsylvania and Ohio County, Virginia, which supported
the rebellion. The gathering, however, proved anti-climactic. Although many rebels appeared
eager to seize a federal arsenal near Pittsburgh and establish a new country, moderates pointed
out that the arsenal was well fortified and that many rebels lacked weapons. Ultimately, the
meeting agreed to march peacefully through the city rather than mount an attack.315
The threat of violence dissipated in the weeks following the meeting at Braddock’s Field.
At an assembly of 200 delegates from the six western counties on August 14, Republican leaders
Albert Gallatin, William Findley, and Brackenridge successfully steered the opposition to the
excise back into legal channels. While some of the delegates still called for armed uprisings, the
majority agreed to a resolution that condemned the practice of trying citizens outside of their
“respective vicinage” and appointed a committee to draft a petition to Congress outlining their
opposition to the excise. They were, however, clear that they did not oppose all taxation and “a
more equal and less odious tax” would “be cheerfully paid by the people of these counties.”
Perhaps most importantly, the gathering resolved “that we will exert ourselves, and that it be
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earnestly recommended to our fellow citizens to exert themselves in support of the municipal
laws of the respective States, and especially from preventing any violence or outrage against the
property and persons of any individual.” In other words, they would only support constitutional
forms of protest and would refrain from resorting to violence as a way of influencing the
deliberative process.316
Although the rebellion collapsed and the majority of westerners pledged to support the
federal government, Washington assembled a force of nearly 13,000 troops to march on western
Pennsylvania. The march accomplished little more than upsetting locals. Civilians taunted the
troops, and some raised liberty poles as a sign of their commitment to the principles of the
Revolution, but the army met no organized opposition. Left with nothing else to do, soldiers
contented themselves with harassing locals and making mass arrests of suspected rebels. Many
of the leading rebels, including David Bradford, managed to escape; others surrendered without
incident. 317 Washington’s decision to use force may not have won him the support of the
westerners, but it sent a clear message about civil disorder and crowd action—the new federal
government would not tolerate popular uprisings.

Triangulation and the Republican Response
The Whiskey Rebellion put members of the emerging Republican Party in Philadelphia in
a difficult position. In the early 1790s, Republicans had been trying to establish themselves as
the legitimate heirs to the Revolution and true defenders of the people’s interests and not, as
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Federalists claimed, ambitious demagogues who promoted lawlessness and disorder.
Republicans had never openly condoned the use of ritual violence, but they had not publically
denounced it either. The attack on Bower Hill and muster at Braddock’s Field forced them to
take a firm stand against popular uprisings or risk being associated with rebellion against the
federal government. Distancing themselves from the rebels would, however, be difficult.
Particularly following the adoption of the Revenue Act of 1794, which placed a duty on
manufactured goods, Republicans in Philadelphia had been some of the most outspoken critics of
the excise. Manufacturers held a series of rallies in the spring of 1794 that criticized the tax and
called on the administration to promote domestic manufacturing. In April, the Democratic
Society of Philadelphia adopted a resolution stating “that the general welfare of our country is
involved in promoting necessary manufacturers” and encouraging members to purchase only
American-made goods.318 The society put the Republican position more succulently in a toast on
the Fourth of July: “EXCISE, may this baneful exotic wither in the soil of freedom.” Prominent
Republicans such as William Findley and Albert Gallatin had also participated in town meetings
in western Pennsylvania that condemned the tax. Pennsylvania Republicans were, therefore,
intimately tied to opposition of the excise.319
Federalists wasted no time blaming the Democratic Societies and nascent Republican
Party for the insurrection. Federalists adhered to a unitary, hierarchical concept of society and
viewed challenges to the government or attempts by other groups to speak for the people as
dangerous and subversive. Therefore, even if Republicans had not directly participated in the
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violence, Federalists believed they helped foster the rebellion.320 President Washington accused
the Democratic Societies of “laboring incessantly to sow the seeds of distrust, jealousy, and, of
course discontent” and was sure “that they [the Democratic societies] have been the fomenters of
the western disturbances.”321 A correspondent in the Gazette of the United States echoed this
sentiment writing that “[t]he mad conduct of the insurgents at Pittsburgh is the natural fruit of
their democratic clubs.”322 The Democratic Societies were not the only threat to order. In one
particularly inflammatory piece, an author under the pseudonym “One of the Men of 1794”
implied that Republicans were plotting to attack Philadelphia while the army was busy in the
west.323
Blamed by the Federalists for provoking internal dissent and implicated in the Rebellion
by their opposition to the excise, Republicans and critics of the Federalists in Philadelphia
responded by condemning the rebellion while simultaneously acknowledging the legitimacy of
the insurgents’ grievances. The Democratic Society, for example, criticized the rebels for not
adhering to the basic principles of majority rule but also adopted a resolution declaring that “we
conceive excise systems to be oppressive, hostile to the liberties of this country, and a nursery of
vice, and sycophancy.” Members of the society pledged to “use our utmost efforts to effect a
repeal of the Excise by Constitutional means” but asserted that they would neither endorse nor
support any attempt to use other forms of resistance.324 Republican authors echoed these
sentiments in the press. One correspondent warned that, while westerners had legitimate
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grievances, “if every portion of the republic rises in arms to prevent the execution of laws
obnoxious to them [the country] would revert to a state of anarchy and barbarism.”325
Philadelphia Republicans also used the Whiskey Rebellion as an opportunity to affirm
that, contrary to what Federalists might claim, they were “friends of order” and had faith in the
constitutional system. Unlike Federalists, Republicans accepted that citizens might disagree with
their government, but by using force to oppose the law the rebels had exceeded their
constitutional right to resistance. “If a law is obnoxious to any part of the country,” explained
one correspondent, “let the citizens there petition for its repeal, expose its defects or injustice
through the medium of the press; let them change their representation, put into their legislature
men who they know to be active to procure its repeal.”326 John Swanwick, a leading Republican
and a member of the state legislature, argued that Republicans in Philadelphia had been utilizing
these very tools and had been close to forcing a repeal of the excise. Unfortunately, the outbreak
of violence “greatly injured” their cause and “have armed the friends of the system with reasons
for enforcing it.”327 Other Republicans demonstrated their commitment to the laws by
volunteering to join the army to march against the insurgents. Overall, Republicans made clear
that, while westerners may have had reason to protest the federal government, they did not
accept popular uprisings as a legitimate form of resistance.328
By charting this middle course through the Federalists on the one side and the western
insurgents on the other, Republicans ultimately managed to turn the Whiskey Rebellion to their
advantage. The violence in the west enabled members of the young party to clearly articulate the
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differences between their legitimate forms of opposition and the illegitimate actions of the
insurgents. Republicans did suffer from the loss of the Democratic and Republicans Societies,
which collapsed under the weight of Federalist accusations that they had caused the Rebellion. 329
As discussed in chapter two, however, other groups, more directly linked to the Republican
Party, emerged to fill the void left by the decline of the Democratic and Republican Societies.
Republicans’ denunciation of the rebels’ tactics also meant that western farmers lost one of the
most effective ways of influencing the deliberative process. Nevertheless, the Republican
response to the Whiskey Rebellion went a long way in establishing the Republicans as a
legitimate opposition. 330

Partisan Violence
Political differences and partisanship flourished in the Pennsylvania during the late
1790s. Republicans denounced popular uprisings and established that they were willing to work
within the constitutional structure, but they did not stop their attacks on the Federalists who
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controlled the federal government. The emerging party worked to harness frustrations with the
policies of the Federalists and channel them into constructive forms of protest. As discussed,
Republicans initially styled themselves as the “friends of liberty” and focused on demonstrating
popular support by staging fêtes and parades that symbolically linked their cause with the
American and French Revolution. Following the ratification of the Jay Treaty, the party began to
focus more on building a network of supporters that could be mobilized on election day.
Federalists, meanwhile, continued to portray Republicans as a threat to order and utilized the
power of the federal government to silence the opposition. Although both parties rejected
popular uprisings as a legitimate form of political expression, during emotionally charged
periods, such as the debates over the Jay Treaty and Quasi-War with France, partisanship flared
and debates often spilled into the streets. Party leaders urged their supporters to remain peaceful
but were unable to contain the political fervor that they had helped foster. Whipped into frenzy
by charged rhetoric and often fueled by alcohol, Republicans and Federalists vented their anger
through vandalism and fighting.331
The apogee of partisan violence in Pennsylvania occurred during the presidency of John
Adams. Federalists used the threat of war with France and the XYZ affair as opportunities to
rally supporters and paint Republicans as traitors for having supported the French Revolution.
Republicans responded by blaming the Federalists for provoking the French with the Jay Treaty.
Emotions reached a boiling point during the months surrounding the XYZ Affair in the spring of
1798. Energized young Federalists roamed the streets looking for an excuse to fight and even a
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meeting of the local society for free debate degenerated into a brawl. All of Philadelphia seemed
to be engulfed in the frenzy. One Congressman claimed that he saw women “meet at the church
door and violently pluck the badges [displaying partisan allegiance] from one another’s bosoms.”
The city of brotherly love appeared on the verge of a civil war.332
In the midst of the crisis President Adams called for a national day of fasting and prayer
to occur on May 9, 1798. Although the day may have appeared non-partisan, Federalists saw it
as an opportunity to further sway public opinion. As Hamilton explained, a day of prayer and
fasting is “an important means of influencing Opinion” and “a valuable resource in a contest
with France.” 333 Republicans in Philadelphia viewed the day as a political stunt and organized
their own demonstration, thereby setting the stage for a standoff between the two parties. The
day’s events, which included speeches and church services, were peaceful but, as Adams later
recalled, that night “ten thousand People, and perhaps many more, were parading the Streets”
cursing and threatening the President. Worried about his safety, Adams went so far as to have a
chest of guns and ammunition snuck into his house.334 Protesters refrained from attacking
Adams’s house but, later in the evening, a group of Federalists beat Republicans who had been
wearing tri-colored cockades. When officials arrived on the scene, they arrested the Republicans,
and the cavalry marched through the city for the rest of the night to ensure order.335
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Changes in the political rhetoric played a major role in the increased partisanship and
partisan violence. One Philadelphia resident reported that during the late 1790s, people were
“speaking with a degree of violence” never before seen.336 This new violent rhetoric reflects a
move away from what historian Andrew Robertson describes as “laudatory,” or demonstrative,
rhetoric that drew on classical texts toward a more dramatic, emotional style that he identifies as
“hortatory.” Characterized by negative associations and personal attacks, hortatory rhetoric
helped fuel partisan animosity. Anti-Jacobin writing, which relied on violent and graphic
imagery to depict the horrors of Revolutionary France and warn of the dangers of democracy,
proliferated during the late 1790s and epitomized hortatory rhetoric. But, as one correspondent
upset with the increasing partisanship lamented, both parties practice the "sophistry" of
reporting “any scandalous story that has ever been whispered” as “a known undoubted truth.”337
While this form of rhetoric proved to be an effective tool to mobilize supporters and influence
public opinion, the infant parties could not always channel the passions they helped generate into
peaceful and constitutionally sanctioned forms of action. Benjamin Bache, editor of the Aurora,
for example, blamed the Fast Day Riot on orators who had “artfully inflamed” the passions of
residents with “war speeches and addresses as well as threats and denunciations against the
Republicans.”338
Hortatory rhetoric mixed with partisanship led to a number of violent attacks against
newspaper editors in the late 1790s. Angry readers assaulted Bache twice in 1798. John Fenno,
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Jr., the son of John Fenno the editor of the arch-Federalist newspaper the Gazette of the United
States, struck Bache in retaliation for an article printed in the Aurora that accused Fenno Sr. of
being a British agent. Federalist leaders ignored this attack. Bache had one of his assailants, Able
Humphreys, prosecuted and fined, but President Adams rewarded Humphreys with a diplomatic
position. While neither of these incidents resulted in any major injuries, a more serious attack on
an editor occurred in the spring of 1799.339
In April, in the midst of the federal government’s response to a series of uprisings in
northeastern Pennsylvania known as Fries’s Rebellion, members of the Federalist militia troop
MacPherson’s Blues became incensed when they heard about an article in the Republican
Readinger Adler that criticized the conduct of certain members of the militia. Jacob Schneider,
the editor, printed a piece accusing troops of behaving in way that “would be more apt to excite
the people to insurrection and raise them against the government, than to enforce obedience.”
The paper also accused members of the militia of ducking payment for their room and board.
Although other newspapers had made similar claims, the militia happened to be near Reading,
where the paper was published, and decided to pay Schneider a visit. After forcing Schneider to
admit that he authored the piece, the troops, led by Robert Goodloe Harper, a Federalist member
of the U.S. House of Representatives, seized Schneider and dragged him to the town square. The
captain of the militia then ordered that the already bloodied Schneider receive twenty-five lashes
with a knotted rope across his bare back. Fortunately for Schneider, a company of the
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Philadelphia cavalry arrived and stopped the lashing at six. The violence did not, however, stop
there.340
In Philadelphia, William Duane, who had assumed the position of editor of the Aurora
following Benjamin Bache’s death from yellow fever in late 1798, printed an account of
Schneider’s beating. Duane and other Republicans were incensed when they learned that the
troops involved in the incident had escaped without punishment. Duane warned that if the
soldiers got away with the violence, “it would not be in the least surprizing, if every citizen in
Philadelphia, who was obnoxious to Macpherson’s Blues, should in turn be dragged out of his
house, and treated as Mr. [Schneider] was.” Congressman Harper wrote an open letter admitting
that he took part in the beating but downplayed the severity and implied that Schneider had
gotten what he deserved. Duane, however, continued to harp on the attack as proof of the
hypocrisy of the so-called “friends of order.”341
Infuriated by Duane’s criticisms, members of various Federalist militia units entered the
office of the Aurora on the morning of May 15th, pushed members of the staff against the wall,
and surrounded Duane at his desk. After a few moments, Duane looked up from his work and
announced that he would be happy to fight any of the soldiers individually. When nobody
responded, he returned to his paperwork. Livid at Duane’s insolence, one of the officers punched
the editor in the face. Although Duane did his best to respond, the crowd overpowered him and
dragged him outside. In front of the office, the troops encircled Duane and took turns beating
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him. When he could no longer stand, the group turned to whipping. By the time they were done,
Duane lay barely conscious and covered in blood and dirt.342
Intent on showing the Federalists that he could not be silenced, Duane was back at work
the following day. He printed an account of the assault under the headline “MORE OF GOOD
ORDER AND REGULAR GOVERNMENT” and used the event to rally Republicans. Articles
condemning the militia and Federalists filled the pages of the Aurora in the days following the
attack. An article by “Mentor,” which was printed next to a detailed description of the event,
called on Republicans to “Arm and organize immediately” in order to prevent further violence.
“Nestor” warned that America stood at the precipice of its own Reign of Terror. “[W]e hear of
the want of laws and protection in France, we are told of the reign of terror and despotism there;
but let us hereafter look at home.” The “inveteracy and fury of party spirit” was dissolving the
bonds of civil society. Ultimately, Duane’s beating allowed Republicans to claim the mantle of
the “true friends of order” and to further distance the party from popular violence.343
The majority of instances of political violence in the late 1790s involved Federalists
attacking Republicans. Both sides contributed to the combustible atmosphere through the use of
violent rhetoric and bore responsibility for fomenting dissension among the public, but
Federalists tended to be the aggressors. Federalist leaders condemned mobbing and rejected
violence as a legitimate political tool. Individual and small groups of Federalists, however,
continued to assault political enemies. Federalist violence in the late 1790s differed from the
popular uprisings of the 1780s and 1790s. Unlike the mobs that harassed excise officers
throughout western Pennsylvania, Federalists attacks were not ritualized—nobody wore
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disguises or blackened their faces, and victims were not tarred and feathered. This difference
reflects an important distinction between the two forms of popular violence. Whereas mobs in
the 1780s and 1790s claimed to act on behalf of the community, the Federalists who attacked
Republicans during the late 1790s made no such claims. Instead of justifying the attack as the
will of the people, Federalists’ claimed that Republicans like Duane posed a threat to the country
which meant that the normal rules of engagement did not apply. Federalist violence often
involved young men who, as historians Albrecht Koschnick and David Waldstreicher have
shown, were eager to assert their masculinity and patriotism through combat, as their fathers had
during the Revolutionary War.344 Unlike their Republican counterparts, these young Federalists
did not have an outlet for the partisan zeal generated through rallies and rhetoric. Federalist
lagged behind Republicans in the construction of a party organization that could channel energy
away from the streets and toward the ballot box. Republicans in Pennsylvania had been working
to create a party that encouraged popular participation in the deliberative process. Supporters
could have their voices heard by taking part in electioneering meetings and petition drives.
Federalists, on the other hand, continued to hold a hierarchical concept of society and believed
the people’s role in the deliberative process should be limited to voting and rituals of deference,
such as the petitions that praised the Adams’ administration handling of the XYZ Affair. Shut
out of the deliberative process, some Federalists turned to violence as a way of venting partisan
animosities.

Federalist Repression and Popular Reaction
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With war fever running high in the summer of 1798, Federalists, who controlled all three
branches of government, pushed through a series of measures designed to cripple domestic
opposition and prepare the country for war. Rumors of French spies and secret plots filled the
streets of Philadelphia and pamphlets warned that Jacobins, members of the Illuminati and Irish
radicals were working to destroy America from within. To protect the country against these
internal enemies, Federalists passed the Alien and Sedition Acts and took steps to strengthen
America’s armed forces. Congress increased the size of the Navy, agreed to let American
merchant ships arm themselves, and passed legislation that enabled American privateers to seize
French ships. In addition, Congress called for the creation of a volunteer army that could be
summoned in case of war. The cost of these measures amounted to a staggering $10,519,368—
nearly $4 million dollars more than Congress usually allotted for the entire government. To pay
for these increases, Congress passed a new round of taxes. The new taxes consisted of a Stamp
Act similar to the notorious law of the same name adopted by the British Parliament in 1765,
followed by the nation’s first direct tax on houses and slaves. Federalists understood that any
form of direct tax would be controversial but hoped that a tax on houses and slaves would be
more palatable. The house tax was progressive and required families that could afford larger
houses to pay more. Additionally, unlike the whiskey tax which fell most heavy on rural
residents, the law affected city dwellers as well as those on the frontier. It required that officials
asses every house, piece of land, and slave in the country and created a number of new offices
that the Federalist Secretary of Treasury Oliver Wolcott used to reward local Federalists.345
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Republicans and critics of the Adams administration responded to the Federalist war
measures with outrage and resistance proceeded along two lines in Pennsylvania. As discussed in
chapter one, many Republicans focused on organizing petition drives and worked to channel
energy into upcoming elections. Petitions were a way to mobilize supporters and encourage the
people to demonstrate their opposition to the laws in a constitutional way. Political tensions ran
so high, however, that even this orderly form or resistance led to the Riot in St. Mary’s
churchyard 346
Critics of the new laws in Pennsylvania also experimented with the concept of
nullification. Although nobody had tried to put the principle into practice, many Republicans in
Pennsylvania and elsewhere believed that the people, in some fashion, had the right to interpret
the Constitution themselves. Unlike Federalists, who argued that citizens’ role in government
should be limited to voting, Republicans supported a more active citizenry and believed that the
people had a right to participate in the deliberative process. What this participation meant in
practice, however, remained uncertain. The experience of the Whiskey Rebellion and subsequent
battles over the Jay Treaty had helped convince many Pennsylvania Republicans on the need to
focus on winning elections. Their focus, therefore, became engaging the public in a party
organization that could serve as an intermediary between the people and the government and
mobilize voters on election day. Despite this move toward party building and commitment to
work within the constitutional structure, no consensus existed on the role of citizens in their
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government. One of these uncertainties was whether the people had the right to declare a law unconstitutional. 347
In Federalist #78 Alexander Hamilton wrote that “no legislature act . . . contrary to the
Constitution, can be valid.” While Hamilton envisioned the judiciary as the arbitrator of
questions involving a law’s constitutionality, some Republicans began arguing in response to the
Alien and Sedition Acts that, because sovereignty ultimately rested with the people, the people
could also deem a law unconstitutional. Most Republicans who toyed with this idea believed it
was the states, acting on behalf of the people, which would make this judgment. This line of
thinking led Jefferson and Madison to draft what became the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions
in 1798 and 1799. While the final documents did not use the term “nullification,” they asserted
that the Constitution had been a compact between states, that each state retained sovereignty, and
that the federal government could only exercise the specifically enumerated powers. Laws
passed that went beyond the scope of delegated powers were illegitimate and unenforceable.
Although they would have important consequences for the county’s future, these Resolutions had
no immediate effect. Neither Virginia nor Kentucky took any action beyond adopting
resolutions, and the other states remained silent on the issue.348
While Jefferson and Madison had argued that the people could declare a law
unconstitutional through their state representatives, other Republicans asserted that individual
citizens and communities had the right to interpret the Constitution. In late 1798 and 1799,
residents of northeastern Pennsylvania used this theory to justify their resistance to attempts by
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federal officials to assess property in order to levy the new taxes. Northeastern Pennsylvania was
populated primarily by German Kirchenleute, or church people. The Kirchenleute had been
committed patriots during the Revolution and believed in localism and self-government. These
values led them to endorse “popular constitutionalism”—the theory that the people retained
sovereignty and could intervene directly in the deliberative process to judge whether a legislative
act violated the Constitution. The Kirchenleute believed that the new taxes and the Alien and
Sedition Acts violated the people’s basic rights and liberties. The people, therefore, had the right,
and even a responsibility, to resist the implantation of the laws.349
Despite similarities between Fries Rebellion and the Whiskey Rebellion, the events of
1798 and 1799 were not, as the historian Terry Bouton argued, “a replay of what had happened
in 1794.”350 The men and women involved in Fries Rebellion saw themselves as fighting on
behalf of the Constitution and Bill of Rights, an entirely different sentiment from that of the
rebels in 1794 who spoke of forming a new country and resented the entire federal government.
The two uprisings differed tactically as well. Insurgents in 1799 did not use ritualized violence or
seek to humiliate federal officials, nor did they burn effigies or target private property. No shots
were fired, and the only violence involved women throwing hot water on assessors.
Nevertheless, Fries’s Rebellion would have an important impact on politics and party
development in Pennsylvania.
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The first stage of “Fries’s Rebellion” consisted of the assembly of town meetings, the
raising of liberty poles, and the organization of associations committed to resisting the new taxes.
In the fall of 1798, liberty poles began appearing throughout the northeast. They carried flags
with slogans such as “The Constitution Sacred, No Gagg Laws, Liberty or Death” and “THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FREE SOVEREIGN, AND INDEPENDENT.” Although
residents did not usually break any specific laws when they raised the pole, these poles wielded
enormous symbolic significance, and Federalists labeled them “sedition poles.” Communities
and militia companies also signed pledges swearing to prevent assessors from doing their jobs.
The resistance remained non-violent and most assessors simply resigned or refused to do their
job. 351
Local Republicans initially supported the resistance and looked for ways to capitalize on
the growing resentments. Jacob Schneider, the editor of the Republican Readinger Adler,
continuously warned of Federalist plots to establish a monarchy. Republicans running for
election in the fall 1798 joined the chorus as well.352 Republican assemblyman Jonas Hartzell
“was very industrious . . . in telling the people that they should endeavor to put other people into
the Legislature [and] that the laws of congress lately made were very dangerous to the liberties of
the people.”353 Blair McClenachan, a Republican member of the U.S. House of Representatives,
traveled throughout the northeast claiming that Federalists “wished to oppress the people” by
taking the people’s land and reducing them to serfdom. “[T]he President,” he cautioned, “would
make himself to be king of the County!”354 Other Republicans encouraged the insurgents to stay
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strong. Republican Congressman Robert Brown urged the people “to keep the assessors back so
that the rates should not be taken before the new congress met.”355 Republican support for the
resistance, however, quickly dissipated when the rebellion became more serious in the spring of
1799.356
The insurgency had centered in Northumberland County in late 1798, but in early 1799
the unrest spread to neighboring Bucks County. Assessors began taking measurements in
February and quickly found that the inhabitants of Bucks had no more interest in submitting to
the new laws than had their brethren in Northumberland. The decision to appoint a few Quakers
as assessors only exacerbated the problem. As pacifists, the Quakers had earned the ire of their
neighbors by refusing to take up arms during the Revolutionary War. Residents were further
incensed when they learned that one of the assessors would be a man named Everhand Foulke,
one of the wealthiest men in the area. In response to the appearance of the assessors, citizens
gathered to form associations and sign pledges to stop the officials from doing their jobs. They
also issued stern warnings to the men appointed to act as assessor that they faced real danger if
they insisted on taking measurements.357
With the resistance spreading, the Adams administration sent Marshal William Nichols to
issue warrants for the arrest of some of the ringleaders. On March 1, Nichols set up an office in
Bethlehem, a town that bordered Northumberland and Bucks, and began making arrests.
Although he was unable to apprehend all of the suspects, Nichols managed to take a few men
into custody and brought them to the jail in Bethlehem, where they would wait for transportation
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to Philadelphia for trial. As had been the case during the Whiskey Rebellion, the fact that the
arrested men would have to stand trial in Philadelphia as opposed to locally infuriated the locals
and contributed to unrest.358
Word of the arrests spread fast throughout the area, and the people quickly mobilized to
liberate the prisoners. On March 7, 1799, a force of about 100 men, some of whom wore tricolored cockades to symbolize their commitment to protect the people’s liberty, met Nichols at a
bridge just outside Bethlehem. Nichols had brought with him four men—two Republicans and
two Federalists—to try to negotiate a peaceful resolution. After some initial verbal parrying in
which Nichols refused an offer from the troops to pay the prisoners bail, the militia agreed to
select three men to negotiate. The negotiations, however, ended in a stalemate and Nichols
remained adamant that he would not release the prisoners.359
By the time the three militiamen headed back to meet their comrades, the number of
armed men ready to march on Bethlehem had swollen to near 400 and Revolutionary War
veteran John Fries had assumed command. While some of the troops wore tricolored cockades,
Fries donned his cap with a black feather—a symbol usually worn by Federalists. Fries had been
a Federalist and had marched against the Whiskey Rebels, but the Federalist war measures and
higher taxes had driven him into to the opposition. After learning that the prisoners remained in
captivity, Fries led the militia to the tavern where Nichols was holding the prisoners. While the
crowd waited, Fries entered the tavern unarmed and offered Nichols one more opportunity to
accept bail. Nichols refused. Fries, who had been trying to avoid violence, was left with no
choice but to use force. Once outside the tavern, he gave the order to free the prisoners but
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pleaded with the troops to “Please, for God’s sake, don’t fire except [if] we are fired on first.”
Nichols did not put up much of a fight and the prisoners were freed without violence. Having
achieved their goal, the militia left town without further incident.360
Although the insurgents had freed the prisoners without violence, both Federalists and
Republicans responded by condemning the participants and calling the event a rebellion. For
Federalists, the uprising seemed to confirm their fear of internal enemies and justify the
suppression of their political opponents. The Federalists were unimpressed that the Kirchenleute
had gone to great lengths to avoid violence and had used the Constitution and Bill of Rights to
justify their actions. They rejected outright the entire concept of constitutional resistance. In their
view, the uprising represented a fundamental threat to the stability of the republic. William
Cobbett warned that, if the federal government did not respond immediately, “a civil war or
surrender of Independence” would be the inevitable result. Federalists were particularly troubled
by the fact that some of the rebels had worn the tri-colored cockade, which they believed
demonstrated that the rebellion was inspired by the French Revolution.361 In the Gazette of the
United States, John Fenno, Jr. stated bluntly that the uprising was “directly related to the political
posture between this county and France.”362 Other Federalists blamed the French outright and
asserted that Fries and the other insurgents were trying to “imitate their revolutionary brethren in
other parts of the world.”363 Fenno also asserted “That infernal Aurora, and the infamous United
Irishman who conducts it” bore some responsibility for inciting the uprising.364
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President Adams agreed with his fellow Federalists that the incident constituted a
rebellion against the government, and on March 11 he issued a proclamation ordering the
“insurgents of Northampton, Montgomery and Bucks counties” to end their “treasonable
proceedings . . . [and] to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes” by March 18.
The same day, Adams also called up the newly created army and appointed Federalist William
MacPherson, who led the Federalist militia corps MacPherson’s Blues, as commander. Residents
of the three counties, including Fries and the other leaders of the opposition movement, gathered
on March 18 and universally agreed “to desist from opposition any public officer in the
execution of his office” and promised to “use their influence to prevent any opposition, and to
give due submission to the laws of the United States.” Even though the group met Adams’s
deadline, the meeting failed to stop the federal government from sending troops.365
Similar to their response in the wake of the Whiskey Rebellion, Federalists argued that
the federal government needed to respond with force and demonstrate that rebellion would not be
tolerated. Cobbett summed up the Federalist position: “merely to quell such an insurrection as
this will answer but little purpose. It is a weed that has poisoned the soil, to crop off the stalk will
only enable it to spring up again and send out a hundred shoots instead of one. It must be torn up
by the root.”366 To accomplish this “weeding” a force of nearly 1,000 men marched on northern
Pennsylvania in early April. Despite being a considerably smaller army than the one that
Washington sent to suppress the Whiskey Rebellion, this regiment represented a substantial
show of force. The troops quickly found, however, that the people had no intention of resisting.
Soldiers arrested Fries and a few of the other leaders of the opposition without incident.
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Ultimately, the army accomplished little in the way of influencing public opinion and may have
further contributed to the region’s move away from the Federalist Party.367
While Federalists condemned the uprising and blamed France, Republicans looked for
ways to distance themselves from their previous position on the insurgency. Republicans in the
region had lent their support to the initial opposition; nation-wide, they had been calling the
Federalist war measures unconstitutional. Although the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions had
claimed that the states, not individuals or communities, had the right to interpret the Constitution,
and they said nothing about the use of force, they did introduce the idea of nullification. Much of
the Republican response to the uprising was, therefore, focused on proving that the party had not
been behind the uprising. William Duane pointed out that Fries was a Federalist and claimed that
the incident had nothing to do with nullification. Rather, it was part of a Federalist plot to punish
the Kirchenleute for voting Republican in the last election. Certainly no “Republican can justify
the conduct of those people who resisted the marshal in the execution of his duty” Duane
declared.368 Echoing this sentiment, Jacob Schnedier, editor of the Republican Readinger Adler,
claimed that “none of the perpetrators of violence were subscribers to the Readinger Adler.”
Republicans even tried to use the rebellion as weapon against James Ross, the Federalist
candidate for governor in 1799.369
Republicans also reaffirmed their commitment to work within the laws. The insurrection
had illustrated the dangers of promoting popular constitutionalism and constellated a belief in the
need to focus their energy on legal forms of protest and on winning elections. The Republican
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Farmers’ Register made this explicit: “Mobs, riots, and hostile oppositions are not the way and
means [of participating in the deliberative process] contemplated in the constitution; a more
effectual and orderly method can be pursued by ELECTIONS.”370 Along similar lines, Duane
stated that “While the law exists, it must be obeyed by every good citizen. There is no honest
method to get rid of a bad tax or a bad law, but by prevailing on the legislature to repeal it.”371
From Philadelphia, Jefferson, who had once claimed that “a little rebellion now and then is a
good thing, and as necessary in the political world as storms in the physical” and who had
endorsed nullification, reached a similar conclusion after Fries’s Rebellion. “In this state we fear
the ill-designing may produce insurrection,” he wrote in a letter to Edmund Pendleton after
receiving news of the uprising. “Nothing could be so fatal. Anything like force would check the
progress of public opinion and rally them around the government. This is not the kind of
opposition the American people will permit. But keep away from all show of force, and they will
bear down the evil propensities of the government, by the constitutional means of election and
petition.”372
In April 1799 a federal grand jury indicted Fries for treason. Another ninety-one people
would receive incitements on charges ranging from sedition to conspiracy and obstruction of
justice. Federalists were eager to see Fries hang for his role in the uprising. The leaders of the
Whiskey Rebellion had either escaped or been pardoned by Washington, and some Federalists
believed that this lack of punishment had sent a message that rebellions were condoned. In this
climate, Fries never stood a chance of exoneration, even with the counsel of the prominent
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Republican attorney Alexander James Dallas. The judge hearing the case ruled that any
organized act of violence against the government, no matter the size, constituted treason, which
left the jury with no choice but to deliver a guilty verdict. On April 25 the jury found Fries guilty
and the judge sentenced him to hang.373
Fries’s Rebellion marked a turning point in Pennsylvania politics. Although Republicans
had denied the legitimacy of crowd action since the Whiskey Rebellion, they had still supported
an active citizenry and believed the people had a right to insert themselves into the deliberative
process. These positions, however, had left them vulnerable to charges of supporting Fries’s
Rebellion. Following the uprising, Republicans backed away from popular constitutionalism and
nullification and joined with Federalists in asserting that a citizen could participate in
government only through the ballot box. Federalist political violence even enabled Republicans
to campaign as “friends of order,” a slogan Federalists had once used.
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Chapter 4: Elections and Electioneering

Elections are the foundation of a representative government, and voting is one of the
most basic, if not direct, ways citizens can engage in the deliberative process. While other forms
of political mobilization such as town meetings, public demonstrations, and popular uprisings
allow the people to engage with policy in an unmediated fashion, voting filters public opinion.
Nevertheless, voting can be a powerful weapon and, as other forms of political mobilization fell
out of a favor, Pennsylvanians began to rely more on elections as a way of expressing their will.
Colonists in Pennsylvania had exercised the franchise in some fashion since the first
settlers arrived, and over time residents came to see voting for representatives as a basic right.
This belief drove the colonists to reject the British concept of virtual representation and to
demand the ability elect their own leaders. The experience of the Revolution, however, left many
Pennsylvanians with a deep suspicion of authority, and in the years following the Declaration of
Independence residents often demanded the right to engage directly in the deliberative process.
Citizens exercised their right to vote, but often turned to other forms of political mobilization to
assert their will. Additionally, a clear connection between elections and policy did not exist and
during these years voters often made their decision based on regional and/or regional and ethnic
loyalties.
By the mid-1780s some Pennsylvanians, particularly the elite, concluded that the masses
exercised too much control over policy decisions and that the government had to be insulated
from the whims of public opinion. Their efforts resulted in new federal and state constitutions
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that limited the ways in which the public could engage in the deliberative process. Supporters of
the new government believed that voting should be the only way citizens exercised their
sovereignty and developed effective strategies for mobilizing voters. Using election laws,
flooding the state with pro-Constitution propaganda and suppressing dissent, these Federalists
were the first group to orchestrate a statewide election campaign and managed to secure
ratification of the Constitution and dominate the first federal elections.
The coalition that voted to ratify the Constitution and elected a solid Federalist delegation
to the First Congress, however, broke down in the early 1790s, and two parties emerged that
were divided over the role of citizens in the new government. United by a shared belief in a
deferential, unitary civil society, Federalists saw elections as the only legitimate way citizens
could exercise their sovereignty and focused their efforts on securing consent for their policies
by winning elections. In contrast, critics of the Washington administration and members of the
emerging Republican Party believed that citizens had to remain vigilant in defense of their rights
and that they had the right to express their will beyond casting a ballot. Members of the
opposition attempted to challenge Federalists at the ballot box, but in the early 1790s they
continued to utilize other forms of political mobilization and focused their efforts on
demonstrations of popular support. By the mid-1790s, however, a growing recognition of the
volatility of crowds along with a string of political defeats drove Republicans to refocus their
efforts on channeling popular support into electoral victories. Aided by the spread of newspapers
and an increasing awareness of the connection between elections and policy, Republicans in the
second half of the 1790s started to create a statewide network of party operatives who could
tailor electioneering efforts to the local public. Unlike the Federalists who tried to rally
supporters through attacks on recent immigrants and fears of French influence, Republicans
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worked to unite a variety of different ethnic and religious groups behind a shared opposition to
Federalists. The emerging party structure also incorporated other forms of political mobilization,
such as fêtes, parades, and town meetings as a way to promote a partisan identity and boost voter
turnout. Instead of giving the public an opportunity to express their will, these forms of political
mobilization became part of party’s effort to win elections. By the end of the decade, the party
organization had emerged as an intermediary between the people and the government. Instead of
engaging directly in the deliberative process, Pennsylvanians participated in a political party
whose primary mission was to win elections.374
This chapter will explore the changing ways in which partisans in Pennsylvania
approached elections and electioneering between 1783 and 1800. Although both Federalists and
Republicans attempted to influence election outcomes in a variety of ways during this time
period, this chapter will focus on four of the most prominent forms of electioneering:
manipulation of election laws, nominating procedures, printed propaganda, and efforts on, or
near, election day to mobilize (or suppress) voters. Each of these forms of electioneering factored
in elections in Pennsylvania and played a key role in the emergence of organized political
parties.
Other historians have explored elections in the early republic. Most notably, the study of
elections and electioneering figured prominently in the scholarship of the “new political
historians” of the 1960s and 1970s. Historians including Ronald Formisano, Noble E.
Cunningham, Jr. and Richard Miller used election data as a way of studying constituent
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behavior. Much of the work of the new political historians centered on uncovering when “real”
political parties emerged. The goal of this chapter is not to wade into this fraught debate over
whether or not a “first party system” existed. Instead, it looks to bridge the gap between the
quantitative work of the new political historians and the qualitative studies of political culture
and show how changing electoral practices related to larger trends in approaches to political
mobilization and questions of the role of citizens in the deliberative process.375

Voting and Electioneering in Colonial Pennsylvania
Pennsylvanians had engaged in some form of organized electioneering since the early
eighteenth century. For much the colonial period, the state was divided between the Quaker Party
and the Proprietary Party. The Quaker Party, as the name implies, drew its strength primarily, but
not exclusively, from the Society of Friends, while the Proprietary Party’s main support came
from Germans, Anglicans and Scotch-Irish Presbyterians. Although many elections passed with
relatively little fanfare, during important elections the two sides fought fiercely for every vote.376
Before the Revolution only adult males who owned fifty acres of land or more could vote
in Pennsylvania. Scholars estimate that about 50 to 60 percent of adult males held the franchise;
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turnout varied by region and by year but hovered between 20 and 40 percent. Nominations were
generally made in private, although Quakers occasionally used their annual meeting to discuss
candidates for upcoming elections. Additionally, the Proprietary Party attempted to organize a
public nominating meeting in 1754, but there is no evidence that such a meeting ever occurred or
that the experiment was tried again.377 Because religious and ethnic groups voted in blocs and
voter turnout was consistently higher in religiously/ethnically divided regions, political
organizers in colonial Pennsylvania often appealed to specific religious or ethnic groups and/or
fanned the flames of rivalries between groups to boost turnout. During the election of 1764, for
example, Benjamin Franklin’s son spent “several days . . . canvassing among the Germans and
endeavoring to get votes by propagating the most infamous lies he could invent” about rival
candidates.378
The factions also resorted to more physical tactics. In Philadelphia, partisans battled over
control of the only staircase that led to the second floor of the state house, where voting
occurred. As early as 1725, the parties stationed guards atop the flight of stairs and prevented
anyone known to support the “wrong” candidate from using them. Control over this hallway
became such an issue that in 1742 members of the Proprietary Party incited a riot by hiring a
group of sailors and shipbuilders to take control of the stairs by force. Heated rhetoric and
violence were, however, the exception. Most elections during the colonial period were quiet
affairs where incumbents were easily reelected.379
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Electioneering in Revolutionary Pennsylvania 1783-1786
The American Revolution transformed the political landscape in Pennsylvania and altered the
public’s relationship with elections. Pennsylvanians had come to see self-government as a
fundamental right and defended their right to engage directly in the deliberative process.
Particularly during the war years, Pennsylvanians relied on town meetings and popular violence
to assert their will. Even as the war wound down, however, citizens continued to employ these
forms of political mobilization as a way of voicing their will. Committed to their freedom and
weary of authority, many Pennsylvanians preferred these more direct methods over voting,
which filtered public opinion and only occurred once a year.380 Moreover, voters did not
necessarily see a connection between changes in policy and changes in representation and often
cast ballots based on regional or ethnic loyalties, not support for a candidate’s positions.381
Elections, nevertheless, remained important, and two proto-parties, the Constitutionalists and the
Republicans/Anti-Constitutionalists’ vied with each other for control of the state government and
worked to mobilize their supporters on election day.
Differences over the democratic constitution of 1776 served as the catalyst for the formation
of factions in Pennsylvania during the 1780s. Republicans, who drew their strength from
Anglicans, Quakers who could vote, and German Sectarians, argued that the constitution lacked
checks and balances and verged on democratic tyranny. Meanwhile, Constitutionalists, who
tended to be Scotch-Irish, Presbyterian or Germans from Reformed churches, defended the frame
of government as the protector of liberty and will of the people. The two groups divided along
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the same lines as the colonial factions had, with the key difference being that many of the men
who had belonged to the Quaker Party had either become Loyalists and fled or were
disfranchised by the Test Laws. A dearth of newspapers in the west and poor communication
made a statewide organization difficult, and the two groups tended to focus on mobilizing their
base rather than on appealing to new voters. Constitutionalists dominated elections immediately
following the Declaration of Independence, but as the war came to a close and life began
returning to normal, a growing number of voters joined the ranks of the Republicans, and
elections became more competitive. Between 1783 and 1786, both factions put forward tickets,
published electioneering articles, and worked to mobilize supporters on election day.382
Election laws and regulations on who had the right to vote played a prominent role in
Pennsylvania’s elections during the 1780s. The state’s 1776 constitution removed all property
requirements and gave the right to vote to all males age 21 and older who had lived in the state
for a year and who paid taxes. The constitution also granted suffrage to adult sons of freeholders
who had not paid taxes. While this was the most liberal franchise law in the nation, other
Pennsylvania laws limited the actual number of men who could vote. As discussed in chapter
one, the new state required that all voters and office holders take an oath to uphold the
constitution and renounce allegiance to the king of England. Men elected to serve in government
also had to declare their belief in a single God and in the divinity of the Scriptures. These laws
disenfranchised many Quakers, who refused to take oaths, as well as anyone who openly
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opposed the new constitution or who had qualms about the new nation. The Test Laws had a
dramatic effect on the electorate, leaving as much as half the population in some areas without
the right to vote. Defenders of the Test Laws argued that they were necessary mechanism to
prevent Tories from sabotaging the republican experiment. Critics of the laws, however, argued
that they deprived men of one of their basic rights and discriminated against certain religious
groups. Just or not, the Test Laws shaped elections in Pennsylvania during this time period and,
because many of the disenfranchised would likely have sided with the Republicans, gave the
Constitutionalists an advantage.383
A uniform approach to nominating candidates did not exist in the 1780s. In some areas the
public played an active role in the process and used town meetings to select candidates. Detailed
records of these meetings do not exist, but available evidence suggests a fairly open and
democratic process. Small towns held meetings to discuss upcoming elections and to select a
representative to attend a larger district or county meeting. Representatives from the towns
would then gather and agree on a ticket.384 In Philadelphia, in addition to these public meetings,
Constitutionalists and Republicans met privately to select candidates.385
During this time period, electioneering articles appeared in late September and increased in
frequency until election day, which occurred on the second Tuesday of October. Many of the
articles that covered upcoming elections involved personal attacks on individual candidates. As
“A Plebian” lamented at the beginning of September 1784, “every newspaper is to teem with
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abuse until the general election is over” because partisans “believe that nothing can procure so
many votes at an election as scurrility and lies.”386 George Bryan, a Constitutionalist and judge
on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, bore the brunt of the Republican assault. Polemists
ridiculed Bryan’s age, claimed he lacked a moral compass, accused him of behaving like a
dictator during his tenure as President of the state, and condemned him for refusing to pardon
supposedly innocent men.387 The Constitutionalists hurled their own insults. Just prior to the
election in 1783, the Freeman’s Journal, a paper friendly to the Constitutionalists, published a
postscript that included blurbs on the leading Republicans in Philadelphia City and County.
Sharp Delany, a Republican member of the Assembly, for example, was mocked for his
“defective education and vulgar manners” and labeled a “tool” for whom “no servility is too
great” in the search for personal reward.388
The factions did, however, use more than just smear campaigns to rally voters. The
Constitutionalists relied on fears and rhetoric from the Revolution. They warned that if
Republicans held power they would restore seized property to Loyalists and to the Penn family
and allow the return of Loyalists. The Constitutionalists also portrayed the Republicans as
aristocrats and elitists unconcerned with the plight of ordinary Pennsylvanians.389 Meanwhile,
Republicans seized on the Test Laws as a way to rally voters. As early as November 1784, after
suffering another defeat at the polls, Republicans discussed supporting the repeal of the Test
Laws as a way of winning the loyalty of non-jurors and their friends. As Benjamin Rush, a
prominent Philadelphia Republican, explained to a friend, the effort would likely yield no
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immediate results, but forcing the Constitutionalists to defend the acts might “rouse and irritate
the sons and friends of the nonjurors” and win the future vote of the disenfranchised.390 The
following year Republicans published their ticket under the name “the Friends to Equal Liberty”
and filled the papers with attacks against Test Laws. One article printed shortly before election
day in 1785 in the Republican-leaning Independent Gazetteer pointed out that the laws put nonjurors in the same position that the colonists had been in when they raised arms against Great
Britain—forced to pay taxes without the right to vote for a representative—and called on voters
to select candidates who would free these “Slaves of a free state.”391
Both Constitutionalists and Republicans, particularly in Philadelphia, worked hard on
election day to ensure that their supporters made it to the polls. As the Independent Gazetteer
reported in 1785, “Great exertions were made by the two contending parties in the city to carry
their favorite ticket.”392 Pennsylvania election law required that each ticket be handwritten, and
party organizers painstakingly wrote hundreds of tickets to distribute to supporters. Reports from
the time indicate that some men went “house-to-house, soliciting votes.”393 Both factions often
stationed supporters outside polling places to harass voters as they approached. Shortly after
election day in 1785, The Pennsylvania Evening Herald printed a fictionalized account of this
type of lobbying near polling locations:
“’Well; Tom, going to vote?—Say?’—Yes—surely—‘My dear fellow, here’s the staunch
supporters of the constitution—your approved friends . . . We’ll have no nabobs—no great
men—no aristocrats—huzza, boys!—Success to the constitution for ever!’—My dear
friends!—Happy to see you!—How are you, Jack?—How’s all your family, Bill?—What’s
390
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the matter with you, Ned?—How do, Harry?—Welcome to Philadelphia once more Dick.—
Are you going to vote? Here’s the ticket—friends of equal liberty—men who understand
trade and commerce—not those damn’d prospeteran crew, who ride rough-shod over the
people, like Oliver Cromwell—huzza!—Three cheers!—Commerce and equal liberty for
ever!—Come on, my lads, come on!”394

Although it is meant to be satirical, the article illustrates the central divisions in Pennsylvania
politics. The imagined activist campaigning for the Constitutionalists relies on class antagonism
and the Constitution—issues that would likely appeal to laborers. The Republican, in contrast,
targets merchants and Quakers with slogans including “trade and commerce” and “Commerce
and equal liberty forever.” The Republican also appeals to the Republican fears of a democratic
despotism and compares the Constitutionalists to Oliver Cromwell.
In the midst of the partisan battles, voting places often degenerated into chaos and confusion.
Following the election of 1784, “A Citizen of Pennsylvania” decried that the scene looked more
like “a mob assembled for some illegal purposes” than an election. The situation was ripe for
fraud, and accusations of irregularities at polling places were commonplace.395
Turnout rates during this time period ranged from the low teens to upward of 60 percent in
some regions. In general, however, more people voted as the decade wore on. The increase in
turnout was, as historian Owen Ireland has shown, due to votes from Lutherans, Sectarians, and
Quakers who had previously abstained from voting for religious reasons. Likely influenced by
the Republican campaign to repeal the Test Laws, the majority of the new voters sided with
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Republican candidates. By 1786 Republicans held a commanding majority in the Assembly and
managed to gut the Test Acts, thus sealing the fate of the Constitutionalists.396

Federalists and the Constitution 1787-1789
The debate over the Federal Constitution and first federal elections marked a shift in how
Pennsylvanians viewed the relationship between the people and their government. The
Constitution was designed to serve as a check against the excesses of the Confederation period.
Instead of exercising direct authority over deliberations, public opinion would be filtered through
the selection of representatives. The presidential veto and bicameral legislature further insulated
the government from popular pressures. Federalists tended to see the vote as the only legitimate
way for the people to express their will. As scholars including Gordon Wood have shown, these
political leaders and their followers asserted that sovereignty rested with the people and elections
were the only way the people as a whole could speak. Benjamin Rush, a leading proponent of the
Constitution, summarized this view:“[T]he sovereignty of the people is delegated to those whom
they have freely appointed to administer [the] constitution, save at the stated period of election,
when the sovereignty is again at the disposal of the whole people.” 397 Federalists viewed other
approaches to political influence such as town meetings, instructions to representatives, and
popular uprisings as illegitimate and saw them as a threat to the health and longevity of the
republic. Given the importance they placed on elections and the significance of what was at
stake, they invested significant amount of time and resources in ensuring the election of
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Federalists to the Constitutional Convention and the first federal Congress. In 1787 and 1788
Pennsylvania Federalists pioneered a new style of electioneering that utilized election law,
grassroots organizing, and newspaper rhetoric to build a diverse coalition of voters.
As the Constitutionalists had done with the Test Acts, Federalists used election laws to
frame the rules of the game in a way that favored their candidates. In 1787, Federalists relied on
a shortened campaign schedule to prevent their opponents from mobilizing. Only ten days after
the introduction of the new Constitution, Federalist member of the Assembly George Clymer
called for the immediate election of a convention to ratify the Constitution. The motion stunned
some fellow Federalists and came as a complete shock to Constitutionalists who had not even
had time to discuss the new frame of government with their constituents. Although most
Pennsylvanians agreed that the Articles of Confederation needed revision and few people
objected to the new government following the first publication of the Constitution, Federalists
correctly predicted that Constitutionalists would see the new government as a threat to the state
constitution and try to block ratification. The proposed Federal Constitution, with its strong
executive and bicameral legislature, represented an implicit rejection of Pennsylvania’s 1776
constitution. As Clymer recognized, the call for immediate elections would undercut the
Constitutionalists’ ability to organize their western supporters.398 Anti-federalists in the
Assembly recognized that the shortened campaign schedule put them at a disadvantage and did
everything in their power to delay the call for a convention, including refusing to attend the
Assembly to prevent a quorum. A similar tactic had been employed in 1784 to thwart an
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attempted revision to the Test Laws.399 While the strategy had worked in 1784, Federalists in
1787 were in no mood for games and sent word that the absent members must return. When the
missing representatives refused to appear, the Sergeant at Arms and a group of Philadelphians
dragged two of the assemblymen back to the meeting room. Once they reached quorum, the
Assembly voted to call for elections for a convention to occur in less than six weeks on Tuesday,
November 6.400
Federalists also manipulated the election laws in 1788 in preparation for the first federal
elections. The Federal Constitution gave the states leeway to decide how to conduct elections,
which meant that the decision rested with the Pennsylvania Assembly, where Federalists held a
majority.401 In September 1788, over the objection of William Findley and other leading western
Anti-federalists, Federalists passed an election bill that called for at-large elections to occur on
November 26. In an at-large election, each voter wrote the names of eight different men on a
piece of paper, and the eight men receiving the greatest number of votes were elected. At-large,
as opposed to district, elections favored Federalists because most of their supporters lived in the
eastern part of the state, in and around Philadelphia. Antifederalists favored district elections
because they held majorities in western parts of the state and had a chance of electing at least a
few representatives if the state was divided into districts. In an at-large election, however, the
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Federalist majorities in the more populous east would likely erase whatever advantage Antifederalists may have had.402
Supporters of the Constitution used a hybrid public/private system to nominate
candidates. In 1787, Federalists organized town meetings to select candidates. Instead of voting
directly for representatives, however, the participants appointed a committee to create a ticket for
ratification at a later meeting. This process ensured that the desired candidates received the
nomination while also allowing the public to feel as though they had participated in the decision.
Even with a select committee picking the candidates, Federalists left nothing to chance and
required each of the proposed candidates to publically state their support for the new
Constitution.403
In late 1788 Federalists organized the first-ever statewide nominating convention. This
convention, held in Lancaster, began as a response to a similar gathering of Anti-federalists in
Harrisburg in the fall of the same year. The primary purpose of the Anti-federalist meeting,
however, had been to discuss possible amendments to the Constitution. The Harrisburg
convention did create a ticket for the upcoming elections, but this action was almost an
afterthought.404 Although Federalists condemned the meeting and claimed that the goal of “the
Antifederal conclave” in creating a ticket had been to “save all the trouble of free elections in the
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future,” Federalist leaders were concerned that the gathering might give Antifederalists an
advantage. 405 Leading Philadelphia Federalists, therefore, called on supporters of the Federal
Constitution throughout the state to hold local meetings and select delegates to attend a
convention. Similar to the process in 1787, citizens who attended these gatherings voted for
delegates to the Lancaster Convention and did not directly select nominees.406 On November 3,
1788, delegates representing eighteen counties and the city of Philadelphia convened in
Lancaster. Unlike the Anti-federalist meeting, the Lancaster Convention dealt solely with
nominations.407
The ticket Federalists settled on, however, was not universally satisfactory. Federalists
trumpeted the Lancaster Ticket as a reflection of the state’s diverse population, but some
Pennsylvanians rejected both the Harrisburg and the Lancaster tickets as unrepresentative of their
interests and demanded the right to select their own candidates.408 An article addressed to “the
German Inhabitants of the State of Pennsylvania” published shortly before election day called on
Germans to “Muster all your strength in the ensuing election, and neither receive nor give a
ticket which has not at least three Germans on it.”409 The article highlights the continued
importance of ethnic loyalty in Pennsylvania and shows that neither Federalists nor Antifederalists had developed a sufficient strategy to appeal to German voters, who made up a
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significant portion of the electorate. The modified tickets also demonstrate that the parties had
not matured to a point where voters felt obliged to adhere to the party-approved ticket.410
In 1787 and 1788 Federalists also utilized newspaper propaganda to build momentum and
rally supporters. Leading Pennsylvania Federalists including Thomas Fitzsimmons and Benjamin
Rush recruited some of the most talented writers in the nation to defend the Constitution, and
Federalists flooded the newspapers with opinion pieces.411 In general, Federalists presented the
Constitution as a panacea—it would solve all problems and create none.412 Beyond responding to
specific Anti-federalist criticisms, however, Federalists authors rarely discussed specific
provisions in the Constitution. Instead, Federalist-leaning journalists harped on the general
benefits of a stronger national government, warned of the dangers of the status quo and attacked
the Anti-federalists as disorganizers. Federalist polemists also made liberal use of lingering
resentments over the Test Laws as a way to ensure that Quakers and other previously
disenfranchised voters turned out to support Federalist candidates.413 Other pieces dwelled on
mistakes made by the Constitutionalists and hammered leading Anti-federalists as either being
closet Tories or power-hungry office-seekers who were worried that the new government would
cost them their lucrative government jobs.414 Finally, Federalists held up George Washington and
Benjamin Franklin’s participation in the Constitutional Convention as evidence that the
Constitution was the best form of government possible. As one correspondent wrote in 1787, “if
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the plan is not a good one, it is impossible that either General Washington or Dr. Franklin would
have recommended it.”415 Overall, the goal of Federalist newspaper campaign was not to
educate the public on the new government or to engage in a debate over the merits of the
Constitution. It was to convince voters to side with Federalist candidates.416
Federalists also looked for ways to undermine their opponents’ campaigns. The majority
of newspaper editors in Pennsylvania supported the Federalists, and Anti-federalists faced
difficulties in even getting their work published.417 Federalist readers, meanwhile, canceled
subscriptions and boycotted newspapers that carried Anti-federalist pieces.418 Anti-federalists
also claimed that Federalists at the Post Office prevented or delayed the delivery of news to the
Anti-federalist western parts of the state.419 Additionally, proponents of the new government
waged a campaign to force journalists to use their real names when publishing articles.
Federalists believed the stature of their supporters might lend the arguments greater weight.
Perhaps more importantly, they hoped the move might scare Anti-federalist authors in
predominantly Federalist parts of the state, such as Philadelphia, from publishing comments
critical of the Constitution because they might lose business or friends if their identity was
revealed. According to one Anti-federalist, the call for authors to use their real name amounted
to “Give me a stick, and I will break your head.”420 Anti-federalists had legitimate reasons to be
concerned about being “outed.” Benjamin Workman, for example, lost his job at the University
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of Pennsylvania after Federalists unmasked him as the author of series of Anti-federalist articles
signed by “Philadelphiensis.”421 While these antics may appear questionable or unethical, they
point to Federalists’ focus on elections and determination to secure victory.
Evidence of election day campaigning in 1787 and 1788 is sparse, but the effect of
Federalist electioneering overall is clear: Federalists sailed to victory in both elections.422 In
1787, Federalists won nearly twice as many seats as their Anti-federalist opponents, thereby
guaranteeing that the state would ratify the Constitution.423 In 1788, the proposed modified
German/Lancaster and German/Harrisburg tickets complicated voting, but six men from the
original Lancaster Ticket, along with two Germans, one Federalist and one moderate, were
elected to the first Congress.424 Federalist regions reported higher turnouts than did those that
sided with the Anti-federalists, which suggests that the Federalists did a better job at getting their
supporters to the polls. Totals for the different Federalist candidates, however, differ
significantly, which means that many voters strayed from the Lancaster Ticket.425 The fact that
voters did not feel compelled to vote for either ticket indicates that these proto-parties had not yet
been fully accepted as the intermediary between the people and their government. Nevertheless,
Federalists’ success at the polls demonstrates the efficacy of their electioneering strategy. Using
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election law, hybrid nominations, and newspapers, Federalists managed to create a broad base of
support and mobilize voters on election day.

Elections in the Early 1790s
The ratification of the Federal Constitution and adoption of a new state constitution in
1790 changed Pennsylvanians’ relationship with their government and invested elections with
greater significance. The new governments limited the ability of average citizens to engage in the
deliberative process and, at least according to some residents, empowered elected officials as the
only legitimate spokesmen of the public will. These developments, in turn, led Pennsylvanians to
begin to focus more on elections.
The Federalist coalition that had united behind ratification and demonstrated the efficacy
of a coordinated electioneering strategy broke down following the first federal elections and, in
its wake, the outlines of two new political parties began to take shape. The two parties divided
over the role of citizens and approached elections and electioneering in different ways.
Federalists supported a hierarchical society and remained convinced that voting was the only
legitimate expression of the public will. Their electioneering efforts were based on the belief that
the general public needed the guidance and direction of a few wealthy and well-educated men
when selecting representatives. In contrast to the 1787 and 1788 campaigns, Federalists in the
early 1790s relied on deference to win elections and, at least initially, avoided grassroots
organizing. Opponents of the Federalists, meanwhile, argued that citizens had to remain active in
defense of their rights, and most of their electioneering centered on demonstrating that their
candidates represented the will of the people. Unlike the Federalists, opponents of the
Washington Administration continued to use other forms of political mobilization to try to more
200

directly influence the deliberative process. As the decade wore on, however, members of the
emerging Republican Party began to recognize that, without challenging Federalists at the polls,
their efforts could accomplish little. As a result, the Party shifted its focus and began working to
construct a party structure designed to mobilize voters.
Throughout the early 1790s, both Republicans and Federalists tried to use election laws
to gain an upper hand. The struggle over election law played a particularly important role in the
state’s congressional races. Following the first federal elections, critics of the Federalists
complained that at-large election had discriminated against inhabitants of the western part of the
state and had resulted in a delegation that did not truly reflect the state’s diversity. 426 To prevent
the same outcome in the second congressional elections, a coalition of westerners and former
Antifederalists managed to pass legislation that divided the state into districts for the second
congressional election.427 Even with district elections, however, Federalists won a majority of
the seats in the second congressional elections. Despite their victory, Federalists in the state’s
House of Representatives were determined to rewrite the laws for the third elections, which were
scheduled for October 1792.428 Their opponents, meanwhile, prepared to defend the district
system. Before proponents of districts could draft an election law, however, they had to wait and
find out how many seats they would have in the House of Representatives. The third
congressional elections would be the first to reflect the data from the census taken in 1790 and
Pennsylvanians expected to pick-up at least two seats. Just as it appeared that a decision was
near, George Washington vetoed the proposed reapportionment bill. The ensuing confusion over
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how many seats Pennsylvania would have in the next session of Congress made dividing the
state into districts impossible, and Republicans were forced to acquiesce to at-large elections.429
The Republicans, however, still managed to pick up a few seats. Actually, an at-large
election in 1792 may have helped them because it forced them to develop a statewide
organization. Cognizant of this fact and worried that Republicans might continue to multiply in
the west and outnumber Federalists in the east, Federalists submitted to district elections
beginning in 1794. Throughout this back and forth, partisans claimed they were motivated by a
desire to secure the best representation for the people of Pennsylvania and not by partisanship.
But, while the sides may have genuinely believed their system was the best for the state, the
strategic importance of the laws to their own cause should not be overlooked.430
The two young parties differed in their approach towards nominating candidates.
Reflecting their belief in a hierarchical society, Federalists did not seek direct public input. For
example, in preparation for the state’s first gubernatorial election in 1790, approximately two
dozen Federalist delegates from the state constitutional convention and a few assemblymen
gathered at the first-ever nominating caucus and settled on General Arthur St. Clair as their
candidate. St. Clair was a war hero, had served in state government, and had been the President
of Congress under the Articles of Confederation. Although St. Clair was a popular figure, no
evidence exists that the Federalist caucus sought any direct input from the public before selecting
him. Whereas nominations were usually presented as the choice of a “numerous and respectable
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meeting,” the circular announcing St. Clair’s candidacy was signed by only seven prominent
Federalists.431 The message was clear: voters should defer to the judgment of these men.
Opponents of the Federalists emphasized that the public had selected their own
candidates. Rather than a select group of well-known politicians, “a very numerous and
respectable meeting of the Citizens of Philadelphia” unanimously agreed to support Thomas
Mifflin in September 1790 for governor. Although a “Republican Party” per se did not exist in
the fall of 1790, many of the men who labored for Mifflin’s candidacy later became
Republicans.432 Mifflin was one of the most well-known political figures in Pennsylvania and
had served in the colonial and state governments and had attended the United States
Constitutional Convention. Following the meeting in Philadelphia, gatherings across the state
adopted similar resolutions. In a break from tradition, newspapers printed the results of votes
taken at many of the town meetings as way to further highlight that Mifflin had the support of the
people.433Instead of trumpeting their candidate’s connections to prominent men, Mifflin’s
supporters emphasized that, although he was a well-respected and influential figure, “no
elevation of rank has been sufficient to warp his mind from its original democratical biases.”434
Other Mifflin supporters mocked the pretentions of the Federalist caucus and their attempt to
overawe the people with their public endorsements. Mifflin was, they argued, the people’s
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choice.435 Their assessment proved to be correct, and Mifflin easily defeated St. Clair in the
election.436
The different styles of nominating candidates played a central role in the third
congressional elections, held in the fall of 1792. As was mentioned, Federalists in the state
legislature had passed an at-large election bill in the hope that the populous eastern parts of the
state that tended to vote Federalist would offset the less-populated western regions that usually
supported opposition candidates. The caucus debacle and rout of St. Clair had convinced
Federalists that they needed to rethink their approach to selecting candidates. With this in mind,
Federalists decided to pursue the same strategy that had led to victory in 1788 and have each
county send delegates to a statewide meeting. The public could participate in the choice of the
delegates but would not be directly engaging in the nomination process. A planning meeting in
Philadelphia called to discuss the new strategy, however, broke down because some attendees
rejected the statewide conference in favor of a committee of correspondence that would
communicate directly with citizens throughout the state. The meeting ended in a deadlock, and in
the ensuing weeks the emerging Republican coalition embraced the correspondence method
while Federalists backed the statewide conference.437 The opposing views on the nomination
process is a reflection of the different way the groups viewed the public’s relationship with the
deliberative process: Federalists believed citizens should defer to the elite and well-educated
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while members of the young Republican Party believed the public should public should play a
more active role.
The debate between Republicans, or “correspondents,” and Federalists, known as
“conferees,” played out in a series of public town meetings. On July 30, Republicans held a rally
in the State House Yard that drew over two thousand residents. Those in attendance appointed a
committee of well-known Republicans to draft a circular letter designed solely to communicate
with residents throughout the state and to collect the names of possible candidates. Their job was
not “to deliberate on the subject of the election [or] to admit, or reject the names of the
candidates” but simply learn the “sense of the people.” On August 3, 1792, members of the
Philadelphia committee sent 520 copies of the letter to various communities throughout state.
The goal of the letter was to ensure that everyone had an opportunity to have their voices heard
and reflects the Republican commitment to demonstrating legitimacy through popular support. 438
Federalists recognized the threat posed by the Republican assembly and organized their
own meeting in the State House Yard on July 31, the day after the Republican rally. Unlike the
Republican gathering, which had started at 7:00 pm in order to accommodate the city’s working
men, the Federalist meeting opened at 3:00 pm. In response, Republicans called on their
supporters to leave work early to attend and protest the gathering. When the meeting convened,
the two sides could not agree on who would serve as chair, and a riot nearly broke out when
Federalists tried to install the Senator Robert Morris, a well-known Federalist. In the mayhem,
the officer’s chair and table were smashed and, as one witness recounted “it was with difficulty
violence of a more serious nature were prevented.”439 This brief foray into engaging the public
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directly in the nominating process convinced Federalists to return to private gatherings and, after
a series of small meetings held at a local tavern, Federalists announced that a nominating
convention would convene in Lancaster on September 20.440
With the lines drawn on how the two parties would approach nominations, the two sides
began the process of creating their tickets. Only nine of the state’s twenty counties sent delegates
to the Lancaster convention. Of the western counties, only York sent a representative,
highlighting the fact that the Federalists were almost exclusively a party of the east. The poor
turnout did not, however, stop the Federalists from creating the “Conferee Ticket.”441
Republicans, meanwhile, presented a list of forty-four names collected from the correspondence
with citizens throughout the state. Next, Republicans throughout the state held meetings to
decide which candidates to nominate. Unlike the tumultuous gathering in Philadelphia, these
meetings do not appear to have degenerated into violence. When the committees had met, a
Philadelphia committee collated the work of the various counties and presented the Republican
ticket under the name “The Rights of Man Ticket.”442 Notably, despite the different approaches
to creating a ticket, seven of the thirteen candidates that appeared on the Republican Rights of
Man ticket were also nominated by Federalists at Lancaster. The fact that the two parties agreed
on more than half of the candidates highlights the fluidity of party lines and immature state of the
parties. At the same time, however, the attention given to the different forms of nominating
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candidates reflects the public’s increasing awareness of the importance of participating in the
electoral process.
The fact that the two parties may have agreed on certain candidates did not, however,
prevent journalists from trying to rally supporters by portraying elections as a contest between
two well-defined ideologies. Generally speaking, during this period Federalists presented
themselves as the defenders of the Constitution and attacked Republicans as Antifederalists and
disorganizers. An electioneering broadside in 1792, for example, warned that “enemies to the
peace and happiness in Pennsylvania, do now exist in various districts of the state, whose object
is to impede the operations of the federal government.” Having failed to prevent ratification,
these men “are now attempting a deadly blow at its administration” by gaining a foothold in
Congress.443 Lest any readers doubt the seriousness of the threat, Federalists reminded readers of
the benefits of the Federal Constitution to the country in general and Pennsylvania in particular.
“No state in the Union,” lectured a correspondent in the Gazette of the United States, “has more
to hope or to fear than Pennsylvania” from the measures of the federal government. It was,
therefore, imperative to elect men “who are firm friends to the present Constitution of the United
States.”444
While Federalists used the Constitution and Washington to substantiate legitimacy,
Republicans claimed to be guardians of the principles of the Revolution and portrayed
Federalists as aristocrats and closet-monarchists. They circulated their own electioneering
broadside in 1792, proclaiming that an “Aristocratic junto” had launched a “daring attack upon
the equality of rights, and freedom of suffrage” by depriving the people of the opportunity to
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participate in the nomination of candidates. The broadside concluded by calling on voters to “Be
vigilant and independent” and praying that the “Power, which inspired the valorous spirit of the
Revolution” will serve as a guide.445 James Madison summed up the Republican view of the
partisan divisions in his famous “A Candid State of the Parties,” which appeared in the
Philadelphia National Gazette, shortly before election day. Contrary to what the Federalists
claimed, Madison asserted that divisions between Federalists and Antifederalist no longer
existed. Instead, society had now divided into two groups: the “republicans” and the “antirepublicans.” Republicans, according to Madison, were those men who were “offended at every
public measure that does not appeal to the understanding and to the general interest of the
community, or that is not strictly conformable to the principles.” Anti-republicans were those
individuals who are “more partial to the opulent than to the other classes of society” and who
believe “that mankind are incapable of governing themselves” and must be guided by the elite.446
In addition to these printed appeals, both parties labored to ensure that their supporters
made it to the polls on election day armed with knowledge of the correct candidate. Republicans,
in particular, had to invest time and energy dispersing copies of the approved tickets to
supporters in the western rural areas. In 1792 Albert Gallatin and William Findley rode
throughout the western counties scattering tickets and trying to galvanize supporters. The
scarcity of newspapers and sparse settlement meant that the success of the Republicans depended
on these efforts.447 Federalists were active in the west as well, and historian Ronald Baumann
claims that Secretary of the Treasurylo Alexander Hamilton spread rumors that Federalists would
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repeal all excise taxes and were close to securing a deal with Spain that would give American
settlers access to the Mississippi in an effort to build support for Federalist candidates. 448
By 1792 the outlines of the Republican Party in Pennsylvania had begun to take shape,
and operatives including James Hutchinson and Alexander James Dallas in Philadelphia and
Gallatin and Findley in the west labored to defeat the Federalists at the polls. Elections and
electioneering, however, were only a few of the tools critics of the Washington administration
used to affect policy in the early 1790s. As mentioned in chapter one, in the fall of 1792 critics of
the Federalists organized a large meeting in Pittsburgh to protest the federal excise tax.
Prominent Republicans, including Gallatin and John Smilie, a candidate on the Rights of Man
ticket, attended the gathering and endorsed resolutions that called for the use of all “legal
measure that may obstruct the operation of the Law until we are able to obtain its total repeal.”449
The gathering came on the heels of a series of violent attacks against excise collectors, and
Federalists pounced on the gathering as proof that the Republicans sought to undermine the
strength of the federal government. They also condemned the resolutions as “disgraceful to
humanity, subversive of social happiness, and destructive of civil authority.”450 Republicans in
Philadelphia recognized that the meeting seemed to reaffirm the Federalist stereotype of any
critic of the federal government as a promoter of disorder. “Tis impossible to conceive,” a
dejected James Hutchinson wrote to Gallatin, “what mischief your Pittsburgh meeting about the
excise has done us.” Hutchinson believed the meeting reversed the momentum and breathed life
into the Federalists.451 Republican newspaper editor Benjamin Bache denounced the meeting and
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concluded that the resolutions could not have been “the result of dispassionate and full
deliberation.”452 The damage, however, had been done. Hutchinson concluded that the antiexcise meeting in Pittsburgh cost Republicans “the Majority in the Counties of Berks and
Dauphin.” 453
Voter turnout during the early 1790s reflects the relative weakness of the federal
government and undeveloped state of the political parties. Communities remained relatively
parochial and voters showed more interested in offices that had a direct impact on their daily
lives than in positions in the new federal government. Local elections, such as the selection of a
sheriff, consistently drew the highest percent of eligible voters to the polls. There were, however,
early signs of how the rise of parties effected who voted. Turnout in Philadelphia, where the
young parties had been most active, increased by six percent between 1790 and 1792 and
Republicans had succeeded in mobilizing a number of voters who had previously stayed at home
on election day. But, the nascent opposition party had not developed a sufficient strategy for
mobilizing voters outside of Philadelphia and Federalists easily secured a majority of statewide
elections throughout this period.454

The Elections of 1794 and 1795
The elections of 1794 and 1795 marked the beginnings of a transition from traditional
styles of electioneering to organized parties. The tumultuous public nominating meeting in 1792,
in conjunction with popular uprisings in the west, led members of the emerging Republican Party
to rethink their approach toward political mobilization. Additionally, following the Jay Treaty
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debates, Republicans recognized that while petitioning, town meetings, and fêtes might build
support, they had to start winning elections to challenge Federalists’ grip on power. The contests
during these years pitted two well-defined groups against each other. Both Republicans and
Federalists utilized nominations and rhetoric and experimented with different ways of mobilizing
voters. Voter turnout continued to rise during these years but some Pennsylvanians resisted the
focus on elections and remained committed to engaging directly in the deliberative process.
Neither Republicans nor Federalists attempted to develop much of a statewide
organization in 1794 and 1795, in large part because easterners had no immediate need to
coordinate their efforts with westerners. These were off-years for the gubernatorial race, and the
election laws remained unchanged, which meant that both the congressional and state elections
occurred in districts. Unlike the situation in 1792, when Philadelphia Republican James
Hutchinson had to rely on westerner Albert Gallatin to secure victory, partisans in 1794 and 1795
had no reason to organize outside of their own region. The establishment of a network of
Democratic and Republican Societies throughout the state and nation during this period seemed
to suggest that the critics of the Federalists were creating a more organized opposition, but these
societies generally did not engage in electioneering. Furthermore, Washington’s denunciation of
the societies destroyed whatever momentum existed and partisans focused their electioneering
efforts locally in 1794 and 1795.455
In general, as the two parties matured the public’s ability to participate directly in the
nominating process diminished. In Philadelphia, where the parties were coalescing faster than
other parts of the state, both Federalists and Republicans during this time period used a mixed
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private/public method of selecting candidates. A small group of party leaders agreed on a ticket
which was then submitted to a public meeting for ratification. Using this approach, party officials
could ensure that the “right” candidate was nominated while providing average voters with an
opportunity to participate in the process. The system had the additional appeal of avoiding
throngs of people, a significant plus for Pennsylvanians who remained wary of large crowds after
the chaos of the 1792 meeting and the uprisings in the west. But, as Federalists learned in 1794,
even inviting the public to participate in such a proscribed manner could prove problematic. 456
In preparation for the fourth congressional elections in 1794, Federalists in Philadelphia
organized a public nominating meeting for Saturday, October 11—three days before the election.
The gathering was held in partial response to a series of Republican meetings that had endorsed
John Swanwick to fill the seat occupied by Federalist Thomas Fitzsimmons. Cognizant that the
Saturday meeting would likely be the last public assembly before the election on Tuesday,
Republican editor Benjamin Bache urged his readers to make every effort to attend. Apparently a
significant number of Republicans heeded his advice because Swanwick’s supporters narrowly
missed nominating their candidate over Fitzsimmons. In fact, the meeting chairman had to call
for a second show of hands before he could declare Fitzsimmons the winner. This close vote
served as yet another reminder of the challenges of engaging the public.457 To avoid a similar
embarrassment, Philadelphia Federalists held their 1795 nominating meeting indoors where they
could better control both attendance and outcome.458
The public, however, was not ready to concede their right to participate in the nomination
process. A correspondent in the Carlisle Gazette raged against a “private junto” which had met
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to form a ticket. These men, he fumed, were trying to “dictate . . . whom you ought to choose to
make laws.” “This is,” he exclaimed, “the few attempting to dictate to the many.”459 Even
newspaper editor Bache, a key figured in the Republican Party, wrote in 1794 that the practice of
framing tickets before an election was something to be “regretted.”460 Another sign that the
parties had not matured was that different meetings from the same district occasionally endorsed
slightly different tickets. Neither party had a centralized power structure that could ensure
uniformity.461 Even the party names remained in flux. The labels “Federalist” and “Republican”
hardly appeared during the 1795 election season. Instead, the parties published tickets under the
labels “Treaty” and “No Treaty” or “Anti-Treaty,” references to how the two groups felt about
the Jay Treaty.462
The use of the “Treaty” and “No Treaty” labels in 1795 does, however, point to an
increasing awareness of the connection between policy and elections. In past elections, partisans
had occasionally referred to specific issues in electioneering pieces, but nobody had ever made
the relationship between elections and policy as explicit as the two emerging parties did in 1795.
Republicans claimed that a vote for the Federalists in the 1795 elections was a vote for the Jay
Treaty even though the elections were for the Pennsylvania state legislature, which had no direct
voice in the treaty debates. “Justitia,” a correspondent in the Republican Aurora, explained that
“the whole representation from [Philadelphia]” voted to appoint Federalist William Bingham as
U.S. Senator in 1795 and that it was “William Bingham’s vote in the Senate” that gave
Federalists the necessary two-thirds of the Senate needed to ratify the treaty.463 The Philadelphia

459

Carlisle Gazette, 30 September 1795.
General Advertiser, 11 October 1794.
461
Keller, “Diversity and Democracy,” 152-155.
462
Aurora, 8 October 1795; Independent Gazette, 10 October 1795.
463
Aurora, 5 October 1795.
460

213

representation, therefore, voted for the Jay Treaty. While Republicans were not completely ready
to abandon their efforts to use other forms of political mobilization to affect change, the effort to
frame the 1795 election as a referendum on the Jay Treaty reflects their move toward a focus on
elections as the only legitimate way to affect change.
The focus on the Jay Treaty also points to Republicans’ decision to use
national/international issues, as opposed to local ones, to rally supporters. In the absence of any
real statewide organization, the emphasis on a national debate such as the Jay Treaty helped
unify the opposition and gave voters throughout Pennsylvania (and the country) a reason to turn
out on election day. Using national issues did, however, come at cost. Whereas the public could
engage directly in debates over local issues, it was not practical to give each citizen a voice in
national and international affairs. Many Republicans had been firm advocates for democratic
localism. The emphasis on national topics reflects their growing acceptance of the power of the
federal government and the limited role of citizens in the deliberative process.464
Evolving views on the role of citizens also effected electioneering rhetoric. The Whiskey
Rebellion and Jay Treaty debates further polarized politics, and electioneering rhetoric continued
to intensify. As discussed in chapter three, during this time journalists began to make a transition
away from laudatory/demonstrative rhetoric that used reason and logic to persuade audiences and
toward the more emotional style of rhetoric known as horatory. Partisans used horatory rhetoric
to inflame passions rather than to involve the public in debates over important policy questions.
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Because it is more accessible to the broader public, the shift to horatory rhetoric in American
politics signaled a democratization of politics.465
Federalists were the first to embrace the use of horatory rhetoric for electioneering. Fear
mongering is one of the most common forms of horatory language, and in 1794 and 1795
Federalists focused their electioneering efforts on demonstrating that the Republicans were a
threat to order. The Whiskey Rebellion, they claimed, proved that Republicans were a dangerous
cabal of Antifederalists eager to destroy the federal government.466 Federalists ignored the fact
that the Philadelphia Democratic Society had condemned the use of violence and that a number
of Republicans had joined the march to quell the disturbance. “Had it not been for the
encouragement & support derived from the inflammatory speeches” of Republicans, explained
one Federalist in the Gazette of the United States, the Whiskey Rebellion would not have
happened.467 Federalists were particularly critical of former members of the Democratic Society
who ran for office. Shortly before the election 1794, for example, a Federalists writing under the
pseudonym “A.B.” labeled John Swanwick, who had joined Philadelphia’s Democratic Society a
few months earlier, “ABASSADO EXTRAORINDARY to the Insurgents.”468 Personal attacks,
another characteristic of horatory rhetoric, played an integral role in the Federalist campaigns
during this period. Swanwick was ridiculed for being short, mocked for writing poetry, and that
he remained unmarried. In 1795, Federalist journalists targeted the Vice President of the
Philadelphia Democratic Society and Republican candidate for the state House of
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Representatives Israel Israel and mocked him for being Jewish, even though Israel was not
Jewish.469
The Federalist cause benefited from the arrival of William Cobbett, aka “Peter
Porcupine,” a journalist and editor with a knack for witty but scathing sarcasm. Cobbett pushed
the rhetorical battles between the two sides to a new level. A prolific writer, Cobbett published
pamphlets entitled “A Little Plain English” and “A Bone to Gnaw, for the Democrats” that
portrayed Republicans as an unthinking and bloodthirsty mob that took orders from
Revolutionary France. Cobbett also repeatedly questioned various Republicans’ masculinity, a
trope that would become more common as the parties continued to grow. For example, he
mocked John Swanwick as a “diminutive superannuated bachelor” who, though a “great and
mighty democrat,” is confined to being a “perfect platonist in politics and love.”470 Cobbett’s
uncouthness certainly offended some but it proved popular and effective. As one Federalist
noted, Cobbett’s writing circulated widely among “the middle and town classes” and his style
“suits them and has a great effect.”471
Republicans did not stand by as Cobbett and other Federalists hurled insults. In response
to Cobbett’s attacks, Swanwick published his own pamphlet that, in addition to picking apart
Cobbett’s grammar, called the British emigrant a Tory and a claimed he was run out of
England.472 But, Republicans journalists did more than respond to Federalist allegations; they
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hammered Federalists as aristocrats bent on depriving the people of the right of self-government.
“A Federal Democrat” stated that “the name of a Federalist and an Aristocrat are now in
connection” and explained that “Treaty Ticket” is “supported by British agents, Old Tories and
Bank Directors.”473 Republicans had to wake up to the imminent danger and act to save the
republic. Alternatively, as the writer “Sleep” ironically suggested, voters could just “sleep on for
a few elections more and . . . never again shall have the trouble of [voting].”474 In short, while
Republicans may not have had someone quite as gifted in electioneering mudslinging as Cobbett,
they did have plenty of able authors willing to engage in verbal fisticuffs.
The elections of 1794 and 1795 also saw the introduction of new styles of electioneering.
Republican John Swanwick is credited with being one of the first candidates to openly seek
election in 1794. A disgusted “T. T.” wrote in the Gazette of the United States that “within these
last two years a total innovation has been effected in our mode of election.” Campaigning and
electioneering were traditionally left to the friends and supporters of a candidate, but now, T.T.
continued, “all the arts of undue influence and corruption supplant the purity” that used to
exist.475 T.T’s objections stemmed from the facts that Swanwick did not hide that he sought
public office and that he used his personal wealth to woo voters, including treating members of
the State House to an extravagant lunch at the luxurious Oeller’s Hotel and purportedly agreeing
to make a generous donation to St. Mary’s Catholic Church in an attempt to win Catholic voters.
Even more egregious, Swanwick’s supporters stood near the polling location on election day and
thrust tickets into the hands of approaching voters and invited them to have some “Pottage, a
slice of ham, or a drink of Grog.” Treating was a common practice in some parts of the country
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but struck some Philadelphians as uncouth. 476 Although these efforts are partially explained by
Swanwick’s personal ambition, they are also a sign of Republicans’ increasing focus on winning
elections.
Federalists claimed to look down on the overt forms of electioneering Swanwick used.
Citizens should vote for the “best” candidate, which for Federalists usually meant the more
educated and refined one, and not the one who offered free food or alcohol. But, while Federalist
candidates avoided public solicitation of votes, their supporters utilized whatever tools were at
their disposal to mobilize voters. At least according to Republicans, wealthy Federalists in 1795
relied on “British influence, British agents, old tories, the power of the Bank, and a long list of
unprincipled speculators” to rally voters.477 Republicans claimed that on election day, Federalists
ransacked the entire city “for every person they could influence either by persuasion or
intimidation.” 478 Republicans also accused their opponents of spreading false rumors that the
Republican anti-treaty ticket had been roundly defeated in a recent election in nearby Delaware
when, in fact, the results were mixed.479
In the mid-1790s Federalists also started using nativist rhetoric and anti-immigrant
sentiment as a way to rally supporters. The turmoil in Europe had resulted in a dramatic increase
in the number of immigrants seeking refuge in America. Philadelphia was the largest and most
diverse city in the new county and seemed a logical choice for many new arrivals. Wave after
wave of Irish, German, and French poured into the city of brotherly love and filtered throughout
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the backcountry. Of course not everyone welcomed the influx of these new ethnic groups.
Federalists, in particular, feared that the Irish and French might infect American politics with the
same type of radical politics that had led to the Reign of Terror in France. That many of the
recent immigrants sided with the emerging Republican Party only seemed to confirm their
suspicions. Some Federalists even claimed that the immigrants were the cause of the increased
partisanship. “A Citizen of 1776” claimed that “since the arrival . . . of a certain junto of
foreigners. . . animosities have been excited, friend set against friend, neighbor against neighbor
and instead of that friendly intercourse which subsisted between men of different parties,
suspicion, jealousy, bitterness, and strife have been stirred up.”480 All friends of order, the author
urged, must unite to prevent the newcomers from infiltrating the government. The Federalist
campaign against immigrants, which would only intensify as time went on, reflects the party’s
struggle to adjust to the realities of the changing political climate and refusal to accept an
increasingly pluralistic society.481
The divisive political atmosphere coupled with Republicans’ evolving approach towards
political mobilization led to increases in voter turnout. Nearly 34 percent of the eligible voters
participated in the contest between John Swanwick and incumbent Federalist Thomas
Fitzsimmons, an increase of about 4 percent from 1792. Thanks in large part to high turnout in
the ethnically diverse working class neighborhoods of North and South Mulberry, along with a
strong showing among the militia united deployed to quell the Whiskey Rebellion, Swanwick
eked out a victory. The contest in greater Philadelphia between the “Treaty” and “No Treaty”
tickets in 1795 drew even more voters to the polls. Over 2,600 citizens in Philadelphia City and
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approximately 1,500 in Philadelphia County cast ballots on election day—more than in any
previous Assembly race. When the votes were counted, the Federalist “Treaty” ticket triumphed
in the city of Philadelphia but the Republican “No Treaty” ticket won convincing majorities in
Philadelphia County. 482
One of the Republicans elected to the Assembly from Philadelphia County in 1795 was
Blair McClenachan, who had served as president of the Democratic Society and had famously
urged his fellow citizen to “kick the [Jay] treaty to hell.”483 McClenachan’s election is a clear
sign of Republicans’ increasing awareness of the importance of elections. McClenachan had
been a vocal opponent of the Washington administration for years but had never run for public
office. Instead, McClenachan had relied on town meetings and voluntary societies to challenge
the Federalists. The Whiskey Rebellion and subsequent demise of the Democratic and
Republican Societies along with Washington’s decision to sign the Jay Treaty, however, forced
him to reconsider this strategy. Like many other Pennsylvania Republicans, by 1795
McClenachan had come to see the ballot box as the most effective means of affecting change.
This, in turn, meant that Republicans would need to start developing a more coherent and
organized electioneering strategy.

The Election of 1796: Electioneering Old and New
Historians have dubbed the election of 1796 in Pennsylvania “the first Presidential
election” because it was the first time two clearly defined political parties competed for the
nation’s highest office. Although it was a national contest, the election would play out on the
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state-level. With no national organization to assist or direct, the campaign would be orchestrated
by local and state leaders. In Pennsylvania, the election gave Republicans their first real
opportunity to test their new commitment to focusing on elections. But, while Republicans
recognized that town meetings, parades, and fêtes were insufficient, they did not abandon all
other forms of political mobilization entirely. As opposed to relying them as way to affect
change directly, Republicans used parades and public rallies as a way to build a partisan identity
and increase voter turnout. Federalists, however, had also learned from the Jay Treaty experience
and would not to cede the election grounds without a fight.484
The presidential election of 1796 in Pennsylvania opened with a struggle over the rules
of the game. As another safeguard against the whims of popular opinion, the Federal
Constitution called a special legislature known as the Electoral College to meet every four years
for the express purpose of selecting a president. The public, therefore, did not vote directly for
the president but for “electors.” The allotment of electoral votes followed the earlier
compromises over representation and gave each state the same weight it had in Congress. Each
state determined on its own how the electors would be selected. Because Washington had been
the obvious choice in 1788 and 1792, the method for selecting electors had not elicited much
controversy. Although Washington waited until the last minute to announce his decision, most
political observers expected him to retire and the end of his second term. Therefore, when the
Pennsylvania legislature turned its attention to framing a law for the selection of the state’s
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fifteen electoral delegates in the spring of 1796, both sides recognized the debate as the opening
salvos of the first contested presidential election.
Although they had been gaining support throughout the state, Republicans did not feel
comfortable enough to challenge the Federalists in a statewide election. Instead, they called for
district elections. Not surprisingly, Federalists favored a statewide approach in the hope that their
majorities in the eastern part of the state would offset the Republican-leaning and less-populous
western region. After much debate, Federalists managed to overcome the Republican-led district
bill and pass a law calling for statewide elections. The Federalists also scheduled the date for the
selection of electors for a month after the state’s regular October elections, a move historian
Jeffrey Pasley suggests was designed to discourage participation by rural Pennsylvanians, who
would have to trek to the polling location twice. In the end, however, the selection of electors on
a statewide basis may have helped Republicans as it forced them to coordinate their activities on
a larger scale and helped create the foundation for a more formal organized party.485
With the method of selecting electors settled, Federalists looked for other ways to
manipulate election law to their advantage as well. In particular, they looked for ways to stem the
tide of immigrants would likely vote Republicans. On the eve of the election a group of
Federalists including William Rawle, the United States Attorney for the District of Pennsylvania;
Jared Ingersoll, the state’s Attorney-General; and former federal attorney William Lewis
announced that, according to their readings of naturalization laws, all immigrants who had
arrived since the Revolution had to present certified proof that they had been naturalized. The
state had never before required voters to show any form of identification or proof of citizenship
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in order to cast a ballot, and the move outraged Republicans who saw it as a blatant attempt to
suppress the immigrant vote. Exactly how many election judges actually followed the new
dictates is unknown, but one Republican claimed that at least three hundred immigrants were
prevented from voting in Philadelphia.486 The last-minute requirement did produce enough
confusion that, following the election, Governor Mifflin asked the legislature to clarify the
laws.487 Federalists seized the opportunity to pass legislation establishing that election judges
could require immigrants to provide documentation of their citizenship before voting. Governor
Mifflin deemed the bill a violation of the rights of immigrants and vetoed the law.488 The
Federalist assault on immigrants’ voting rights would, however, continue in future elections.
No real mystery surrounded who would be the respective parties’ nominees. Although
Vice President John Adams had a somewhat strained relationship with the Federalist Party, he
was the logical successor to Washington. Adams had a long history of public service and had
diligently fulfilled his duties under President Washington. On the Republican side, Thomas
Jefferson stood as the obvious candidate. Jefferson had claimed to have left politics for good
when he retired from the office of the Secretary of State in 1793, and he professed to have no
desire to serve as the chief executive. Nobody, however, seemed to take him seriously. Both
Federalists and Republicans struggled to settle on a candidate for Vice President but eventually
New Yorker Aaron Burr emerged as the frontrunner for the Republicans while Thomas Pinckney
of South Carolina became the consensus candidate for the Federalists.489 As the candidates
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running in the first contested presidential election, these men were quickly seen as the leaders of
their respective political parties. They did not, however, personally engage in any real
electioneering.
In Pennsylvania, presidential electioneering began with the nomination of electors who
would actually appear on the ballot. As had become common, the two parties sought only limited
public advice when creating their tickets. On the last day of the legislative session on April 4,
1796, Republican and Federalist gathered separately to discuss the upcoming elections and to
nominate candidates. Historians consider these gathering as the first real party caucuses and
would become the norm as the two party system matured. The Republican caucus consisted of
“several members of this state in Congress, and of both houses of the State Legislature” while
the Federalists who assembled were primarily members of the state legislature. The caucuses met
privately and no evidence exists that either party engaged the public in the discussion. The
embryonic parties had effectively removed the public’s right to nominate whomever they
pleased.490
But while the parties had circumscribed the public’s participation in the nomination
process, they could not discount public engagement entirely. Pennsylvania election law banned
printed tickets, so the electors had to be recognizable to voters throughout the state. With this in
mind, Republicans filled their ticket with popular and influential men including Chief Justice
Thomas McKean, Congressman William Irvine, and the prominent German politicians Peter
Muhlenberg and Daniel Hesiter. Unaware that their adversaries had assembled such high profile
men to run, Federalists selected second-tier state leaders such as Philadelphians Samuel Miles
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and Israel Whelen. The obvious disparity between the popularity of the men nominated on the
two tickets, which even Federalist John Fenno admitted, is evidence of the increased
sophistication of Republican electioneering and of Federalists’ relative lack of organization.491
The parties framed their tickets in the spring of 1796, but the real campaigning did not
begin until Washington officially declared his retirement in mid-September. Although in his
Farewell Address Washington urged his fellow Americans to avoid parties, according to
Federalist Fisher Ames, the announcement that he would not seek a third term served as “a
signal, like dropping a hat, for the party races to start.”492 Following the declaration, both parties
staged meetings throughout the state to allow public ratification of the pre-selected tickets. The
Republicans, in particular, organized dozens of meetings, including multiple gatherings in
Philadelphia. Holding several meetings in one area ensured that none of these assemblies reached
the size of the nominating meetings held in 1792. The goal of these meetings was not to seek
input from the public, however. Instead, they served as an opportunity to rally voters behind the
party-approved ticket and give the public the feeling of having participated in the process. 493
With the campaign in full swing, the two parties turned their attention to ensuring that
voters had access to their tickets—a difficult task considering that all the tickets had to be hand
written. After agreeing on a nominee, the Republican caucus established a committee of
correspondence tasked with keeping in regular contact with Republicans throughout the state and
with ensuring that voters had access to campaign literature and ballots. Much of the work fell to
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John Beckley, who has been called Jefferson’s “campaign manager” for his work during the
election of 1796. Along with the help of other Republican activists in Philadelphia, Beckley
transcribed nearly 50,000 ballots that were then passed to express riders to deliver throughout the
state. One rider, Major John Smith, recalled covering more than 600 miles and riding from
before the sun rose until after dark for nearly three weeks straight to distribute tickets and
campaign literature. Beckley asked that his riders begin delivering tickets in the western parts of
the state and slowly work their way back to Philadelphia, thereby preventing leading Federalists
from learning of their all-star cast of nominees until insufficient time remained to respond.
Federalists circulated tickets as well, although on a much smaller scale. Additionally, the
literature and ballots Federalists riders dropped off did not always make its way into the hands of
supporters: Major Smith, the Republican rider, reported following a group of Federalists for sixty
miles, picking up whatever material they had distributed.494
While the actual ballots may have been handwritten, printed material proliferated during
the time leading up to the election. The number of newspapers printed in the state had steadily
increased throughout the 1790s, and both sides relied heavily on them in 1796. Newspapers
helped forge a shared partisan identity and linked voters in remote parts of the state with leaders
in Philadelphia.495 In addition to newspapers, the parties circulated hundreds of handbills,
broadsides, and pamphlets. Polemists from both parties continued to rely on horatory rhetoric,
and few authors made an effort to engage voters in a reasoned discussion on the issues and
positions at stake in the election. Character assassination and dire warnings of what would
happen if the opposing party won were the preferred tools.
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Republicans framed the election as a struggle between the forces of democracy and
republicanism against monarchy and aristocracy. Authors seized on passages from John Adams’s
Defence of the Constitutions of the United States as well as his Discourses on Davila as proof the
signer of the Declaration of Independence harbored monarchical ambitions. As one handbill
stated succinctly: “Thomas Jefferson is a firm REPUBLICAN—John Adams is an avowed
MONARCHIST.”496 Others sought to capitalize on rumors that Washington and Adams did not
always see eye-to-eye. “President Washington Loves a Republican and hates a monarchist,”
explained one correspondent. “He therefore wishes that Jefferson may be his successor.”497
According to Pasley, some of the Republican campaign literature printed in Philadelphia targeted
party leaders in other parts of the state and not voters—a sign of the growing network of party
operatives.498 The party also printed “voter guides” which provided voters with the details of the
upcoming election along with a list of the approved ticket. Republicans even printed a smaller
pocket-sized version to make it easier for voters to carry a crib card with them to the polls on
election day. These approaches add up to the most sophisticated use of print as a campaign tool
in the nation’s young history.499
Although less active then their opponents, Federalists also used print to rally support for
Adams. The majority of the Federalist electioneering articles came in the form of attacks against
Jefferson and dire warnings of what would happen if the Republicans ran the country. Jefferson,
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Federalists warned, was a dangerous man without a moral compass. Authors such as “Phocion”
thoroughly analyzed Jefferson’s career in public life and found him lacking “firmness” and
sound judgment. Jefferson was, moreover, a non-believer as evidenced by statements in his
Notes on the State of Virginia. Were Jefferson elected President, Phocion warned, the atheistic
Virginian would outlaw religion and the moral fabric of society would unravel. Federalists also
targeted Jefferson for his well-known attachment to France and suggested that the French might
even be funding part of the Republican print campaign.500 In short, if Republicans framed the
election as monarchy v. republicanism/democracy Federalists saw it as a struggle between
French style anarchy and atheism versus order and good government.
In addition to the plethora of print that blanketed the state, partisans turned to new styles
of electioneering in 1796. More so than in any previous election, Republicans employed
celebratory politics during the 1796 campaign as a way to rally voters. As discussed in chapter
two, in the second half of the 1790s Republicans began using popular politics as a way to build a
partisan identity that emphasized voting. This fusion of celebratory politics, voting, and parties
was apparent during the presidential election in 1796. In the weeks before the election
Republicans used symbolism, parades, and fêtes to create a party identity and mobilize voters.
For example, in addition to warning Americans of the possible consequences of electing another
anglophile, Pierre Adet, the French foreign minister, issued the “cockade proclamation” shortly
before the election. This edict called on all friends of France to wear a tri-colored cockade. The
exact number of Republicans who heeded Adet’s suggestion is uncertain, but one Federalist
noted with disgust that “supporters of the Jefferson ticket . . . went to the polls with French
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cockades in their hats in Philadelphia.”501 In addition to donning cockades, Republicans
organized a parade on the day before the election. The parade consisted of a crowd of upward of
150 sailors carrying a flag that proclaimed Jefferson “the man of the People” and chanting
“Jefferson and no king.” The size of the gathering, however, made some locals uneasy, and
rumors circulated that the sailors planned to prevent voters from casting ballots. When the
Alderman tried to stop the parade, a fight ensued that resulted in the jailing of sixty participants.
Undeterred, many of the sailors returned on election day and continued to promote Jefferson.
The violence and arrest of some members of the parade did, however, served as a stern reminder
of the dangers associated with popular politics.502
Federalists were active in the final days of the campaign as well. Building on their
successful use of committees during the petition drive against the Republican-led effort to block
the Jay Treaty in the House of Representatives, Federalists created special committees to visit
Philadelphia neighborhoods and ensure supporters make it to the polls on election day.503 In
addition, Federalist shipbuilders warned their employees that a vote for the Republican ticket
might cost them their jobs, a move reminiscent of Federalist bankers’ threat to withhold credit to
garner signatures on the pro-Jay Treaty petitions, Finally, Federalist clergymen warned their
congregations of the threat Jefferson and Republicans posed to organized religion.504
Election returns for the presidential election of 1796 reflect the superior Republican
electioneering effort as well as the hardening of partisan lines. Despite a relatively low turnout
statewide (likely a product of Federalists’ decision to hold the election a month after the
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statewide races), the budding Republican organization managed to mobilize enough voters to
swing the state in Jefferson’s favor.505 A review of the election returns indicates high levels of
ticket-voting. In what can be considered a testament to John Beckley’s tireless work, statewide,
only 133 votes separate Thomas McKean, the Republican elector who received the most votes,
from James Edgar, the Republican who received the least votes. Federalists, however, also voted
as a bloc as well and the difference between the top and bottom Federalist electors is only 146
votes. As these numbers suggest, the public had accepted the parties as intermediaries.

Electioneering and Party Development 1797-1798
The election of 1796 ushered in a new era in party conflict in Pennsylvania. The two
parties became even more polarized, and elections were viciously contested as both sides
continued to hone their electioneering strategies. In and around Philadelphia, both parties created
committees to coordinate and oversee campaigning. In addition to the increased organization in
the eastern part of the state, Republicans constructed a statewide network of party operatives
who could tailor electioneering efforts to the local audience. Fries’s Rebellion in late 1798 and
1799 dramatized the importance of finding a way to channel frustrations with the Adams’s
administration into orderly forms of political mobilization. Federalists failed to match the
Republican party-building efforts outside of Philadelphia during these years. While Republicans
adopted different strategies for different groups of voters, Federalists throughout the state relied
on nativism and fear to mobilize voters. Federalists’ strategy yielded dividends in some areas but
eventually proved less effective than the Republican focus on local organizing.

505

Officially, Jefferson won 13 electoral and Adams 2. One of the Adams electors, however, cast his ballot for
Jefferson when the Electoral College met. The returns from Greene County, however, were excluded from the
official count because they were late. If they were counted, Jefferson would have received all 15 of the state’s votes.

230

By the second half of the 1790s, both Federalists and Republicans had accepted the
division of the state into districts for congressional elections. Nevertheless, election law
remained an important electioneering tool. Federalists continued their campaign to limit the
number of immigrants who could vote. Party officials had become convinced that immigrants,
particularly French and Irish immigrants, were importing radical democratic ideas and trying to
undermine the American republic from within. Republicans, they believed, were part of this
conspiracy and owed their success to the influx of immigrants. The XYZ Affair and subsequent
war hysteria increased tensions further and fueled a national wave of nativism, the culmination
of which was the passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts. These laws included an extension of
the residency requirement for citizenship from five to fourteen years, creating difficulties for
Republicans who had come to rely on immigrants to win elections.506 At the state level,
Federalists persisted in their efforts to pass a law requiring voters to prove their citizenship
before casting their ballot. Federalist scored a major victory in this campaign when a state
committee discovered that Republican election-judges in Philadelphia had been systematically
letting non-naturalized immigrants vote. As a result, the committee invalidated the election of
Republican Israel Israel in 1797. But, while the exposure of election fraud embarrassed
Republican leaders, Governor Mifflin remained opposed to any form of voter identification, and
the Federalist effort stalled. One Federalist became so disgusted with the inaction that he openly
pined for the establishment of property requirements which could prevent all men without
property from voting as a way to ensure poor immigrants could not cast ballots.507

Keller, “Diversity and Democracy,” 218; Michael Durey, Transatlantic Radicals and the Early American
Republic (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1997); Edward C. Carter, II, “A ‘Wild Irishman’ under Every
Federalist’s Bed: Naturalization in Philadelphia, 1789-1806,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography
94:3 (July 1790), 331-346; Maurice Bric, Ireland, Philadelphia, and the Re-Invention of America, 1760-1800
(Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2008); Bradburn, The Citizenship Revolution, 168-187.
507
Carlisle Gazette, 4 October 1797.
506

231

The parties effectively controlled the nomination of candidates during this time. Both
Federalists and Republicans continued to use the mixed private/public method to nominate
candidates, and neither party invited the public to participate directly in the selection of
candidates. Republicans established standing committees in each of Philadelphia’s wards in the
congressional elections of 1796. The combined committees nominated candidates and organized
meetings designed to give the broader public an opportunity to ratify their decisions. Following
the election of 1796, Republicans in other parts of the state organized similar committees at the
county level. In some areas, these county committees established committees at the township
level. These committees, in turn, organized meetings for the broader public. As historian
Kenneth Keller argues, for Republicans this phase of party development occurred both from the
top-down and bottom-up. At first, party leaders appointed committee members but, as the base of
the party grew, these posts became elected positions. By the end of the decade, Republicans had
built a statewide party structure that acted as an intermediary between the public and the
deliberative process. Instead of engaging directly in the selection of candidates, the public picked
committee-members who would oversee nominations and/or attended meetings to endorse the
party’s decision.508
Some Republicans, like an author who used the pseudonym “Republican” that appeared
in the Aurora in 1797, heralded the new party organization and argued that, whether or not the
people like it, “at present, it is chiefly by the collision of parties that public business is pushed
forward.” Republicans, he asserted, must unite behind the party’s nominees and not waste their
ballots on other candidates.509 Not everyone under the Republican umbrella, however, approved
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of the institutionalization of parties. Alexander James Dallas, for example, refused to accept the
reality of the emerging two party system. As Secretary of the Commonwealth under Governor
Mifflin, Dallas had been a leading Republican organizer in the early 1790s but had broken with
the party in 1796 over the Republican campaign to block appropriation for the Jay Treaty. As a
result, Dallas did not participate in the presidential election of 1796 and had earned the title
“trimmer” from fellow Republicans.510 Although Dallas remained wary of the increased
partisanship, he decided to reenter the political fray in 1797. In a 1798 speech given before a
committee investigating charges of election fraud, Dallas lamented the degree to which the party
spirit had infiltrated society. “It has obtruded,” he bemoaned, “into every class of society and
goes nearly to annihilate the useful as well as the agreeable avocations of life. Unless an end is
speedily put to this dreadful evil, no man will accept a situation in the public councils, it will be
no longer safe, no longer honorable.” While many Republicans chose to embrace the existence of
parties as a way to mobilize the public in an organized and efficient manner, Dallas’s warnings
against party spirit foreshadowed future party schisms.511
Like Dallas, Federalists in Pennsylvania struggled with the growth of parties and use of
committees. These men still adhered to a unitary view of society and asserted that the federal
government was the only true expression of the public will. As “Unity” explained in an essay
entitled “The Philosophy of Politics” printed in the Gazette of the United States, “In a republic
the public good, determined by the public will, as expressed by the representative government,
must be considered the political center of gravity.”512 In short, the public spoke through voting
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and voting alone. Federalists understood the value of engaging the public outside of election day
and were adept at using deferential rituals and symbolism, but they were resistant to the type of
grassroots organizing used by Republicans.
The success of the Republican committees, however, forced Federalists to develop some
type of organization. Federalists, therefore, haltingly began using committees to nominate
candidates and oversee electioneering. But, unlike the Republicans, Federalists organized purely
from the top-down. During the elections of 1797 and 1798, leading Federalists in Philadelphia
appointed ward committees and tasked them with organizing local meetings to ratify pre-selected
tickets.513 These meetings made no attempt to speak on behalf of the community as a whole or to
solicit public opinion—a direct contrast to the nominating meetings held in the 1780s and early
1790s. These were not “town meetings” but private assemblies of the “friends” of a particular
candidate. A near-riot ensued in 1798 when Republicans tried to crash a Federalist meeting. The
fact that Republicans even bothered to attempt to overtake the Federalist nominating meeting
does, however, reflect that even the sentiments of these private meetings held weight. 514
While Federalists in the years 1796 and 1797 accepted the need to create committees in
Philadelphia, the party did not immediately begin building committees in the rest of the state as
Republicans had. Their lack of activity reflected both a distaste for parties and a belief that no
further organization was needed. They were, after all, in control and in many areas had the
support of local elites and therefore could rely on the levers of power to achieve their goals.
Outside of Philadelphia, Federalists often relied on local militias and/or grand juries to ratify the
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party ticket instead of engaging the public through the committee system.515The absence of any
real grassroots organization presented problems for candidates interested in running for election
in the Republican-dominated western parts of the state. In 1798 Arthur St. Clair, the Federalist
candidate for governor in 1790 who was serving as Governor of the Northwest Territory, asked a
few western Federalists about his chances for winning a seat in Congress for a district that
included Westmoreland and Fayette Counties. Writing from Pittsburgh, Federalist Senator James
Ross gave St. Clair a brief rundown of the state of the Federalist Party the west:
“You know as well as I do that there is no such thing as a Federal party in Westmoreland
county, and the friends of these three men are only subdivisions of the great universal
mass of insurrectionary anti-federalism, Jacobinism, or whatever you please to call it.
The Federalist might have secured a number of friends, had there been any permanent,
sensible leader, who could have organized and kept them in countenance against
[William] Findley. Unfortunately, we have never had anybody there who would
undertake and attempt to execute this task, and at present, it seems to me, that, however
these candidates may contend among themselves and scramble for power, they would all
united against the government man.”516
In short, even with divisions appearing in the Republican ranks, Ross did not think St.
Clair had a chance at winning. Leaderless and lacking any real structure, the Federalist Party in
the west was simply outmatched.
During the late 1790s the network of partisan newspapers continued to expand, and both
sides looked for ways to use print to bring voters to the polls. Federalists had hoped that the
Sedition Act would silence the chorus of Republican editors but, as historian Jeffrey Pasley has
shown, the number of Republican newspapers actually increased after the passage of the laws.

Keller, “Diversity and Democracy,” 192 ; Keller, “Rural Politics and the Collapse of Pennsylvania Federalism,”
7-8.
516
Ross to St. Clair, 6 July 1798 in William Henry Smith, ed. The Life and Public Services of Arthur St. Clair
(Cincinnati: Robert Clarke & Co, 1882) 2:422-425.
515

235

Between 1797 and 1799, eight new Republican newspapers circulated in Pennsylvania.517
Republicans, much more so than their opponents, relied on local editors to serve as a liaison
between party officials in Philadelphia and the voting public across the state. Local editors,
printing in both English and German, crafted election appeals tailored to the readership. In his
study of Pennsylvania politics during the late eighteenth century Kenneth Keller demonstrated
that Republican editors employed different strategies in different areas. In ethnically and
culturally diverse areas such as Philadelphia, Lancaster County, and York County, Republican
editors avoided references to specific religious or ethnic distinctions.518 Instead, polemicists
presented the election as a struggle between the many and the few. This strategy had first been
used by Republicans to unite the heterogeneous opponents of the Federalists in Philadelphia in
1795, and 1796 and proved successful enough that they employed it in other parts of the state.
While Republican editors in racially and culturally mixed regions tried to unite voters against the
forces of aristocracy, their counterparts in more homogenous parts of the state frequently used
racial and ethnic appeals. In predominantly German Berks County, for example, Republican
editor Jacob Schenider appealed to Germans to mobilize against the Irish and overthrow the
Federalists who “boast that they always can do with the Germany whatever they want to, that
they are patient asses.”519 The targeted messaging is another sign of the sophistication of the
Republican organization in Pennsylvania.
In the late 1790s Pennsylvania Federalists also established a network of newspapers
throughout the state. Like the Republicans, they printed papers in both English and German as a
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way to reach a diverse audience. Unlike their adversaries, however, Federalist editors did not
tailor their electioneering rhetoric to local audiences. Rural newspapers usually just carried
reprints of the same articles that appeared in Philadelphia. Anti-immigrant tirades and dire
warnings of the threat posed by Republicans were therefore the staple of Federalist newspapers
throughout the state. Federalist journalists especially targeted the French. An appeal printed in
the Gazette of the United States shortly before election day in 1797, for example, urged
Federalists to mobilize against the “Jacobins, Democrats, Frenchmen and pretend Republicans”
and “[shut] the door against French principles and every thing French.”520The French, however,
were not the only immigrants Americans needed to fear. Federalists blamed the Republican
success in 1796 on the “new imported Cocknies and raw Irishmen” and “disgraced men,
bankrupts, swindlers, over-drawers at the bank, renegades from Britain and Ireland” who had
turned out for Jefferson.521 Even though Federalists had succeeded in extending the time
immigrants had to reside in the United States before applying for citizenship, the effort to require
proof of citizenship before casting ballot failed and Federalist editors stressed that it was critical
for true Americans to turn out at the polls to protect against these foreigners.
With partisan fever running higher than ever, both parties stressed the importance of
turnout and looked for new ways to ensure voters made it to polls on election day. Get out the
vote efforts were particularly intense in Philadelphia, where not even the return of the Yellow
Fever in 1797 justified missing an election. Federalists were, however, concerned enough about
the health and welfare of their supporters to warn voters to employ “proper precaution” when
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entering Philadelphia and to use only Chestnut Street to access the State House.522 During these
years, the Republican committees in Philadelphia focused on mobilizing recent immigrants and
the lower and middling classes. During the special election following Federalists’ successful
attempt to invalidate the election of Israel Israel in 1798, for example, Republicans treated voters
to food and drink, offered to pay the taxes of poor voters, and sent trumpeters and drummers
throughout to parade the streets the night before the election. They also reminded immigrants
that, despite what the Federalists may claim, a new election law had not been passed, so they
would not need to provide proof of citizenship.523 Federalist qualms with electioneering seemed
to dissipate during this time. According to historian Richard Miller, the Federalist committees in
Philadelphia worked even harder than their adversaries to mobilize voters in 1797 and 1798.
Federalists blanketed the city with handbills and broadsides in the days before the election as
well as establishing ward captains to distribute hundreds of handwritten tickets and to ensure
voters knew what to do.524 Passions ran so high in 1798 that rumors circulated that voters were
planning to come to election day armed with clubs. “A Democrat” claimed that Federalists were
planning to incite violence in an effort to prove that Republicans were a threat to society and, if
need be, provide grounds for challenging the election results.525
While the Federalists may have been more active than their adversaries in Philadelphia,
the network of committees gave Republicans the upper hand in other parts of the state. In the
weeks before the election of 1798, Republican Congressman Blair McClenachan crisscrossed
Northampton County spreading rumors that the Federalists planned to further increase taxation
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and to establish a monarchy. A horrified Federalist merchant traveling through the region
reported that the locals believed that John Quincy Adams was going to marry a British princess
and that “General Washington was to hold the United States in trust for their King.”526
Federalists outside of Philadelphia, meanwhile, continue to rely on local elites and militia
organizations to promote turnout and, at least according to Republicans, intimidate voters.527
The return of Yellow Fever suppressed voter turnout in Philadelphia during this time, a
factor historian Richard Miller argues helped give Federalists an advantage. In 1798, for
example, only 18 percent of eligible voters cast ballots and the Federalist candidate won handily.
Outside of Philadelphia, however, voter turnout continued to rise. Thanks to the work of the
partisan committees, voters flocked to the polls and turnout soared to above 50 percent in many
parts of the state. Even elections that did not include local offices such as sheriffs drew a large
number of voters. In another sign of the increasing interest in elections and turnout, newspapers
across the state began printing detailed election returns. Partisan editors in Philadelphia had
begun supplying readers with the breakdown of election results as opposed to just announcing
the winner since the mid-1790s but it was not until the latter part of the decade that the practice
caught on in other parts of the state. Partisans from both sides poured over the election returns
looking for information that might help them in the next election. With the state fairly evenly
split, both parties understood that every vote would count.
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The Election of 1799
The parties that had been slowly gestating during the 1790s blossomed during the gubernatorial
election of 1799. By this point, Federalists and Republicans both considered elections the only legitimate
way citizens could express their will and, with Governor Thomas Mifflin unable to run for reelection due
to term limits, saw this as a pivotal and must-win election. For Republicans, the election presented an
opportunity to harness popular outrage at the policies of the Adams administration and, in the wake of
Fries’s Rebellion, reaffirm their faith in law and order. Federalists saw the election as a chance to crush
the Republican organization before it spread. In an attempt to gain the upper hand, the parties employed
electioneering strategies they had been developing for years. Ultimately, a record number of citizens
turned out to vote and the election marked the triumph of political parties as an effective and organized
way for the people to exercise their sovereignty.
Election law once again played an important role during the election of 1799. In preparation for
the contest, Federalists renewed their efforts to require immigrants to provide proof of naturalization in
order to vote. Mifflin had previously vetoed the bill but, perhaps bending to the increased fear of war, he
agreed to sign a law in 1799 that enabled election judges to request proof of citizenship. Federalists, who
controlled both branches of the state legislature, also tried to prevent Republicans from treating potential
voters to food and beverage. The legislation regulating the gubernatorial election stated “That all elections
shall be free and voluntary, and that any elector who shall receive any gift or reward of his vote, in meat,
drink, or moneys, or otherwise” shall not only forfeit his right to vote but receive a fine and a jail
sentence. While treating may have been common practice in other parts of the county, Federalists in
Pennsylvania saw it as a form of bribery.528
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Both parties used caucuses and a network of committees to select the nominees and coordinate
electioneering efforts. Republicans opened their discussion of the upcoming election with gathering of
federal and state officials along with a few select private citizens in April 1799. After debating the
qualifications and personal character of prominent Republicans, a final meeting attended by “about sixty
persons from all parts of the state” took a vote and found that a considerable majority supported the
nomination of Thomas McKean, the state’s Chief Justice. McKean had a long history of public service,
including as a delegate to the First and Second Continental Congresses, and had signed the Declaration of
Independence. After nominating McKean, the caucus appointed a central committee which included party
stalwarts Michael Leib, Alexander James Dallas, and former Federalist Tench Coxe to oversee the
campaign. The Philadelphia committee then issued a circular letter to the Republican committees
throughout the state calling on them to hold public meetings to endorse McKean. Republicans residing in
areas that did not already have a committee were encouraged to create one and do the same. Although the
central committee communicated with Republicans throughout the state, local committees were left a
significant amount of latitude to select members and craft electioneering strategies.529
Federalists also held a caucus to discuss the upcoming gubernatorial election in the spring of
1799. On March 6, after a “Committee of Gentlemen from twenty-one counties” ensured that their chosen
candidate would accept the nomination, the caucus announced that the party would support James Ross.
A westerner, Ross had acted as a lead negotiator during the Whiskey Rebellion and had been selected to
serve as one of the state’s two federal senators in 1794. The Federalist caucus also created a network of
committees to oversee the campaign in different parts of the state. In contrast to what Republicans had
done, however, Federalists in Philadelphia appointed the members of the various local committees and
did not engage local partisans in the process.530 The difference between how the two parties approached
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the organization of party committees is both a reflection of Federalists’ lack of a preexisting party
structure outside of Philadelphia and their top-down view of society. While Republicans used the
committees as a form of grassroots mobilization to harness the opposition to the Federalists in a peaceful
and organized manner, Federalists viewed the committees as just a tool to boost turnout.
While neither party invited the public to participate directly in the nomination of a candidate,
between March, when the parties nominated their candidates, and election day on October 8, the party
committees used a variety of strategies to create the illusion that their candidate reflected the will of the
people. Both parties organized dozens of meetings throughout the state where attendees voted to ratify the
party’s nominee and agree to resolutions that would be printed in the local newspaper. After endorsing
Ross, for example, a Federalist meeting in Cumberland County agreed to an address praising Ross as “the
poor man’s friend” and claiming that, no matter what slander McKean’s supporter may hurl, his
“character is irreproachable.”531 Despite the fact that these were private gatherings called by the parties,
organizers still tried to present their meeting as representative of public sentiment. Republicans, for
example, went to great lengths to show that they welcomed men with different opinions at their meetings
and that they would not expel someone for dissenting with the majority.532 The parties also held meetings
on the Fourth of July as a way to maximize attendance and symbolically link their efforts with the legacy
of the American Revolution.533
Electioneering articles and broadsided flooded the state in the months leading up to the election
as both sides tried to rally support and build momentum. At no small cost, the committees usually
oversaw the printing and distribution of electioneering propaganda. Individual Philadelphia Republicans
spent so much of their own money that a special committee had to be appointed following the election to
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raise money to reimburse donors.534 The vast majority of electioneering articles dealt with the candidates’
character and neither side showed interest in engaging the public in a reasoned debate on policy
differences or issues which the governor actually had the power to address (as opposed to the federal
Alien and Sedition Acts). As one correspondent bemoaned, the newspaper had “ceased to be a source of
public intelligence and instruction; and became an instrument to vitiate the taste, to mislead the
understanding, to taint the virtue, and undermine the independence of the People.”535 Although penned by
a Republican with the writing of Cobbett in mind, the statement accurately reflects the way in which both
parties used the press during the election of 1799. The goal of the partisan newspapers, at least in the
months before an election, was to boost voter turnout and not to educate the public.
Throughout the state Federalist propaganda tried to establish Ross as the candidate of law and
order. Ross was, explained one Federalist broadside, the only candidate who would “suppress the spirit of
anarchy and insurrection” and uphold the laws of the nation.536 Using both the Whiskey and Fries’s
Rebellion as evidence, Federalists tried to paint Republicans and McKean as anarchists. McKean’s stated
“political wishes and opinions,” Federalists charged, “would subvert the liberty, the religion, and the
social order of our country.”537 Federalists also accused their opponents of plotting with radical immigrant
groups such as the United Irishmen to overthrow the federal and state constitutions.538
Similar to their tactics in previous elections, Republicans used targeted messaging to appeal to
specific groups. For example, the Carlisle Gazette, printed in an area with a large German population,
carried a special plea to Germans from General Peter Muhlenberg, one of the most popular Germans in
the state, shortly before the election.539 In heavily religious areas, Republicans took a page out of the
Federalist 1796 playbook and called Ross a deist and published affidavits from a minister who claimed to
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have overheard Ross deny a belief in original sin.540 In other areas, Republicans focused more on tying
the Ross campaign to the controversial policies of the Adams’s administration. “[T]he supporters of
James Ross,” exclaimed one Republican address printed Washington County, “are the friends of the
sedition law, the alien law . . . . [and] who are in favor of a standing army.”541 Throughout the state,
Republicans presented McKean as the “firm” and “manly” candidate with a history of public service who
was also “a true friend to the Federal Constitution and Government.”542
Electioneering articles and accounts of local meetings and addresses flooded the papers in the
final days of the campaign, leading one editor to feel compelled to issue an apology promising that he
would return to printing other types of news after election day.543 The party committees engaged in a
frantic effort to ensure their supporters turned out to the polls. A Federalist meeting in Montgomery
County aimed to visit “[e]very man in the several townships . . . excepting only, such as are notoriously
governed by French principles, and are under French influence.”544 Republicans prepared tickets and
appointed men to visit supporters to remind them to turnout on election day. Federalists also released a
barrage of new attacks on McKean in the waning days. Similar to what Republicans had done with their
nominees in 1796, Federalists circulated these charges in the western parts of the state, timing the
distribution so that Republicans would not have time to respond.545 The last minute attacks, however,
failed to stem the Republican tide.
The contest between McKean and Ross brought record numbers of voters to the polls. Statewide,
over 60 percent of the adult males voted, nearly 30 percent more than had turned out in any of the

“Declaration of the Reverend Mr. David Jones . . .,” Broadside,26 September 1799, Washington, Pa. The
accusations concerned Federalists enough to publish a statement from members of a Presbyterian congregation in
Washington County that Ross regularly attended church. “To the electors of Pennsylvania,” Broadside, Philadelphia,
1799, EAI: 50968.
541
Herald of Liberty, 26 August 1799.
542
Carlisle Gazette, 25 September 1799.
543
Carlisle Gazette, 2 October 1799.
544
Philadelphia Gazette, 31 July 1799. See also, Gazette of the United States 22 June 1799; Carlisle Gazette, 28
August 1799.
545
“To the Citizens of the County of Philadelphia,” Broadside, Philadelphia, 1799. EAI: 36422.
540

244

previous gubernatorial contests. In some counties, over 80 percent of the eligible voters cast a ballot.546
Although particularly contentious local elections had resulted in similar levels of turnout in previous
years, this was the first time that a statewide contest elicited such a response. Additionally, as Kenneth
Keller demonstrated in his detailed analysis of the election returns, the counties that voted for McKean
had a higher turnout than those that sided with Ross, a reflection of Republicans’ superior organization.
Notably, some of the highest turnout occurred in heavily German speaking regions where Fries’s
Rebellion occurred, a reflection of Republican’s success at channeling frustrations with the Federalists
into voting. The Federalist committees did, however, outperform their adversaries in some regions. Ross,
for example, won in Philadelphia, where the Republican committees had first taken root. Overall, the
record turnout is evidence that Pennsylvanians from both parties had accepted elections as the primary
vehicle for the expression of the public will.547

546
547

Pasley, “The Cheese and the Words,” Beyond the Founders, 46-47.
Keller, “Rural Politics and the Collapse of Pennsylvania Federalism,” 40-41.

245

Chapter 5: Party Schism and Political Mobilization, 18011808

The boundaries of citizenship and the relationship between the public and the deliberative
process appeared settled in Pennsylvania at the advent of the nineteenth century. After failing to
effect change through disparate forms of direct political mobilization including town meetings,
parades, and popular uprisings, opponents of the Federalists had embraced elections and
electioneering as the primary vehicles for the expression of the public will and begun
construction of a multi-layer party organization that acted as an intermediary between the public
and the government. Town meetings, parades and fêtes did not disappear; they became part of
the larger party structure. Rather than using these forms of political mobilization as a way to
engage the people directly in the deliberative process, Republicans employed them as a way to
generate support and mobilize voters. While in some ways this approach represented a retreat
from the democratic ideals advanced by critics of the Federalists, the new party’s success and
election of Thomas McKean in 1799 and Thomas Jefferson in 1800 appeared to justify the move
away from direct participation in the deliberative process. 548
Success at the polls, however, exposed fundamental disagreements between Republican
leaders that had been masked by a shared goal of defeating the Federalists. Republicans had
rallied around elections and party building to achieve change, but once they secured power, party
members disagreed over what change meant in practice. For some Republicans, electing new
men to office represented the ultimate goal. With Republicans McKean and Jefferson at the

548

For a good discussion of the machinery of the Republican Party in Pennsylvania at this time, see, Noble E.
Cunningham, Jr., The Jeffersonian Republicans in Power: Party Operations, 1801-1809 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1963), 156-166.

246

helm, these men believed the public could relax and trust that the country was in good hands.
Other Republicans, however, viewed the election of like-minded individuals as only the first step
toward a more democratic society. Government, they argued, had become too insulated from the
will of the people and required major reforms. After a brief honeymoon following the election of
McKean and Jefferson, the differences between the two wings became overwhelming and,
beginning in 1802, the party split into warring factions.
The schism in the Republican Party was, in many ways, a continuation of the debate over
the role of citizens in the new government that had been occurring since the end of the
Revolutionary War. Both the Quids and the Democrats emerged from the Republican coalition of
the 1790s and both sides claimed to be the successors of the Republican Party and asserted that
they were fighting on behalf of the people. The two factions, however, had different visions for
the future of the party. The Quids, which included moderates Alexander James Dallas and Tench
Coxe, continued to believe that the public should stay out of the deliberative process with the
exception of casting a ballot on election day and otherwise defer to their elected officials.
Democrats including William Duane and Michael Leib believed the people should play a more
active role in the deliberative process. Democrats also supported reforms to the legal system and
called for structural revisions to the state constitution that would make the government more
responsive to the will of the people. Quids denied that government required any fundamental
changes and fought against the proposed reforms.
To establish their legitimacy and gain control, Quids and Democrats returned to the forms
of political mobilization and strategies for marshalling public opinion Republicans had
developed in the 1790s. Each side staged rallies, developed electioneering committees, employed
printed propaganda, organized voluntary societies, and held celebrations. Although the two sides
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used many of the same tools, important differences existed in the way that Quids and Democrats
employed them. Quids preferred more controlled and less direct means of engaging the public,
while Democrats favored more direct and popular forms. Ultimately, however, neither side could
claim victory. Democrats seized control of the party in Philadelphia, but their radicalism
alienated many potential allies. Quids blocked the Democratic-led reform movement and
reelected Governor Thomas McKean in 1805 but eventually lost legitimacy due to their
connections with the Federalists. The real winner was Simon Snyder and his followers, who won
the 1808 gubernatorial election and managed to chart a middle course between the two wings. As
historian Andrew Shankman has demonstrated, a new vision of democracy that was compatible
with capitalism emerged from the “crucible of conflict” between the Quids and Democrats. 549
Perhaps just as importantly, the battles between Quids and Democrats ultimately reinforced the
existence of parties and of elections as the primary vehicles for the expression of the public will.

The Republican Honeymoon and Stirrings of Discontent
Although historians disagree about whether Jefferson’s election in 1800 represented a
second revolution, few scholars question whether Republicans in Pennsylvania saw the election
as a watershed moment.550 Even though a deadlock between the Federalist-controlled state
Senate and the Republican-led House of Representatives had prevented Republicans from
delivering all fifteen of the state’s electoral votes to Jefferson and Burr, Republicans in
Pennsylvania believed they stood at the forefront of a democratic movement that had saved the
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country from the combined forces of monarchy and aristocracy. Having succeeded in taking
control of both the state and federal governments, Republicans entered the nineteenth century
confident of a bright future. Below the surface, however, tensions within the party began to
brew.
Boisterous celebrations throughout the commonwealth welcomed the official news that
Jefferson had been elected president. Weeks of pent-up anxiety and worry as Congress worked
through the electoral tie between Jefferson and Aaron Burr gave way to public jubilation among
Republicans. When the first reports reached Philadelphia in February 1801, the bells of Christ
Church “were kept constantly tolling for the death of the British faction” and a spontaneous
gathering of Republicans paraded through the streets of Philadelphia with drums and fifes and
carrying a flag with the mottos “JEFFERSON, the Friend of the PEOPLE,” and “JEFFERSON
and BURR.”551 One Philadelphia resident reported that “The Republicans, through the medium
of hurras, cannons, and drums have made such a noise for three days past that one could hardly
read a newspaper.”552
These initial parties were, however, the prologue to the official celebration that occurred
on March 4, 1801, the day Jefferson took the oath of office. On that day, Republican militia
groups, along with the members of the Tammany Society and the True Republican Society, took
part in a massive procession that included a schooner drawn by sixteen white horses. In the
afternoon, John Beckley delivered an oration tracing the triumph of reason of ignorance and
proclaimed Jefferson’s inauguration as the end of the “reign of terror and political delusion” in
America. Following the oration, Republicans retired to private dinners where they raised their
551
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glasses to toasts such as “Our days of triumph—The Fourth of July 1776, Independence
declared; the Fourth of March, 1801, Independence preserved!”553
By the Fourth of July, 1801, the Republican takeover appeared complete and the success
of their vision of a political society where citizens engaged the deliberative process through
parties and elections seemed assured. Dejected Federalists did not even bother to attend
celebrations. In reporting the day’s festivities, William Duane gleefully pointed out that, while
Republicans honored the founding of their nation, “those who call themselves federalists were
invisible.”554 Republicans even managed to vote out all remaining Federalist officers from the
Society of the Cincinnati, once the bastion of Federalism, and elect Republicans in their place. 555
Symbolically, Republican control over the Fourth of July and of the Society of the Cincinnati
represented a triumph of their vision of a participatory democracy over Federalists’ view of a
deferential society. Republicans in York County went so far as to act out the death of Federalist
political culture by staging a “black cockade funeral” and burying Federalist symbols.556
Even in the midst of these celebrations, signs of future trouble simmered. A review of
toasts raised at Republican gatherings during the spring and summer of 1801 indicate that, while
all Republicans agreed the election of Jefferson and McKean represented a major step forward,
they disagreed over what should happen next. Many Pennsylvania Republicans hoped that
Jefferson’s election would mark the end of partisanship and welcomed Jefferson’s olive branch
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to the Federalists. At a Fourth of July celebration, the Republican Blues, for example, drank to
“Moderation among Republicans—May it differ from the moderation of Tories, and convince
them that it is intended to conciliate.”557 But while some Republicans favored a moderate course
and wanted to cooperate with Federalists, others believed the electoral victories were a mandate
from the people to institute democratic reforms. At a dinner in Northumberland to mark
Jefferson’s inauguration, participants drank to “A speedy revision to our constitution, and a
reform to the senatorial branch of our legislature” and condemned Federalists.558 Federalists
certainly noticed a difference between the two groups. A correspondent in the Gazette of the
United States noted that toasts drank by the “decent democrats . . . were in general moderate and
such as might be drank by Americans” while those at other gatherings “were truly
Jacobinical.”559 Republicans easily overlooked in the midst of the festivities but, as the elation
wore off and Republicans turned their attention to the actual process of governance, the
conflicting visions for the future could no longer be ignored.

The Schism
As the glow of success dissipated, the disagreements that had been percolating within the
Republican Party in Pennsylvania came to a boil. An attempt to reform the judicial system and
clash over patronage served as the immediate catalysts for this schism. Most Republicans agreed
that the state’s judicial system needed changes, but they disagreed over what needed fixing. For
Governor McKean and other moderates, the real problem was that the courts were overworked.
A little streamlining and some additional courts, the Governor believed, would solve everything.
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William Duane and other more radically minded individuals, however, saw the judicial branch as
undemocratic and called for major changes. Specifically, these men wanted elected justices of
the peace to have more power and they opposed the use of common law. Duane also believed the
people should have the right to impeach judges if they disagreed with their decisions. Moderates
who considered an independent judiciary an important safeguard against tyranny feared these
proposed reforms would lead to a breakdown in law and order.560
Patronage emerged as a contentious issue during this time as well. Governor McKean and
President Jefferson stood atop large bureaucracies, and one of their first tasks was deciding how
to use their patronage powers. Many Republican partisans expected to be rewarded for their
dedication, and letters from office seekers flooded the two executives during their first months.
Both the Governor and the President believed that some Federalists officeholders, particularly
those who were incompetent and/or had actively campaigned against them, should be removed.
They also recognized, however, that the wholesale removal of Federalists from office would
inflame partisan tensions. Worried about the possible consequences of a Federalist purge,
prominent Republicans including Beckley and Dallas urged moderation. If the Republican
executives were to fire all men who opposed their elections, Dallas warned, “the parties will
continue almost equally to divide the nation; every Federalist will become a conspirator; every
Republican will be a tyrant; and each general election will invite the hazard of civil war.”561
Dallas, Beckley, and others who shared their views wanted to move past the bitter partisanship of
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the late 1790s and were open to working with Federalists. With Jefferson and McKean
ensconced in office, they felt no need to worry about the Federalists.
Other Republicans, however, saw all Federalists as enemies to the country and pressed
for their removal. Duane wrote in the Aurora that Republicans would “think themselves
persecuted if every . . . [Federalist] is not discharged.”562 Ultimately Jefferson and McKean
chose a moderate course and removed some of the most outspoken Federalists but left others at
their post. The decision infuriated Duane and his supporters, further separating the two groups.
“What is this thing that they call moderation?” Duane fumed, “Is it a patronage of tories? Is it to
bestow a benefit upon an enemy at the expense of a friend? Is it to arm your adversaries with
weapons of government for your own destruction?”563
The lines were drawn. Those men who supported only minor changes to the judiciary and
endorsed a moderate patronage policy became known as Quids, from the Latin phrase tetrium
quid, meaning “third way.” Those who wanted to make the judiciary more reliant on the will of
the people and favored the replacement of all Federalists were known as Democrats. 564
Importantly, despite their differences, both Democrats and Quids considered themselves
Republicans.
Beneath the debates over judicial reform and patronage, historian Andrew Shankman has
shown that the root of the divide between Quids and Democrats was a debate over the meaning
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of democracy and the proper way for citizens to engage in the deliberative process. 565 The Quids,
who included party stalwarts Dallas, Coxe, Blair McClenachan, and, for all intents and purposes,
Governor McKean, believed in popular sovereignty and embraced popular politics but thought
that prosperity required stability. In their estimation, the public could and should participate in
the deliberative process through voting, but citizens should defer to their elected officials in all
other matters. Democrats, led by Congressman Leib and Duane, wanted government to become
more directly responsive to the will of the people and favored democratic reforms such as annual
elections for senators and empowering the public to elect judges. These men believed in the
principle of majority rule and argued that barriers between the people and the deliberative
process should be kept as minimal as possible. Between 1802 and 1804, the Quids and
Democrats battled for legitimacy and control of the Republican Party using the tools developed
in the 1790s. Exploring the differences in how the two factions utilized some of these tools and
strategies underscores their divergent views on the role of citizens and political parties in the
post-1800 republic.
One of the first skirmishes between Quids and Democrats occurred in 1802-1803 during
a debate in Philadelphia County over the best way to select candidates. The central issue was
whether to hold one large county meeting to draw up a ticket or to break the area into districts.
The district approach, which most other counties used, involved a series of smaller meetings at
which committee members were nominated to attend another gathering which would select the
candidates. Quids tended to favor districts while the Democrats backed county-wide meetings.
Historians who have discussed this division have primarily focused on the strategic reasons the
two groups favored one method over another: Democrats supported county meetings because
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their superior organizational skills and ability to mobilize supporters, coupled with the fact that
the meetings typically occurred in the heavily Democratic neighborhood of Northern Liberties,
meant that Democrats could assume a majority and control of the proceedings. For the same
reason, Quids preferred a series of smaller meetings in areas sympathetic to their beliefs where
they would have a better chance at influencing the outcomes.566
While attempts to capitalize on strategic advantages are important to understanding
differences between Quids and Democrats, these positions also reflect the respective group’s
view of political society. Both groups agreed that the public had a right to participate in the
nomination process and defended their approach to candidate selection as most likely to facilitate
the expression of the public will. Democrats favored large meetings because attendees could
participate more directly in the nomination process. Quids, in contrast, believed the people
needed some guidance and that large gatherings undermined order and reason. They argued that
a district/committee system would act as a filter for public opinion and guard against hasty and
unwise decisions. The smaller gatherings, they contended, facilitated calm deliberation and
avoided the dangers of disorganization and unchecked tempers. Finally, Quids pointed out that
using the district approach allowed more people from a wider geographic range to participate in
the process.567
The two Republican groups also disagreed over who should be allowed to participate in
the party meetings. After an attempt at a joint meeting between Quids and Democrats
degenerated into violence in 1803, Democrats passed a resolution stating that henceforward only
“known democrats” would be allowed to participate in party meetings.568 Though political
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parties had been holding private meetings for years, it was rare for a meeting to put such explicit
boundaries on attendance. Quids reacted with outrage, focusing on use of the term “democrat”
instead of “democratic-republican,” a standard term to describe the coalition that backed
Jefferson. Furthermore, Quids wanted to know who got to decide who was a democrat. Was “a
political inquisition about to be established in the county of Philadelphia,” asked one Quid.569
Duane and his Democratic supporters retorted that Quids were only upset because they had
hoped to rely on Federalists to help take control of meetings.570
The issue of closed meetings points to larger ideological differences between how the
two groups viewed political parties. Democrats considered political parties as a positive force.
The party, they believed, was an expression of the public will. Federalists were enemies of the
party, and by extension the people, and therefore could not be trusted. Quids had a different
view. As a correspondent in the Philadelphia Evening Post explained, Quids accepted parties as
necessary to guard against “that state of apathy which precedes despotism” but saw “party
carried to the excess” as tyrannical and poisonous to a healthy republic.571 Many Quids hoped
that the need for political parties would dissipate as the country matured. Quids’ willingness to
allow Federalists to attend party meetings involved more than simply padding numbers at public
meetings and was evidence of their hope to avoid extremes.
As the fissure deepened, Quids and Democrats differed in their use of other forms of
political mobilization as well. Newspapers continued to flourish in Pennsylvania during the early
nineteenth century, and both Quids and Democrats took advantage of the medium to advance
their agenda. But while both sides relied on print to galvanize supporters, the rhetoric and
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journalistic style differed between the two groups. Democrats argued that the people were best
equipped to defend their rights and utilized hortatory rhetoric, which appealed to the masses,
while Quids who believed that order and stability required that citizens defer to their elected
officials aimed to have an intellectual discussion with educated and level-headed men.
Duane’s Aurora stood as the most influential newspaper in the state and set the tone for
most Democratic writings. An evangelical in the democratic cause, Duane cut his literary teeth
on the battles between Federalists and Republicans and had embraced hortatory rhetoric as his
weapon of choice when dealing with adversaries. The Aurora did engage in reasoned and
thoughtful debate, but when it came to his political opponents, Duane reveled in personal attacks,
scathing satire, and witty putdowns. His aggressive and personal style had landed him in jail for
libel and led to a number of physical altercations. To him, the world was black and white—
supporters of democracy and the rights of the people or their opponents. Quids, regardless of
their previous service to the Republican Party, fell into the latter category. In fact, Quids were
worse than Federalists in Duane’s mind. “Let men who endeavor to disunite us,” he declared, “be
severed from us” because “an open enemy is far less to be dreaded than a treacherous friend.”572
While Duane fired verbal rounds from the Aurora, Quids professed to approach print and
rhetoric in a more moderated manner. In 1804 William McCorkle set up the Pennsylvania
Evening Post, later renamed the Freeman’s Journal, to serve as a Quid counter to the
Democratic Aurora. McCorkle and his Quid correspondents claimed to be disgusted with
Democratic tactics of character assassination and urged readers to not be swayed by threats.
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Writers in the Freeman’s Journal contended that a healthy republic required calm deliberation
and the free-flow of ideas. The Aurora, they charged, stifled both. According to the Quids,
“honest Republicans” would not stand by while the country descended into democratic anarchy.
“The day is coming,” McCorkle predicted, “when we shall speak out, not in menaces and threats
like the Aurora, for we detest them, but in the dispassionate language of freemen. Then will the
long black catalogue of intrigue and denunciation, of antirepublicanism and intolerance, be
exposed to view.”573 Quids did not always live up to this promise to take the high road, and the
Freeman’s Journal printed its share of personal attacks and innuendos, but their goal of avoiding
Aurora- style “Robespierism, denunciations, and proscription” highlights the differences
between how Democrats and Quids approached rhetoric and reflects their conflicting views on
the role of citizens.574
Quids and Democrats also differed over the use of public ritual and political fêtes. By the
beginning of the nineteenth century the calendar was filled with holidays and celebrations that
gave partisans an opportunity to enjoy some revelry and reaffirm their allegiance to the party.
When the schism occurred, Democrats controlled most of the voluntary societies including the
Tammany Society and militia units that typically organized these festivals. Democrats, therefore,
took advantage of the public rituals to promote their version of democracy and to chastise Quids.
During a celebration in honor of the Louisiana Purchase in May 1804, for example, Democratic
voluntary societies drank toasts to “The people, the source of government—May they never
suffer their servants to become their masters” and “Execration to political hypocrisy—the worse
enemies of the people are those who pretend to save them from themselves.” The Tammany
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Society went so far as to refuse to offer the customary toast to Governor McKean, a move Quids
promised would not be forgotten.575 For Democrats, celebratory politics was a way to engage
with the public and promote party loyalty.
Although they recognized the importance of honoring national holidays, Quids were
wary of large, alcohol-infused rallies and questioned their value. A correspondent to the
Philadelphia Evening Post writing under the pseudonym “A Philadelphian” in 1804 expressed
the Quid vision of celebratory politics. He agreed that Americans should express their gratitude
for events such as the acquisition of Louisiana, but he wondered what was gained from the
current style of celebrating. “[T]he labor of a whole day is in the first place lost,” he pointed out.
“[W]ere this all, it would be soon gotten over; but citizens form themselves into large companies,
dine at some tavern, spend from two to six dollars, and many of their families are the worse for
weeks by celebrating one grand holiday.” Instead of wasting money on “costly dinners and
swallowing down bottles of wine” while drinking toasts that “only can flatter weak men, but
never profit society,” A Philadelphian suggested that citizens partake in a quiet and orderly
procession capped by an oration on the blessing of being an American. At the conclusion, “let
every one go quietly to his own home, and enjoy the sweets of liberty in the circle of family.”
Finally, as a way of further demonstrating their gratitude and patriotism, “let each democratic
citizen give a dollar, to be applied for the most patriotic purposes.”576 As this passage suggests,
while Democrats embraced the ribaldry of public fêtes, Quids preferred low-key, sober
demonstrations that stressed virtue and patriotism over debauchery and disorder.
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During the first years of the schism, Quids struggled to translate their reasoned and
orderly style of popular politics into winning elections. In 1804 their top target for removal from
office, Congressman Michael Leib, narrowly won reelection. Quids took some solace in the fact
that Leib polled less than any of the other winning candidates and that the Quid candidate
outpolled Leib in Delaware County. But these facts did not change the final result. Quid
candidates in other parts of the state likewise failed to mobilize sufficient support. As a result,
Quids were forced to sit on the sidelines while the Democrats celebrated another victory. 577

Constitutional Reform
The year 1805 was pivotal for Pennsylvania politics, and the struggles underscore the
continued debate over the role of citizens in the post-Revolution of 1800 Pennsylvania. Although
Leib and the Democrats had survived the Quid onslaught the previous year, their attempts to
institute reforms were stymied by Governor McKean’s veto powers. Frustrated and convinced
that they spoke for the majority of Pennsylvanians, Democrats responded in early 1805 by
launching a campaign to call a new constitutional convention. These men claimed that the
constitution of 1790 had been a counter-revolution that had deprived the people of their right to
participate in the deliberative process. The call for a new constitutional convention, therefore,
represented the next step in Democrat’s mission to make government more responsive to the will
of the people. Quids, along with their Federalist allies, denied the need for a new convention and
charged Democrats with recklessness. The constitution, they argued, balanced liberty and order
and had led to over a decade of prosperity. During the debate over the constitution, Quids and
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Democrats once again turned to forms of political mobilization developed during the 1790s to
build support for their position and fight for their vision of political society.
On February 28, 1805, the Aurora published a long memorial addressed to members of
the legislature that urged them to take immediate steps toward calling a new constitutional
convention. The memorial, which Duane pressed his readers to sign and help distribute
throughout the state, outlined a series of “material imperfections” in the constitution that had
become apparent since its adoption in 1790. The first problem was that senators were elected
every four years, meaning that they could freely operate against the will of their constituents for
years before being recalled. “[W]e hold it as a fundamental principle of republican government,”
the memorial read, “that the agents of the people should feel at all times their responsibility to
those who have constituted them.” Annual elections, therefore, were necessary to ensure that
senators respected the will of the people. In addition, the memorial demanded drastic cuts to the
governor’s patronage powers and veto powers. Finally, it asserted that the judicial branch was
too independent and suggested that judges be regularly “bro’t to the tribunal of an election” to
ensure that they adhered to the public will.578
While Democrats saw the convention as a chance to move toward greater democracy and
freedom, Quids feared a new convention could plunge the state into anarchy. “We are fast
approaching the brink of an awful precipice—an unfathomable abyss” warned the Freeman’s
Journal.579 Quids admitted that the current constitution had problems and did not deny the right
of the people to amend or abolish the document, but argued that a new convention was
unnecessary and potentially dangerous. “Innovation, in great affairs, should be adopted with

578
579

Aurora, 28 February 1805.
Freeman’s Journal, 28 February 1805.

261

caution,” explained a Quid correspondent, “and their direct and relative consequences be duly
considered and weighed in the balance.”580 Furthermore, Quids claimed that the memorial
calling for a convention had not originated from the people but was the work of Duane and his
minions.581 Finally, Quids questioned the legitimacy of relying on petitions as a way to
demonstrate that the public supported a new convention. The only way to really gauge public
opinion, they believed, was through taking “a vote of citizens at large by printed ballots, on
points properly defined.”582 To their way of thinking, elections remained the only acceptable way
for the people to express their will.
Despite questioning the legitimacy of petitions as a vehicle for expressing public will,
Quids recognized the efficacy of this tool in political mobilization and began circulating a
counter-memorial. The Quid petition opened with the statement that the constitution was the
work of Pennsylvanian’s “wisest and best Citizens” and that the public should trust that they
developed the best possible constitution. Despite what some may say, the petition continued, the
constitution “exhibits nothing essentially defective in its theory” and has protected “civil liberty
and public order” since its inception. The proposed changes were “calculated to destroy the
political symmetry” by empowering the House of Representatives at the expense of the Senate,
Governor, and Judiciary. Moreover, calling a convention would “generate licentiousness and
anarchy” and inevitably “agitate, inflame, and may fatally divide the people.”583
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Quids took other steps to counter the Democratic effort to call a new convention as well.
Similar to what Republicans in the late 1790s had done, Quids organized a new voluntary
society, “The Society of Constitutional Republicans,” to help direct the mobilization effort
against the Democratic effort to call a new convention. In contrast to existing voluntary societies
such as the Tammany Society, however, the Quid organization formed explicitly for political
purposes. The Society of Constitutional Republicans’ constitution stated that the society’s
mission was “To preserve and perpetuate the principles of A DEMOCRACY which recognizes
the PEOPLE, as the legitimate sources of all the powers of Government” and “to maintain and
defend THE CONSTITUTION of the Union, and of the STATE.” The society’s aim was,
therefore, to protect the constitution and perpetuate Quid’s vision of democracy as a
representative government based on popular sovereignty where the people expressed their will
through the ballot and deferred to their elected officials. To achieve these goals, the society
established a correspondence committee and set regular times for members to gather and discuss
strategy. 584
Democrats initially condemned the Society of Constitutional Republicans and warned
that the new “self-created club” planned to deprive the people of their right to call a
convention.585 Their outrage did not, however, prevent them from establishing their own purely
political voluntary society. At one of the largest public meetings in years, Democrats adopted
resolutions creating the “Society of Friends of the People.” The constitution stated that the
society was organized in response to an effort to prevent the people from exercising their

Freeman’s Journal, 15 March 1805; Albrecht Koschnik, “Let A Common Interest Bind Us Together:”
Associations, Partisanship, and Culture in Philadelphia, 1775-1840 (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
2007), 66-69.
585
Aurora, 29 Mach 1805.
584

263

sovereignty. Like the Quid organization, the Society of Friends of the People created committees
to communicate with likeminded men across the state and called on other communities to form
their own societies.586
While the two voluntary societies gathered signatures, a tide of opinion articles flooded
the newspapers, as both Quids and Democrats honed their ability to articulate their understanding
of democracy and their views on the proper role of citizens. Democratic writers became more
vehement in their commitment to the principle of majority rule and passionately defended the
people’s right to engage in the deliberative process. The people, according to Democrats, might
make occasional mistakes but they would always be the best guardians of liberty. As “Cato,” a
correspondent in the Aurora, wrote, “it is a correct maxim, that the will of the people ought to
rule, and that the will of a majority is the will of the people. Therefore, every part of a
constitution, which prevents the will of the people, from becoming supreme law . . . is unjust,
and dangerous and ought to be abolished.”587 In the process of arguing in favor of a new
convention, Democrat writers also defended the existence of political parties and argued that it
was “the duty of every Republican to aid in correcting the aristocratic tendencies of the
constitution.”588
In response to Quid charges that these changes would spell an end to law and order,
Democrats pointed out that the British said the same thing about reforms urged by the colonists
in 1775 and Federalists said the same thing about the election of Jefferson in 1800. What horrible
consequences followed these events? Democrats thus portrayed the call for a convention as part
of a larger historical march toward greater freedom and equality. They saw themselves as the
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standard-bearers of progress and denounced anyone who stood in their way as a tory or
aristocrat. The rich, wealthy, and ambitious, they argued, would always complain and try to
induce fear by denouncing reformers as “jacobins” and “disorganizers” but history had proven
them wrong.589
Quids countered with a different version of history that stressed the need for stability and
moderation. According to Quid writers, a healthy republic was a stable republic and a strong,
independent, judiciary was one of the best safeguards against tyranny of the few and the many.
While they agreed with Democrats that all power flowed from the people, Quids believed the
people were fallible. As one Quid explained, “Despots deprive the people of liberty, under the
doctrine that man is a restless violent animal, always inclined to subvert order. Jacobins destroy
regular government by avowing, that the people are always actuated by the true knowledge of
their own interest—and that their own delegated authorities are secret enemies. Republicans
know that human nature is intrinsically good, but liable to error and passion.”590 Quids, therefore,
viewed Democrats as the logical successors of the Jacobins in France and not the Patriots in 1775
or Republicans in 1800. To save the county from these reincarnated Jacobins, Quids called for a
“union of honest men.” This phrase, “a union of honest men”—a reference to a toast given by
Aaron Burr at a Federalist dinner— appeared often in Quid writings during this time period and
underscored Quids’ desire to move beyond the existing political parties. 591
Between late February and mid-April, the legislature received a total of 169 petitions
with 10,893 signatures addressing the matter of calling a convention. Of those, Democrats and
proponents of the convention delivered 79 petitions with 4,944 names and opponents of the
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convention sent in 90 remonstrances with 5,949 signatures. Most of the signatures against the
convention came from the city and county of Philadelphia and from areas that tended to vote
Federalist, while the support for the convention came from across the state and from regions that
typically elected Republicans.592 The “union of honest men,” appeared to have outflanked the
Democrats. Despite the fact that a majority of the petitions opposed a convention, the
Democratic-controlled legislature still passed a resolution stating that “no man, or generation of
men, is authorised [sp] to say to their successors, that we have arrived at the acme of perfection
in any human institution, beyond which it is impossible for you to pass” and argued that the
constitution required amendment. The legislature, however, stopped short of calling a convention
and concluded that not enough time had passed “for the majority of the people fully to express
their opinion on this very interesting subject.” They suggested that the next legislature return to
the issue once the people had had more time to deliberate the question.593 In short, Democrats
were not ready to concede defeat.

Election of 1805
In the midst of the debate over whether to call a convention, Pennsylvanians began to
turn their attention toward the upcoming gubernatorial election. McKean had won reelection in
1803 by a landslide, but his decision to veto Democratic legislation and his aristocratic
tendencies had earned him the ire of Democrats. His reputation was further damaged in early
1805 when the Aurora printed an account of a meeting between McKean and two Democratic
members of the state legislature. Although McKean’s version of the incident, which was later
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printed, differed from the original Aurora piece, McKean admitted that he had lost his temper
and referred to those who supported the convention as a “set of clodpoles [clodhoppers], and
ignoramuses.”594 The outburst fit the Democratic narrative that McKean was aloof and
condescending toward common people and Democrats embraced the term “clodhopper” as a sign
of their humble roots.595 But while the “clodhopper affair” helped guarantee that Democrats
would challenge McKean’s re-election, both Quids and Democrats understood that the election
would turn on the question of the convention.
At a legislative caucus on April 1, 1805, Democrats nominated speaker of the state House
of Representatives Simon Snyder as their candidate for governor. Snyder’s background stood in
stark contrast to McKean’s privileged upbringing. The Democratic candidate came from humble
beginnings and had worked his way up to become one of the most influential political figures in
the state. He was also of German descent and therefore popular with the large numbers of
German voters in the state.596 Duane and Leib, however, greeted the nomination coolly and,
while they agreed to abide by the party’s decision, they were not fully satisfied and rumors
circulated that Leib tried to undermine Snyder’s nomination. Nothing came of these whispers in
1805, but they did foreshadow future problems.597
Shortly after the Democratic caucus nominated Snyder, a group of Quid legislators and a
few Federalists formally nominated McKean.598 From the outset, Quids sought to make the
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election about the constitution. Not only did they believe that the majority of Pennsylvanians
opposed the convention, but focusing on the constitution also gave cover to Federalists who
would otherwise not vote for McKean. On April 15, therefore, the Society of Constitutional
Republicans resolved to promote the election of representatives “selected from such of the
democratic-republican citizens of the state, as are opposed to the call of a convention” and
endorsed McKean. The society praised McKean’s previous service to the country and applauded
his “wisdom, energy, and fidelity” and concluded that the governor had earned another term in
office.599 Over the next few months, meetings across the state echoed these sentiments. Blockely
and Kingsessing townships in Philadelphia County, for example, adopted a resolution stating
that, “We deem it necessary for all those who wish to preserve the present constitution, to unite
in supporting Thomas M’Kean; for should the opposition candidate succeed, it will most
inevitably be destroyed.”600As had become customary, these gatherings would also nominate
men to serve on committees of correspondence to communicate and coordinate with other
groups. In some areas Quids could use existing Republican standing committees while in regions
McKean’s supporters created new ones. In both cases the meetings welcomed Federalist
participants.601
Democrats organized meetings throughout the state as well. Firmly committed to
constitutional reform and confident that they spoke for the people, these men initially welcomed
the Quids’ attempt to make the election about the constitution and call for a convention. Like
their rivals, Democrats used gatherings to adopt resolutions that explicitly linked Snyder’s
election to the convention question. Participants at a meeting in Northumberland agreed to
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“mutually pledge ourselves . . . to use our best exertions to promote the election of Simon Snyder
for governor of this commonwealth at the next election, and also the call of a convention.”602
Again like the Quids, Democrats relied on Republican committees where they could and, in at
least one instance, overthrew an existing committee that favored McKean.603 Additionally,
Democrats established committees of “vigilance” tasked with drumming up support for Snyder
and the convention movement.604
During the summer of 1805, the growing animosity between Quids and Democrats
spilled into the established Republican voluntary societies. Leib, Duane, and their Democratic
allies began to purge Quids and anyone who had opposed the call for a convention from the
Tammany Society. Quids retailed by denouncing the organization. The Freeman’s Journal
claimed that the original goals of the society had been achieved through the election of McKean
and Jefferson and asserted that the organization had become a “scourge of the people” that
existed only for the purpose of “individual aggrandizement.”605 A similar rupture occurred in the
militia when Democratic companies refused to salute Governor McKean as part of the annual
Independence Day celebrations. Quids viewed the refusal as a sign of Democratic intransigence
and evidence of the threat they posed to law and order. Democrats retorted that, as an
independent and self-governing institution, the volunteer units were not required to salute
McKean. Despite the Quids’ outcry, most of the militia ended up siding with the Democrats and,
rather than acknowledge the Governor, the soldiers used the Fourth of July as an opportunity to
promote Snyder’s candidacy. They also mocked McKean with toasts such as, “Clodhoppers,
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stumbling blocks in the way of his excellency—May they teach him good manners and decorum
at the next election.”606
Blocked from the largest and most influential voluntary societies, Quid supporters of
McKean relied on print to build support and counter Democratic accusations. According to one
historian, thirty out of forty of the state’s newspapers endorsed McKean.607 The Freeman’s
Journal remained the primary Quid newspaper and carried a steady stream of articles
condemning Duane and Leib as revolutionists. One of the most widely distributed Quid piece of
campaign literature was a pamphlet containing a speech given by Dallas on June 10, 1805. The
Society of Constitutional Republicans printed more than 25,000 copies of the pamphlet in both
German and English and had them dispersed throughout the state.608 The speech encapsulated the
Quid view of the election and of what was at stake. In it, Dallas traced the rise of the Republican
Party and argued that it was “a principle of concert and conciliation” that enabled Republicans to
triumph over Federalists. Although the party had succeeded in saving the republic from the
Federalists and could rest assured that their liberty was safe in the hands of Republicans, he
warned that “a small but active COMBINATION OF MALCONTENTS” threatened to
undermine the party’s achievements. The vast majority of Republicans understood “that their
position did not afford a view of the whole of the political ground” and they were therefore
happy to defer policy decisions to elected officials. The malcontents, however, refused to abide
by the will of the majority and sought to force their wishes on the party.
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Dallas urged his fellow citizens to ignore these “men deranged by Utopian theories” and
to trust the wisdom of those who came before. Despite what the malcontents claimed, he asserted
that Pennsylvania had thrived under McKean and “no material change can be projected, without
involving the hazard of material injury.” Dallas concluded that it was “time, to evince to the
world, that a Democratic Republic, can enjoy energy without tyranny, and Liberty without
anarchy.”609 The election represented a “struggle, in which the very character and principles of a
republican government are implicated” and would determine whether reason or passion would
govern.610
The Democratic press responded with a focus on the larger issues of the constitution and
the principle of majority rule. Some Democratic writers even began to question the legitimacy of
constitutions in general.611 A noticeable shift, however, occurred in Democratic rhetoric as
election day drew closer. Writers retreated from the question of a convention and focused their
criticism on McKean. A broadside published late in the campaign suggested that the real
problem with the government may not have been the constitution or the judiciary but how
McKean used these instruments of power. “Indeed, had the present governor been regardful of
the public will; had he not scorned the public sentiment and scoffed at the people; had he not
considered himself monarch of the state . . . the constitution might have remained without
analysis, and the people undisturbed under its administration.”612 Electing someone other than
McKean, they implied, might render the convention question moot.
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This rhetorical shift indicates a growing recognition among Democrats that the majority
of the public supported the constitution. The Democrats’ decision to abandon the convention as a
campaign issue became even more apparent during the final weeks before the election. At a
special meeting of the Society of the Friends of the People held two weeks before election day,
members adopted resolutions stating that it was “the opinion of this society, That the two
questions now before the public, the choice of a governor for the next three years, and the call of
a convention to amend the constitution, are independent of each other, and stand upon distinct
ground.”613 This shift does not mean that Democrats such as Leib and Duane stopped supporting
fundamental changes to the constitution. Instead, the attempt to distance Snyder’s election from
the convention indicates that Democrats realized they were fighting a losing battle. Duane and
Leib had underestimated the public’s support for the established institutions and misread popular
outrage with McKean as evidence that a majority of Pennsylvanians wanted more direct control
over the deliberative process.
Quids, however, did not retreat from the question of the convention, and in the final days
of the campaign sent out a stream of campaign literature that urged voters to mobilize to save the
constitution. An address from Bucks County Society of Constitutional Republicans issued the
day before the election pleaded with readers not to be fooled by Democrats who said the election
had nothing to do with the constitution. The “malcontents” would stop at nothing, they claimed,
and were simply biding their time. Pennsylvanians may have already demonstrated their
opposition to the convention through petitions, but the results of the election would carry more
weight. “A fair election, though not perfect, is the most perfect expression of public will,” Quids
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asserted. 614 By voting for McKean citizens could clearly demonstrate their support for the
constitution.
In the waning days of the campaign, Quids also formalized their partnership with
Federalists. Quid leaders including Dallas and Coxe announced in mid-September that they “had
disregarded what may now be called but shades of difference in political opinion” and introduced
a ticket with a mix of Republicans and well-known Federalists such as William Lewis and Levi
Hollingsworth.615 Quids and Federalists had been working together against the Democrats for
months, but the joint-ticket represented the first formal union. Although some Federalists had
trepidation about joining forces with former enemies and agreeing to vote for a man who had
once denounced them as tories, most were concerned enough about the prospects of a
Democratic governor that they accepted the union.616 Quids and Federalists across the state
followed the same course and adopted combined tickets. The barrage of Quid/Federalist tickets
led one editor to conclude that “there is no longer any third party” because the two had become
“so completely amalgamated.”617
Democrats pounced on the public union of Federalists and Quids as further proof of how
far the Quids had strayed from the principles of the Republican Party. No real Republican could
possibly vote for a Federalist, they claimed. On election day, the Aurora printed a special halfpage advertisement comparing Snyder, the “uniform republican,” with McKean, “an apostate
from principle.” Duane asked readers to recall the Federalists of 1799, 1800, and 1801 and to
reflect on the terrors associated with the Adams’s administration. A McKean victory, he
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threatened, would result in similar outcomes. “TODAY,” he cried, “you are to meet your old and
uniform political opponents, the federalists who are supported by a mongrel faction destitute of
all principle.” The final pitch to Democrats was that voters needed to mobilize to defense of the
Republican Party.618
A total of 82,866 Pennsylvanians, or nearly 55 percent of the state’s eligible voters, cast a
ballot on election day. The heated contest between Quids/Federalists and Democrats had driven a
record number of people to the polls, and the results reveal a closely contested race. McKean
received 43,674 votes (53 percent) while Snyder garnered 38,924 (47 percent).619 McKean won
in every county that tended to vote for Federalists and in most of the counties where the two
parties split evenly, while Snyder took the areas that usually sided with Republican candidates.
With a few exceptions, however, both candidates did well across the state, an indication of how
divided Pennsylvanians were over the election.
The Quid view of society and version of democracy had triumphed, and the constitution
appeared safe. The checks on popular passions would remain in place, and the people would
continue to engage in the deliberative process through elections. The victory, however, was
incomplete. The “union of honest men” may have triumphed but, as the election results reveal,
Quids held a tenuous majority and McKean owed his election primarily to Federalists. Even
Alberta Gallatin, a prominent Quid, admitted that the Democrats had won more than two-thirds
of the Republican vote and that McKean owed his election to the Federalists.620 The decision to
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join publically with Federalists had yielded short-term results but, as soon became apparent, the
embrace proved to be a kiss of death.

Decline of Quids and Democratic Divisions, 1806-1807
The political landscape in Pennsylvania shifted once again in the years following
McKean’s narrow victory in 1805. Having secured the governor’s reelection and defended the
constitution, Quid leaders initially hoped to reunite with their Democratic opponents under the
Republican banner. Democrats, however, were not ready to welcome the Quids back. Instead,
they continued to attack McKean and his Quid allies. Making matters worse for Quids, the
Federalist Party began to reemerge at the national level, and Quids were put in the uncomfortable
position of being allied with men who attacked President Jefferson. Democrats faced their own
problems, however. The Democratic coalition began to fracture as members debated what to
focus on following McKean’s reelection: some Democrats wanted to continue to push for
reforms while others believed that the party needed to shift its focus to elections. In the midst of
the turmoil, both Quids and Democrats were forced once again to revisit their approaches toward
political mobilization and to reconsider their views on the role of citizens.
In November 1805, following McKean’s reelection, the Society of the Constitutional
Republicans gathered and adopted an address stating that the society had succeeded in its
mission of protecting the constitution and, as a result, would soon dissolve. The address also
urged members to rejoin their Republican allies who had been deluded and led astray by a
“faction” during the last election and warned against heeding the siren song of some Federalists.
Dallas and his allies understood that reconciliation with the Democrats might be difficult as long
as Leib and Duane controlled the party, but the dissolution of the Constitutional Republican
275

society represented an olive branch to Democrats. Dallas, George Logan, and many of the other
Quids had been fighting Federalists for decades and, while circumstances may have necessitated
an occasional need to form a joint ticket with Federalists, they were not prepared to join
permanently with their adversaries.621
Democrats did not welcome the Quids back. Duane laughed at the idea of reunion and
called it an “extraordinary and ludicrous” idea. Why, he wondered, would Democrats want to
cooperate with men who referred to Democrats as “jacobins” and spread rumors that they
planned to plunder farms and eliminate private property? 622 A few correspondents in the Aurora
suggested that there might be room in the party for honest Quids who had been fooled by Dallas,
but most agreed that the Quid “leaders must fall into the pit they dug for the republican party.”623
The formal cooperation with Federalists had, according to Duane, exposed Dallas and the Quid
leaders as “naked federalists.”624 Quids had, after all, admitted themselves that only a “shade of
difference” existed between Federalists and Quids.625
Unable to rejoin the Democrats, Quids were forced to continue their cooperation with
Federalists. The Quid alliance with Federalists, however, became more complicated and
problematic following the resurgence of Federalists at the national level. National issues had, for
the most part, remained of secondary importance for Pennsylvanians since Jefferson’s election.
The collapse of the Federalist Party had left Republicans in firm control of the federal
government, which meant that Pennsylvanians could focus on state issues. But, with the prospect
of war looming and the passage of the controversial Embargo Act in 1807, national issues
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assumed paramount importance. Federalists in Pennsylvania and at the national level denounced
Jefferson’s foreign policy and the Embargo Act and Federalists throughout the state who had
remained on the sidelines for years resurfaced and joined the chorus of criticism. This Federalist
revival put Quids in an awkward position. Quids had always maintained that they were
Republicans and the real heirs to the party that had elected Jefferson. They had been willing to
work with Federalists against a common enemy when Federalists had remained quiet, but now
that Federalists were loudly attacking Jefferson and his foreign policy, Quids faced a dilemma.
They could continue to cooperate with Federalists and in the process implicitly work against
Jefferson and the national Republican Party, or they could abandon the Federalists and try again
to rejoin the Democrats. Neither option looked appealing. Both choices would require the
sacrifice of principle—either the rebuke of the Republican Party, which many Quids had helped
build, or the acceptance of Democratic views on the role of citizens.
While Quids deliberated on which course to take, a debate began within the Democratic
Party. Despite failing to unseat McKean, Democrats had initially remained unified and
committed to democratic reforms. They continued to press for reforms to make the judiciary
more responsive to the people’s will and moved to impeach Governor McKean. As the party
began preparations for the next gubernatorial election, however, tensions emerged between the
more radical wing led by Duane and Leib who wanted a new candidate and a more moderate
group united in selecting Simon Snyder as the party’s nominee again. Although some historians
portray the intraparty debate as primarily a clash of personalities and just a question of who
would lead the party, the struggle stemmed from a fundamental disagreement over approaches to
political mobilization and whether Democrats should continue to press for reforms or to accept
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the election of 1805 as a referendum on dramatic change and make winning elections the
priority.626
The genesis of the split occurred in 1807 with the founding of the Democratic Press, a
new Democratic paper in Philadelphia. Edited by John Binns, a staunch Democrat who had
previously published the Northumberland Argus, the paper initially worked in tandem with
Duane’s Aurora. Duane even assisted Binns in finding subscribers and, in conjunction with the
“grand sachem” Leib, invited Binns to give the ceremonial “long talk” at the annual Tammany
Society celebration in May.627 Unity, however, proved elusive.
In June 1807 a pamphlet entitled “A Narrative of Facts Relative to the Conduct of Some
of the Members of the Legislature” began to circulate. Purportedly written by a committee of
Democratic members of the legislature, the pamphlet accused Leib of behaving like a dictator
and promoting his own agenda at the expense of the party as a whole. The effort to impeach
McKean, it claimed, was an attempt “to re-establish his popularity.” The pamphlet detailed
Leib’s maneuverings during the legislature’s election of a new federal senator in January 1807
and blamed Leib for costing Democrats the election. It described the Democratic Party as the
great bulwark against tyranny and warned that Leib’s machinations threatened to undermine the
organization. “The affairs of our party are at a crisis,” it concluded, “we must either get rid of
this man or the party will fall.”628 Leib did not publically respond to the accusations and Duane
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quickly denounced the pamphlet and urged readers to not be swayed by the salacious
accusations. The pamphlet, however, proved to be the opening salvos of a war between wings of
the Democratic Party.629
In the latter half of 1807, the Democratic Press emerged as an advocate for a restrained
and moderate version of the Democratic Party characterized by an emphasis on party
organization and a focus on winning elections. Binns’ decision to take the Democratic Press in a
new direction and break with Duane and his allies first became apparent when the paper came
out in favor of dividing Philadelphia County into districts as opposed to using a single countywide meeting to nominate candidates for the fall elections. Echoing the arguments Quids had
used against the county-wide meeting in 1804, a series of articles in the Democratic Press and
signed by “A Citizen of the Northern Liberties” defended districts as the most effective,
organized, and practical method of conducting county business. Not only did the size of the
county make it impractical for all interested citizens to attend a single meeting, the author
claimed, but the current practice of gathering in Northern Liberties, the epicenter of Leib and
Duane’s popularity, invited chicanery and enabled a small number of men to dictate the
proceedings. Open and fair nominations, he argued, were crucial to the party’s future. “THE
POWER OF NOMINATION IS THE POLITICAL LEVER UPON WHICH DEPENDS THE
RISE OR FALL OF PARTIES,” he exclaimed. Nominations were particularly important because
they served as a test of political loyalty. Determining whether a partisan would acquiesce to the
will of the majority and back the nominated candidate, regardless of who they had originally
supported, enabled the party to eliminate men who were using the organization for selfish ends.
It was, therefore, imperative that the legitimacy of the nomination process be unimpeachable.
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Notably, in contrast to the Quid writers who defended districts, this author viewed political
parties as a positive and necessary force. Thus, while this wing of the Democratic Party may
have adopted Quid positions, crucial differences between the moderate Democrats and the Quids
remained.630
In addition to the call for districts, the Democratic Press began printing a series of letters
addressed to Leib. Signed by “Veritas,” the letters built on accusations made in the pamphlet and
accused Leib of demagoguery. Veritas prefaced his letters by acknowledging that his attack was
like “David against Goliath” and that he understood that, when the dust settled, one of them
would slip “into political insignificance.” Nevertheless, in subtle jab at Duane, Veritas promised
to eschew personal insults and hortatory rhetoric used by many writers and to look only at Leib’s
political conduct. The public, he suggested, should soberly deliberate on the facts presented in
the letters. “A calm investigation, and temperate discussion will make manifest truth.” Veritas
detailed Leib’s actions as a member of Congress, highlighting the instances where Leib acted
contrary to the will of most Democrats. In addition to rehashing some of the charges made in the
previously published pamphlet, Veritas accused Leib of secretly working to prevent the
nomination of Snyder in 1805 and then of trying to block the selection of Snyder as Speaker of
the House in 1806. In light of this evidence Veritas concluded that “the name of Leib, like of
Arnold, will be synonimous [sp] with Treachery and Treason.631
Through these acts, Binns and his correspondents in the Democratic Press declared their
independence from Leib and Duane. This schism emerged from contrasting approaches to
political mobilization. While both groups shared the same goal of creating a more democratic
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society, they disagreed over how to achieve these reforms. Writers in the Democratic Press
asserted that the best way to institute reforms was the election of new men, not a constitutional
convention. Furthermore, they believed that Duane’s and Leib’s radicalism and uncompromising
attitudes had cost Snyder the election. To prevent a similar outcome in 1808, these Democrats
concluded, the party had to bring Quids back into the fold. This approach might come at the
expense of engaging the public directly in the process, but such concessions were necessary to
build a broad coalition. In essence, the opponents of Duane and Leib sought to return to the
strategy that Republicans had employed in 1799 and 1800.
Not surprisingly given their record of dealing with dissenters, Duane and Leib denounced
Binns and the men who sought to steer the party in a different direction. The two men still
controlled much of the party organization and quickly mobilized their supporters. The Tammany
Society as well as from the Society of the Friends of the People banned Bins. Democratic
meetings adopted resolutions condemning him and the organizers of the district meetings. The
move to call districts, according to one assembly of Democrats, stemmed from a desire to
“distract and disorganize the democratic interest, or to gratify personal hatred and malice, or to
favor the ambitious views of a certain set of individuals.”632 Real Democrats, another group
declared, believed that “whenever the people can deliberate for themselves, they ought never to
delegate their authority.”633 In addition to criticizing the promoters of district meetings,
Democratic gatherings adopted statements praising Leib and thanking him for his tireless work
on behalf of the people.634
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Duane meanwhile used the Aurora as a platform to portray Binns and his allies as
traitors and enemies of the people. Calling them “Quadroons,”635 Duane wrote that “they are
only the successors in fact and form of the third party or quids” and secretly worked with
Federalists. Moreover, Duane accused the Quadroons of plotting to elect Dallas as governor.
According to Duane, a lust for power and prestige drove these pretend friends of the people to
break with the party.636
But, while Duane and Leib called Binns and the Democratic Press a minority faction and
traitors to the cause, the 1807 election results presented a different story. The voters of
Philadelphia City rebuked Duane’s attempt to win a seat in the state legislature. Leib, running in
Philadelphia County, narrowly won his election but received the least number of votes of the
winning candidates, a sign of his diminishing popularity. Despite what Leib and Duane may have
claimed, the moderate Democratic wing appeared to be in the ascendency.

Election of 1808
The status of the parties in Pennsylvania remained uncertain as the state geared up for the
gubernatorial election of 1808. With McKean barred from seeking reelection, the field appeared
wide open. Each of state’s political groups vying for power, however, faced serious obstacles.
The Quid/Federalist coalition that had elected McKean in 1805 was becoming difficult to
maintain as a rejuvenated national Federalist Party began denouncing Jeffersonian foreign
policy. Federalists, moreover, did not appear interested in playing a supportive role this time and
believed that, in return for backing McKean in 1805, Quids should unite behind a Federalist in
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1808. Quids, however, were reluctant to abandon the Republican Party. Democrats, meanwhile,
remained embroiled in an internal debate over strategies for achieving reform. Snyder stood as
the obvious choice of candidate for the party, but concerns remained that the Leib and Duane
faction might attempt to torpedo his candidacy. The campaign proved to be a political furnace
that helped fuse the factions of the Democratic Party and distill the party’s views on the role of
citizens, political mobilization, and meaning of democracy.
The nomination process started ominously for Democrats. In the fall of 1807, a gathering
of Philadelphia Democrats adopted resolutions criticizing the use of a legislative caucus to select
the party’s nominees. Instead, the gathering suggested that Democrats in each county select
delegates to a statewide convention. This new method, the meeting claimed, would ensure that
communities without a Democratic representative could still participate.637 Duane defended the
proposals and argued that they would lead to a more democratic process but the call was also an
obvious attempt by the Duane and Leib faction to assert control over the nomination process and
to challenge the selection of Snyder, who had the support of the majority of the state legislators.
Snyder’s supporters recognized the threat and organized meetings throughout the state that
condemned the idea of a convention and voiced faith in the legislative caucus. Duane continued
to push for a convention, but it quickly became clear he was in the minority.638
At a caucus in early January 1808, Democrats reached a compromise: a mixed-legislative
caucus. Regions that did not have a Democratic representative were allowed to send a delegate to
engage in the process. Democrats from across the state would, therefore, be able to participate. In
another concession to the Duane-Leib faction, the caucus suggested that local meetings provide
637
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instructions to their representatives. Citizens could, therefore, play a more active role in the
process, although at least one Democratic gathering concluded, after a vigorous debate, that
everyone knew Snyder would be nominated and that “entering into a specific resolution to
instruct members would shew [sp] a suspicion of their republican firmness and integrity.”639 On
the surface, at least, the party appeared to be coalescing, and at the mixed caucus in early March
the Democratic Party unanimously endorsed Snyder for governor. Leib served as secretary of the
gathering while his close friend Thomas Leiper acted as chair. Duane, meanwhile, was selected
to be on the state committee to oversee the campaign.640
As the Democrats rallied around Snyder, Federalists and Quids tried to work through
their differences. Coming into the election, Quids backed John Spayd, a prominent judge, while
Federalists tended to support James Ross, a lawyer and former Senator who had run against
McKean in 1799 and 1802. Quids and Federalists met twice in an attempt to resolve their
differences, but neither group would abandon their preferred candidate. Quids refused to vote for
a man so intimately tied to the Federalist Party, and Federalists were “resolved not to be under
the direction of the Quids” any longer. As a result, the two groups nominated their respective
candidates.641
With the candidates finalized, the parties began organizing for the campaign.
Theoretically, Snyder’s candidacy would be overseen by a committee appointed during the
Democratic caucus. But, in a sign of the lingering tensions within the party, Snyder’s supporters
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also set up their own organization. Before the caucus had officially selected Snyder, Binns and
his allies formed the “Society of Independent Democrats” to provide a home for Democrats
disenchanted with Duane and Leib. Then, in May, they established the “Association of Friends
of Democracy and Simon Snyder” for the express purpose of electing Snyder.642 Both societies
formed committees of correspondence and urged Democrats in other parts of the state to found
their own groups. The new societies would enable Snyder’s supporters to control the tenor of the
campaign and, regardless of what Leib and Duane wanted, keep the focus on the election and
party unity and not any democratic reforms. Duane denounced the new societies and refused to
carry accounts of their meetings. Instead he printed information from the regular state
committee, which Binns had been ignoring, along with the proceedings of the standard voluntary
societies such as the Tammany Society.643
While Democrats suffered from an abundance of electioneering, Quids and Federalists
struggled to build any sort of campaign structure. Instead of forming a specific group to promote
Spayd’s election, Quids relied on the Society of Constitutional Republicans to publish addresses
and coordinate activities. The organization, however, lacked the same vigor as their Democratic
counterparts, and Spayd’s campaign never really got off the ground. Federalists did not create a
new voluntary society either, but they did appoint committees of correspondence and organize
meetings throughout the state. Somewhat controversially, Ross also undertook some
electioneering himself during the early stages of the campaign. For the most part, however,
Federalists remained uncomfortable with the type of popular politics and electioneering practiced
by Democrats.644
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Election coverage dominated the newspapers months before anyone went to the polls. On
the Democratic side, the Democratic Press and the Aurora remained the most prominent papers.
As early as June, both Binns and Duane dedicated multiple columns to discussing the upcoming
contest. But, while both papers defended Snyder, the way they approached electioneering
differed in substance and style. The Democratic Press only published the accounts of the new
voluntary societies. These organizations stressed Snyder’s popularity and urged that all
Republicans unite. An Address from the Friends of Democracy and Simon Snyder, for example,
described Snyder as “a lover of our political institutions . . . [and] an open and firm friend to the
constitution of this state.”645 Binns also carried a number of articles that targeted the Quid vote
by stressing Snyder’s moderation. “A Constitutional Republican” wrote a series of open letters to
the Quids urging them to support Snyder. Professing to be “a zealous friend of Mr. Madison and
the administration of Mr. Jefferson,” the author claimed to be a firm defender of the state
constitution and to have voted for McKean in the previous election. He had, however, concluded
that while Spayd was a good man, Snyder offered the only real hope for defeating Ross and the
Federalists. Moreover, he asserted that the question of a change to the constitution “has been
totally abandoned” by Snyder and his friends because the election of 1805 had demonstrated that
the public did not support a convention.646 Other pieces suggested that “many honest” men
became Quids and were forced into the hands of the Federalists by rogue Democrats. Real
Democrats “never approved of this system of driving men from their party” and would welcome
any Quid back.647
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Duane struck a different chord in the Aurora. In keeping with his previous journalistic
style, he relied heavily on personal attacks against Ross and reveled in one particular incident in
which Ross purportedly used nefarious means to steal his house in Pittsburgh from a poor
unsuspecting widow.648 Duane also gave space to the Democratic committee tasked with
overseeing Snyder’s election. In stark contrast to the addresses carried in the Democratic Press,
the Democratic committee initially suggested that the election revolved around the question of
changing the constitution. In June, the committee claimed that the constitution violated the first
principle of a republican government that “the will of the majority ought to govern.” The most
egregious example, they asserted, was the office of the governor. “Though not actually a
monarch, he has qualified monarchical powers, such as are dangerous to our rights . . . . If we are
competent to govern ourselves, then ought no constitutional power to exist in any one man,
which implies an incapacity in the people for self government.”649 Considering that Leib and
Duane served on the committee that drafted the address, the focus on the constitution was
unsurprising. The Aurora had never stopped attacking the constitution and regularly likened
McKean to a monarch. Nevertheless, the address met with a cool reception, and over the next
few months the question of a convention faded from the pages of the Aurora. Snyder and his
allies wanted the focus on party unity and on winning the election, not on the constitution or
fundamental democratic reforms.650
Democrats’ moderation did not prevent the Federalist press from portraying Snyder as a
radical. Much of the Federalist strategy hinged on winning the Quid vote. By painting Snyder as
a tool of the radical wing of the Democrats, Federalists hoped that Quids would overcome their
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trepidation about voting for Ross. Federalists denounced Snyder as a “violent and intemperate
party man” who “tolerates neither the principles, nor character of his opponents.” If elected, they
claimed, he would punish and persecute “the whole body of the Quids and Federalists.”651 “He
who votes for Simon Snyder,” warned one Federalist, “votes in fact, and in truth, for Leib,
Duane, and Binns.”652 Other writers urged readers not to trust Democratic lies and claimed that
Snyder planned to gut the constitution. In contrast, Federalists presented Ross as a moderate who
would faithfully uphold the constitution.653
With both sides courting their vote, Quids faced a tough decision. By the summer,
Spayd’s candidacy was clearly a failure. Although a few meetings continued to express their
support for Spayd right up to the election, most Quids recognized that their choice of candidate
would be either Ross, a Federalist who many of them had campaigned against in 1799, or
Snyder, whom they had vehemently opposed in 1805. The journey of the Freeman’s Journal
illustrates the difficulties Quids faced. Founded as the primary mouthpiece for the growing Quid
opposition, the paper welcomed news of Spayd’s nomination as a way to prevent the election of
Snyder. Confidence in Spayd was, however, short-lived, and in May the paper announced that
Quids would be supporting someone else. Just who that someone else was remained ambiguous
but, as the summer progressed, editor McCorkle indicated that Ross was the candidate of choice.
Completing its transformation into a Federalist paper, the Freeman’s Journal also began
criticizing Jefferson’s foreign policy and the embargo.654 The decision to embrace Federalism
did not sit well with many of the Philadelphia Quids. In August, a meeting of Quids resolved that
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they would “not support JAMES ROSS for governor, because we believe him hostile to the
Constitution of the United States, and to the equal rights of the people.” Those gathered also
declared that they “view with concern and decided disapprobation” the Freeman’s Journal’s
endorsement of Ross.655 McCorkle responded with a tirade of abuse and accused the meeting of
trying to deprive him of his freedom of speech.656
The Quid coalition dissolved following the rupture with the Freeman’s Journal. With
McCorkle firmly in the Federalist camp, Binns offered to start publishing the accounts of Quid
meetings in the Democratic Press. Stating that Quids and Democrats agreed on “nineteen out of
twenty” issues, Binns called on all Republicans to unite. It was time, he insisted, to put the
interest of the party ahead of personalities. “As individuals we may observe our personal likings
and disliking but as members of a political party they must be sacrificed to the general will.”657
Quids in Philadelphia agreed, and at a meeting in late August adopted resolutions endorsing
Snyder and acknowledging that a vote for Spayd would, in effect, be a vote for Ross. 658
Although some Quids in other parts of the state stayed loyal to Spayd and, at least according to
the Federalist press, a few Quid meetings endorsed Ross, the majority of Quids decided to return
to the Republican/Democratic fold. The willingness of prominent Quids such as Coxe to vote for
Snyder is perhaps the best evidence of the changes in the Democratic Party. By replacing Duane
and Leib’s uncompromising commitment to democratic reforms and unforgiving attitude with an
approach that focused on partisan building and elections, Snyder and his allies had managed to
rebuild the original Republican coalition.659
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A record number of Pennsylvanians voted in 1808. A total of 111,482 citizens, or
approximately 70 percent of those eligible to vote, cast a ballot. Of those who voted, about 61
percent, or 67,829, sided with Snyder; 35 percent, or 39,647, with Ross; and four percent, or
4,006, with Spayd. Snyder and the Democrats had trounced their opponents. Ross only managed
to win a majority in six counties. Spayd, who in the final days of the campaign had to fight off
rumors that he had dropped out of the race, got nearly 25 percent of the vote in Northumberland
and Berks Counties but did poorly in most areas.660
The election results highlight two important points. First, the state had reverted to the
traditional Federalist/Republican dichotomy. Snyder won in Philadelphia County and western
and central counties that had traditionally leaned Republican, while Ross won in Federalist
strongholds such as Luzerne and Delaware Counties. Quids had been effectively re-absorbed into
the two parties. Second, the election illustrates the importance of parties and political
organization. The network of partisan committees and voluntary societies, along with nearly nonstop election coverage in the media, proved remarkably successful at mobilizing voters. Similar
turnout levels would not be seen in Pennsylvania again until the Jacksonian era, a testament to
both the sophistication of the parties in 1808 and to how committed the citizenry was to
exercising their right to engage in the deliberative process.
More broadly, the election of 1808 reaffirmed the political consensus that had been
forged during the 1790s. Leib and Duane’s hope for a more democratic society where citizens
regularly engaged in the deliberative process through political parties had proven too radical for
most Pennsylvanians. Quids had not been victorious either and their vision of a post-political
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party republic was never realized. Snyder and his followers succeeded where the others did not
by returning the focus to party building and electioneering. The Republican coalition would
suffer more schisms in the future as they dealt with contentious question of federal vs. state
power, race, and gender but Snyder’s election marked the conclusion of the debate over how
citizens would engage in the deliberative process.
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Conclusion

Historians have argued that a moment existed, however fleeting, in the years immediately
before and after the Declaration of Independence when the principles of liberty and equality
flourished and the people held the reins of power. Even after this golden moment began to
dissipate, some historians contend, true democracy might have prevailed had it not been for the
emergence of organized political parties. Other scholars, however, assert that Americans slowly
gained more rights and freedoms during this time period. Far from snuffing out true democracy,
political parties opened the door for more citizens to engage in the deliberative process. Both of
these narratives oversimplify a complex and uncertain time when Americans struggled to come
to terms with the meaning of the Revolution and build a new nation. Using political mobilization
as an analytical framework, this dissertation has shown that Americans in Pennsylvania did lose
the ability to directly engage in the deliberative process in the years following the end of the
Revolutionary War. The rise of party politics, however, provided post-Revolution Americans
with a more effective way to secure change, in essence providing them with a more powerful
role in their government than had been previously possible.
In the early 1780s, when memories of life under a monarchy were still fresh, citizens
remained committed to direct participation in the deliberative process. As the dust of war settled,
however, an increasing number of men – particularly wealthy men who became known as
Federalists – worried that the country had become too democratic, so they instituted reforms that
limited the average citizen’s ability to engage in the deliberative process to the casting of a
ballot. Despite extensive efforts to rally public opinion behind this change, not everyone agreed
on the new definition of a citizens’ role. An opposition movement that began to coalesce in the
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early 1790s rejected Federalists’ vision, and its members organized forums that gave average
citizens a platform on which to express their will. Efforts to sway the state to their point of view
were unsuccessful, however, and Republicans realized they needed to win elections in order to
implement the changes they desired. In 1796, they set about establishing a statewide, multilayer
organization designed to mobilize voters in a process that required both conservative and radical
Republicans to accept compromise for the sake of electability. Harmony between party factors,
however, dissipated once the election was over, and Republicans, who held the reins of power,
faced the same dilemma that had confronted the nation in the 1780s: how to balance the need to
govern with the desire to remain true to their principles. Only when these factions – the Quids
and the Democrats – recognized that a functioning democracy required combining myriad voices
into a single vision did America’s fledgling democracy truly take shape.
Pennsylvanians unquestionably experienced new limitations on the ways they could
engage in the deliberative process between the early 1780s and 1800s. In the early 1780s the
public expressed its will and engaged directly in the deliberative process in a number of ways.
By 1808 many of these avenues had been closed or limited, and the average citizen could no
longer participate in the actual process of governance beyond the casting of a ballot.
Pennsylvanians continued to utilize some of traditional forms of political mobilization, including
town meetings, but their function changed and could not be used to participate directly in the
deliberative process. Instead, partisans often used them as a tool to mobilize supporters and
influence public opinion. The deliberative process became exclusively the domain of members
of the government. But the public did gain new powers. The rise of organized parties provided
Pennsylvanians with a powerful new tool for asserting their will. Critics of Federalists’
conception of a strong central government and a deferential/hierarchical society had been unable
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to force change through town meetings, parades, fêtes and popular uprisings. Once they accepted
the limits on the role of citizens and focused their efforts on party-building and elections,
however, Republicans successfully overthrew the Federalists. The political party succeeded
where other methods had failed and, while issues such as who holds the franchise, the balance of
power between the state and federal governments, and the issues surrounding slavery, remained
unsettled, party politics created a type of democracy that balanced the desire to create an orderly
society with the principles of the Revolution.
By exploring the trajectory of multiple forms of political mobilization, this dissertation
provides a new window into the evolving relationship between the public and their government
in the early republic. Previous scholars who have looked at political mobilization have focused
on a single type and have not considered how changing approaches in one kind related to shifts
in other kinds. Analyzing multiple forms of political mobilization reveals connections and
broader developments that are obscured when looking at only one approach. As a result, this
approach provides a more complete and nuanced understanding of the era’s political culture.
While this dissertation has focused on Pennsylvania, the same framework can be applied to other
states in an effort to understand more about the development of American democracy in other
areas. In Pennsylvania, an exploration of the connective tissue that joins people to their
government – political mobilization – shows that the early republic was both a period of
declension and of democratization. The people may have lost a direct line to the deliberative
process, but they developed a tool that gave them a more powerful voice.
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